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Malaysia's growth performance in recent years has been lacklustre. This 
research attempts to identify what institutional issues may have contributed to this 
performance. 
The research examines the impact of institutional quality on economic 
performance generally. The study proceeds at two levels: at the cross-country level and 
at the sectoral level. The research uses econometric and case study analysis to explain 
the effects of institutions on economic performance and identify the fundamental causes 
of less satisfactory economic outcomes. Recommendations for institutional reform then 
follow. 
At the cross-country level , a stochastic frontier model was used to analyse the 
relationship between institutions and economic efficiency, to rank the economic 
efficiency of Malaysia in relation to other countries over time, and to explain what the 
reasons are for changes in economic performance. Economic efficiency is defined here 
by measuring numerically a best practice frontier and evaluating the performance of 
countries included in the study ( or other economic units) relati \'._e to that best practice 
frontier. The results suggest that overall, and at the middle income level, institutions 
related to 'Government Effectiveness' have the strongest impact on economic 
efficiency. Institutions related to 'Control of Corruption' and 'Rule of Law' are 
important to economic efficiency at the middle in~ome level while institutions related to 
the 'Rule of Law' matter the most to economic efficiency at the high income level. 
Using a case study approach, the thesis investigates the links between human 
capital development and manufacturing sector output and the determinants of wage 
inequality in the manufacturing sector. A stochastic frontier model is again used, here to 
investigate the contribution of the different skills level to manufacturing sector output. 
The results demonstrate that unskilled labour contributes most significantly 
manufacturing se~tor output. Using the ' supply-demand-institutions ' framework and 
implementing it within a modified industry wage equation framework, the detenninants 
V 
of the wage gap at the industry level in the manufacturing sector were identified. 
Difference in skill levels are found to have the biggest impact on increasing the wage 
gap in Malaysia' s manufacturing sector. 
The analysis suggests three key reasons for the weak human capital development 
in Malaysia' s manufacturing sector. First, Malaysia' s education and training institutions 
have failed to produce skilled labour in sufficient numbers and _quality. Second, skills 
development through training, retraining and up-skilling in the manufacturing sector has 
not produced the required human capital with the appropriate skills. Private sector 
linkages as well as the public-private sector partnerships that are necessary for effective 
training and development are at much lower and unsatisfactory levels in Malaysia's 
manufacturing sector compared to the successful East Asian economies. Third, labour 
policies in the manufacturing sector provide incentives for firms to rely on unskilled or 
semi-skilled labour rather than use high skilled labour. The unlimited supply of 
unskilled labour and weak human c·apital formation in the manufacturing sector (that 
Malaysian policy and institutional settings allow) in turn leads to increasing wage 
inequality. The government's response to human capital development and income 
· inequality is primarily race-based, and has failed to resolve these issues. This approach 
is unlikely to be successful in addressing the middle-income trap. A move away from 
race-based institutions will be necessary to break through the middle income trap. 
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Chapter 1 Caught in a middle-income trap 
Malaysia is caught in a 'middle-income trap ' - caught between low wage 
producers and highly-skilled innovators and without a viable growth strategy. 
NEAC (201 0a, p. 14) 
Malaysia, a developing economy with historically stellar growth performance, is 
said to be caught in a middle-income trap. A survey of the indicators of Malaysia ' s 
economic fundamentals suggests that Malaysia is markedly different from other high-
income economies in human capital development and income inequality. This raises 
interesting questions about the reasons for this difference. This chapter sets out the 
background to the question of where Malaysia stands in the ladder of economic 
development, discussing and defining the middle-income trap and how it relates to the 
challenges that Malaysia currently faces. The chapter goes on to establish the research 
questions, the research method employed to answer the research questions, and 
concludes by outlining the organisation of the arguments in approaching the research 
questions. 
INTRODUCTION 
In many ways Malaysia's economic performance since independence from the 
British in 1957 has been remarkable. In 1993, Malaysia was identified as among eight 
'East A~ian Miracle ' economies that were recording ' spectacular' economic growth 
(World Bank 1993 ). 1 Malaysia was also one of 13 countries to have recorded average 
growth rates of more than 7 per cent per year for 25 years or more between 1967 and 
1997 (CGD 2008).2 
1 The World Bank (1993) categorised eight Asian economies that had 'miraculous ' economic growth 
rates (real GDP growth of around or above four per cent) from 1960 to 1990 as high performing Asian 
economies: Japan, the 'Four Tigers ' - Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, 
Province of China - and the three newly industrialising economies oflndonesia, Malaysia and Thailand . 
2 The 13 economies identified by the Commission on Growth and Development (2008) were Botswana, 
Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, Peoples ' Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, Japan, Republic ofKorea, 
Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China and Thailand. 
1 
Since the 1997 /98 East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC), this has changed. Key 
economic indicators, such as GDP and GDP per capita, are on a downward trend. The 
average GDP per capita growth rate has dropped from 5.2 per cent for the period 1970-
1979 to 2.8 per cent for the period 2000-2009 (Hill et al. 2012). Exports and imports, 
private investment, gross capital formation and total factor pro_ductivity are all on a 
downward trend. Average labour productivity growth has dropped from 5.5 per cent per 
annum during the pre-crisis period (1987-1997) to 2.9 per cent per year during the post-
crisis period (1998-2007) (NEAC 201 0a) while private investment is now 10 per cent of 
GDP, down from 30 per cent of GDP before the EAFC (World Bank 2009a). Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows, the main driver of Malaysia's most important export 
sector- manufacturing- is also on a downward trend. 
In 2009, Malaysia's new Prime Minister, Najib Razak, commissioned a study to 
analyse the reasons for Malaysia's ·deteriorating economic performance. The outcome 
was a vision document titled 'The New Economic Model' (NEAC 2010a). The report 
provided an overview of the challenges that the Malaysian economy was facing. The 
NEAC argued that Malaysia core challenge was that it was caught in a middle-income 
trap: 3 
The economy is caught in a middle income trap - caught between low-wage 
producers and highly-skilled innovators and caught with a viable high-growth 
strategy. The policies and strategies used to achieve the current state of 
development are now inadequate for the next stage of development. 
NEAC (2010a, p. 34) 
Stated differently, Malaysia ' s past successful growth strategy, which relied on 
its comparative advantage of low cost labour and natural resources in attracting foreign 
direct investment, have since diminished. However, with low human capital and low 
3 The NEAC report main diagnosis follows on from several other studies published by the World Bank 
such as 'The East Asian Renaissance ', (Gill and K.haras, 2007), 'Tigers Economies under Threat' (Yusuf 
and abeshirna, 2009) and 'Repositioning for Growth ' (Malaysia Economic Monitor, 2009) had preceded 
the NEAC in identifying this situation . 
2 
technological capabilities, Malaysia is unlikely to overcome the middle-income trap 
without new sources of growth and new growth strategies. 
The NEAC recommended several broad reform strategies that Malaysia needed 
to undertake to 'overcome' the middle-income trap. This New Economic Model would 
undergird the Prime Minister's reform efforts. The NEAC also identified the constraints 
that Malaysia faces in its efforts to achieve high-income or developed economy status. 
The report points to domestic factors such as 'weak investor confidence' , 'capability 
constraints', 'productivity ceilings' and 'institutional degradation' and external factors 
' such as a sluggish global economy' caused by the global financial crisis (GFC) and the 
' rise of neighbours in the region ' as contributing to the declining growth trajectory 
(NEAC 2010a). The report concludes that without widespread economic reforms, the 
Malaysian economy will be trapped in its upper middle-income economy equilibrium 
but that it also runs the risk of spiralling downwards (NEAC 201 0a). 
THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 
The term middle-income trap is now an idea that has wide currency. At its core, 
the middle-income trap attempts to explain the long term economic stagnation and 
growth slowdowns of fast growing East Asian economies (Gill and Kharas 2008; 
Kharas and Kohli 2011) and in particular the newly emerging middle-income 
economies such as China, India, Thailand and Vietnam (World Bank and DRC 2012; 
Eichengreen et al. 2011; Kohli and Mukherjee 2011; Phongpaichit and Benyaapikul 
2012; Ohno 2009). It has now been retrospectively applied to also explain the 
performance of Latin American economies in the 1980s (Jankowska et al. 2012). 
The middle-income trap narrative appears to be compelling but there is still no 
consensus about its theoretical underpinnings and/or conclusive empirical evidence. 
There is also the argument that the middle-income trap - if it is a trap - is caused by 
political factors, and not economic ones, as the politicians and/or the political system is 
unable to find the required policy solutions to deliver continued economic growth 
3 
(Riedel 2011; Doner 2012).4 Four critical questions continue to challenge the middle-
income trap concept: (1) how much should the economic growth rates fall from trend; 
(2) for how long should they fall or remain stagnant; (3) at what income levels should 
this occur, for it to be considered a middle-income trap, and (4) if this concept can be 
applied retrospectively. These questions continue to be debated as economists ' attempt 
to find a rigorous theory and the supporting empirics to explai:\1 this phenomenon. 
The middle-income trap concept or term is used to describe the experience of 
low-income countries5 that initially compete successfully in international markets by 
producing labour intensive low costs products often by using technologies developed in 
advanced economies. These countries experience the gains of 'catching up ', with large 
productivity gains that occur through the reallocation of labour and capital from low 
productivity agriculture to high productivity manufacturing. As these countries reach 
middle-income level , the underemployed rural labour force dwindles and wage rise, 
eroding competitiveness. Productivity growth from sectoral reallocation and technology 
catch-up are eventually exhausted, while rising wages make labour-intensive exports 
less competitive internationally. When countries cannot increase productivity through 
innovation or adaptation in products and processes, they find themselves trapped as they 
are unable to compete with lower cost producers or technologically superior competitors 
further up the value chain (Fang 2012; Kharas and Kohli 2011). 
4 Riedel ' s (2011) arguments were presented through an unpublished working paper at a seminar at the 
Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. Riedel puts forward the following 
proposition, 'If the middle-income trap is associated with a slowdown in long-term growth due to policy, 
rather than the natural and inevitable consequence of catching-up with high-income countries, as theory 
predicts; and if growth slowdown is due to policy, does it mean ipso facto that a country is ' trapped ' 
when all that may be needed to raise growth is a change in policy? '. Riedel argues that the answer is no, 
unless the government does not want to change policy because it has a vested interest in growth-inhibiting 
policies . In this case the country may be considered to be trapped, but by politics, not policy per se. 
Riedel goes on to put forward a hypothesis and an empirical illustration to explain why middle-income 
countries may be especially prone to a political growth trap . Doner (2012) has a similar argument but he 
specifies the reasons that political regimes are trapped at the middle-income. He notes that successfu l 
economic upgrading beyond the middle-income are retarded because political regimes have access to 
resources, including export revenues, external aid, and migrant/informal labour all of which limits the 
need to develop local competitiveness. 
5 The World Bank classifies countries by income group using the World Bank Atlas method . The groups 
are : low income, US$1025 or less; lower middle income, US$1026 - $4,035; upper middle income, 
US$4,036 - $12,475; and high income, US$ 12,476 or more. 
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Garrett (2004) first introduced the term middle-income trap when he observed 
that for the period 1980 to 2000, increased integration6 had led to the middle classes 
within countries and middle-income economies among countries being squeezed.7 High-
income economies had increased their per capita income by 50 per cent in real terms 
while low-income economies had increased their real per capita income by more than 
160 per cent. However, real per capita income for middle-income economies grew by 
only 20 per cent. 
This provided the premise for his argument that, in global markets the only 
option for middle-income economies to move ahead was either to be competitive in the 
knowledge economy, which rewards skills, and develops institutions that promote 
cutting-edge technological innovation, or stay as a low-wage economy, which uses 
widely available technology to do routine tasks at the lowest possible cost. 
The middle-income trap from the economic development perspective involves 
three inter-related concepts popularised in the 1950s - ' the poverty trap ', ' the big push' 
and 'the take-off (Easterly 2006). The poverty trap argues that many poor countries 
were in stagnation due to low economic growth, which leads to low savings and low 
capital accumulation which fails to keep up with depreciation and population growth 
(Rostow 1969 and Hayami 1998 cited in Easterly 2006). To enable these poor countries 
to break out of their poverty trap and achieve take-off or sustained economic growth, a 
'big push' is needed. The 'big push' called for large scale externally financed 
investment which could not spontaneously emerge from the private sector because of 
market failures (Rosenstien-Rodan 1943 cited in Easterly 2006). When countries 
experience a growth slowdown and stagnation at the middle-income level, a similar 
strategy is required to achieve take-off. Except for Hong Kong, all of the successful East 
Asian economies have adopted measures that have conformed to this prescription since 
6 Garrett (2004) uses the term globalisation which he did not define. However, he constantly refers to 
uninhibited trade and capital flows. It can be assumed that Garret refers to trade and financial integration . 
7 Garrett (2004) observed this by calculating the changes in per capita national income of countries and 
using the World Bank classification. The top 25 per cent are high income economies and the bottom 30 
per cent are low income economies. The remaining 45 per cent are the middle income economies. 
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the beginning of their industrialisation process (World Bank 1993 ; Wade 2003). In 
relation to the middle-income trap, Malaysia's New Economic Model is explicitly 
premised on such an approach (NEAC 2010a). 
Aoki (2011), in analysing the economic development of China, Japan and Korea, 
identified five phases of economic developments that were common among these three 
countries. These five phases were the Malthusian phase, wher~ technological progress 
could not keep pace with population growth; the government-led phase, where the 
economy overcomes the Malthusian trap through government involvement; the Kuznets 
phase, where the labour share of industry exceeds the agricultural share; the human-
capital-based phase, when high total factor productivity drives economic growth; and 
the post-demographic phase where the low fertility rates and economic shrinkage of the 
economically active population has a negative impact on GDP per capita. While the 
development phases were common, there were marked differences in the onset, duration 
and institutional forms of these economic phases across the three countries. Aoki (2011) 
provides an institutional analysis to explain these divergences in the economic 
development phases. He also postulates that institutional reform will be critical in 
managing the middle-income trap. 
Industrial structure analysis has also been used to explain the middle-income 
trap. Using a 'stages of industrialisation approach' and focusing on the manufacturing 
sector among East Asian economies, Ohno (2009) identifies several countries, including 
Malaysia that are stuck in the middle-income trap, the second stage in Ohno 's schema 
(see Figure 1). 
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The second stage is where these Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs),8 having 
successfully courted FDI and where domestic firms having been successful in simple 
manufacturing processes, achieve critical mass and are able to compete with foreign 
suppliers for most parts and components except the most complex. However, domestic 
firms in the NICs still fail to master important tasks in production such as management, 
technology design, factory operation, logistics, quality control and marketing. These 
areas remain dominated by foreigners and foreign firms from countries that are more 
technologically advanced, such as Japan and Korea. 
Countries that cannot break through the second stage by internalising knowledge 
and industrial skills through replacing foreigners and foreign firms in these areas are 
likely to remain stuck in a middle-income trap. While Ohno ' s view is inspired by the 
East Asian experience, the underlying reasoning is that domestic firms must develop 
capabilities in the more complex aspects of industrialisation to break through the 
middle.-income trap. 
8 In East Asia, the term Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) are referred to Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. The (East) Asian Tigers were Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore. 
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The second approach within the industrial structure approach focuses on the 
types of products that are produced in the economy. The product space method maps the 
relative proximity or similarly traded products to explain the structural transformation 
of the manufacturing sector (Hidalgo et al. 2007; Jankowska et al. 2012). The key 
argument of this approach is based on the successful experience of the East Asian 
Tigers in beating the middle-income level. Jankowska et al. (2012) note that: 
The focus on the economic structure of a country does not imply a deterministic 
view of development path. On the contrary, productive transitions are the result 
of policies, particularly those that aim to influence the economic specialisation 
of a county. Successful structural change is driven by proximity considerations -
with expansion into related industries, making use of existing productive skills -
while concomitantly accumulating more advanced capabilities. 
Jankowska et al. (2012, p. 43) 
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The East Asian Tigers' experience suggests that beating the middle-income trap 
is a function of structural transformation through diversification 9 into a greater number 
of products, as well as movement into higher value-added products over time. This was 
done through new production that was sequentially developed in industries such as iron, 
steel, machinery and electronics, using skills and capabilities that were transferable with 
relative ease from existing industries. The strategic increase in high 'connectivity' 
sectors10 allowed these countries to undertake a gradual yet systematic transition 
towards higher value added activities, especially those requiring similar technology and 
production techniques (Jankowska et al. 2012). 
This product space approach provides a compelling view on why the Latin 
American economies are still trapped in the middle-income trap (Jankowska et al. 
2012). The eight largest Latin American economies - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela ('the Latin American 8 ' ) - have been 
in a middle-income trap since the 1970s while Japan and the NI Cs four East Asian 
economies -Hong Kong SAR (Hong Kong), the Republic of Korea (Korea), Singapore 
and Taiwan, Province of China (Taiwan) ('the East Asia 5 high-income' ) - have 
graduated to become high-income economies. The product space approach argues that 
the Latin American economies failed to diversify and upgrade their countries ' export 
structure while the East Asian NICs pursued export-led growth by targeting strategic 
industries which facilitated gradual diversification and upgrading into new products that 
required similar skills and inputs. This approach relies on institutions via which 
coherent and complementary industrial policies in the areas of education, infrastructure, 
innovation and access to finance are able to be developed and implemented. 
-Malaysia together with Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and China ('the East 
Asian 5 developing' ) are currently the next batch of middle-income economies in East 
9 The degree of diversification has a U-shaped relationship. Increased diversification improves 
connectivity (the potential to export a particular product) of a country up to a certain extent before it 
becomes counterproductive (Jankowska et al. 2012). 
JO The 'connectivity ' of a country is determined by the degree of diversification of the economy, the 
export profile of the country and the value of products that remain outside the country 's expo1i basket. 
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Asia that will , at some point, have to navigate out of the middle-income trap (Gill and 
Kharas 2007). Malaysia, with the highest level of income per capita (upper middle-
income economy) in this cohort and having recorded weak economic performance for 
the past decade, appears to be the first among the second tier East Asian NICs to be 
caught in the middle-income trap. 
The growth trajectories of the East Asian 5 high-incon:ie to graduation as high-
income economies are all different. Using Ohno ' s (2009) schema, only Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan have graduated to stages 3 and 4 while Hong Kong and Singapore have 
exited. Hong Kong has become a high-income economy by focusing on the services 
sector while Singapore has specialised in the services sector, the knowledge economy 
and high value added manufacturing (Gill and Kharas 2007; Thangavelu et al. 2008). 
Hong Kong has done this through liberalisation of its economy, while Singapore has 
mixed a strong government presence in strategic sectors 11 with liberalisation of the 
economy. Both have also leveraged their strategic locations and high human capital. 
Aoki ' s (2011) phases of development would see Malaysia attempting to transition from 
the Kuznets phase to the human capital-based phase but still struggling with 
institutional reforms. 
It may be inferred from the literature that middle-income economies would 
experience three transformations as put forward by Gill and Kharas (2007) in 
association with a successful shift in strategy to graduate to a high-income economy. 
First, diversification will slow and then reverse as countries become more specialised in 
production and employment. Next, investment will become less important, and 
innovation should accelerate. Finally education systems will shift from equipping 
workers with skill s that allow them to adjust to new technologies, to preparing them to 
shape new products and processes (Gill and Kharas 2007). 
11 The Singapore government via its sovereign wealth fund maintains a significant presence in the 
domesti c economy and has controlling interests in several strategic Lndustries. 
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MALAYSIA'S MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP CHALLENGE 
A snapshot comparing Malaysia's basic country and economic profile with 
selected economies that have graduated and those still stuck in the middle-income trap, 
provides a useful context to situate Malaysia. On the upper boundary are East Asia' s 
most successful economies that have graduated from the middle-income trap: Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore; recent graduates to high-income economies are Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic and Poland, and those still stuck in the middle-income trap are 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
The Malaysian economy was the 35th largest in 2010 with a GDP ofUS$237.8 
billion, 12 and accounted for approximately 0.38 per cent of global GDP (when using 
constant 2000 US$). However, when measured using purchasing power parity (PPP at 
current international$), it was the 27th largest. The World Bank' s country economic 
classification (into lower-, middle- and high-income economies), uses a measurement 
termed the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita PPP, Atlas method. 13 This provides 
for the average per capita income for each country measured in PPP terms in nominal 
terms. When measured using the World Bank' s GNI PPP, the Malaysian economy was 
ranked 29th largest in 2010 at US$3 77 billion. 14 Malaysia' s current per capita income 
using this method is US$7,350. Malaysia officially became a middle-income economy 
in 1994. These three different measurements confirm Malaysia' s status as an upper 
middle-income economy indicating that Malaysia l}as been ' stuck' in the middle-income 
12 World Bank ranking of economies based on GDP for 2010 using WDI data. The data are in constant 
2000 US$. 
13 GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using 
the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all 
resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net 
receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, 
calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for 
comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is 
judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international 
transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is 
used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year 
and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and 
through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
From 2001 , these countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
(World Bank Indicators, 2012). 
14 Data from Word Development Indicators. Ranking is provided. 
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level for the past 18 years. The benchmark to becoming a high-income economy is 
projected to be US$15 ,000 15 in 2020 - the year Malaysia's current government, the 
Najib administration, 16 has targeted Malaysia to become a high-income economy, 
appears to be within reach. 17 
Malaysia' s natural endowment and trade profile suggests that it has all the pre-
requisites to graduate from the middle-income trap. Malaysia _is the 64th largest country 
in terms of land mass and 45th in terms of population size. The comparators in the high-
income economy category include both larger countries, in terms of land mass and 
population (such as Japan) and smaller countries (such as Taiwan, Singapore and 
Slovenia), suggesting that country size is not a key consideration in breaking through 
the middle-income trap. 
15 It is currently at US$ I 2, 196. The GN1 pct PPP is measured using the World Bank Atl as method. 
16 Naj ib Razak, Malays ia ' s current Prime M inister of (April 2009 - present), set the target of beco ming a 
high income economy by 2020 through a New Economic Model. Thj s downgraded the previous obj ective 
of Dr. Mahath ir Mohamad ' s Vision 2020 (1991 ) of turning Malaysia into a developed country by 2020. A 
high income economy need not necessarily be a developed economy. 
17 The NEAC notes that Malays ia would have to grow annually at 6 per cent to achieve this target 
(NEAC, 2010a). These projections however have come under intense scrutiny and fo und to be defective 
by several analysts. The most comprehensive critique of these projections were made by Ong Kian Mi ng 
and Teh Chi Chang (March 29, 201 2), ' A critique of the ETP-1 ', Refsa website. 
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Table 1 Basic country profile, 2011 * 
Country Rank Rank by Urban Labour GDP GDP pct 
by land population population 19 participation (US$)a (US$)b 
area18 (%) (%)20 
Japan 61 10 67 52 4.338 t 34,200 
Taiwan# 138 50 n/a 48 823.6 b 35,800 
Korea 105 25 82 51 1.467 t 30,200 
Singapore 184 116 100 59 314.2 b 59,900 
Slovenia 150 146 48 59 56.81 b 28,400 
Czech Rep 115 79 74 50 262 b 25 ,600 
Poland 69 33 61 56 725.2 b 18,800 
Chile 37 59 89 60 260 b 15,500 
Argentina 8 32 92 61 596 b 14,700 
Malaysia 64 45 72 61 416.7 b 14,700 
Brazil 5 5 87 70 2.194 t 10,900 
Note *2011 or latest available data;# - data from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World 
Factbook; a - GDP PPP in current US$ (t - trillion, b - billion), b - GDP per capita (pct) PPP in 
current US$, and c - urban area only. 
Source World Development Indicators, (2012). 
Furthermore, Malaysia is located within the East Asian region and is integrated 
within the East Asian global production network (Athukorala 2005; Athukorala and 
Yamashita 2006). East Asia is economically the most dynamic region in the world and 
the twenty-first century is predicted to be the ' Asian Century ' (Kohli et al. 2011). The 
spillover effects of this dynamic region will be positive for the Malaysian economy. 
Malaysia is also fortunate to have a demographic dividend as 70 per cent of its citizens 
are below the age of 40. This is also a highly urbanised country. Although this brings its 
18 Land area is a country ' s total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to 
continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. 
19 Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is 
calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World 
Urbanisation Prospects. 
20 Labour force participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is 
economically active: all people who supply labour for the production of goods and services during a 
specified period (2007 - 2011 ). 
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own set of challenges, the demographic dividend and high urbanisation rates are 
nevertheless favourable for economic growth (Gill and Kharas 2007). 
Table 2 Structure of the economy, 2009 
Country Agriculture Industry Services 
Value Employment Value Employment Value Employment 
added (% of total added (% of total added (% of total 
(¾of employment) (¾of employment) (¾of employment) 
GDP) GDP) GDP) 
Japan 1.2 3.9 25.9 25.9 72 .9 69 
Taiwan# 1.4 5.2 31.1 35.9 67.5 58.8 
Korea 2.9 7 36.8 16.4 60.5 76.6 
Singapore 0.04 1.1 27.9 21.8 72.l 77.1 
Slovenia 2.5 9.1 31.2 33 .0 66.4 57.4 
Czech 2.2 # 3.1 38.3 # 38.6 59.5 # 58.3 
Rep. 
Poland 3.7 13.3 31.74 31.1 64.6 55.6 
Chile 3.6 11.2 37.87 23.2 58.6 65.6 
Argentina 7.5 1.2 31.80 · 23.1 60.7 75.2 
Malaysia 9.5 13.5 43.81 27.0 46.7 59.5 
Brazil 5.6 17 26.83 22.1 67.5 60.7 
Note 2009 is selected as it is the most recent data that is available for all the countries selected 
for comparison;# - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. Taiwan figures are 
estimates for 2011 and are percentage contribution of sector to GDP. 
Source World Development Indicators, (2012). 
At the macro level, the structure of the Malaysian economy appears to be similar 
to that of high-income economy comparators except that Malaysia has larger 
agricultural and industrial sectors - both in terms of contribution to GDP and to 
employment as reported in Table 2. This fits with the economic theory that the 
contribution of the services sector becomes more dominant as nations specialise and 
achieve high levels of income. The Malaysian economy has diversified from a largely 
resource-producing economy (agriculture - rubber and palm oil , and mining- tin and 
petroleum) to manufacturing afthough the contribution from natural resources remains 
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significant (especially palm oil and petroleum). The contribution of the services sector 
to GDP though, has not shown any significant change over the years. 
Malaysia is among the most open economies in the world in the merchandise 
sector as reported in Table 3. With trade almost equal to twice the size of its GDP, 
Malaysia ' s share of global trade is higher than that of many other larger economies or 
high-income economies, with the exception of Singapore. Malaysia has ranked in the 
top 25 largest trading nations for the past two decades. Malaysia ' s integration into the 
global production network has allowed it to specialise in the export of selected 
electronic and electrical (E&E) products, which account for almost 85 per cent of total 
exports. Malaysia's economic openness has been a feature of the Malaysian economy 
since its independence. Economic openness in the tradable sector, however, is marred 
by protection in the services sector and some strategic industries such as the auto sector 
(Menon 2000; 2009; 2012). 
Table 3 Merchandise and services trade profile for 2010 
Country Trade to Exports (Share & Rank for Imports (Share & Rank for 
GDP Ratio 20] ma 20] ma 
(2008 - Merchandise Services Merchandise Services 
2010) 
Japan 30.9 5.05 (4) 3.71 (6) 4.49 (4) 4.45 (5) 
Taiwan 132.2 1.80(16) 1.07 (24) 1.63 (17) 1.06 (27) 
Korea 107.3 3.06 (7) 2.30 (14) 2.75 (10) 2.71 (12) 
Singapore 420.1 2.31 (14) 2.99 (10) 2.01 (15) 2.75 (11) 
Slovenia 127.4 0.19 (61) 0.16(60) 0.19 (61) 0.12 (60) 
Czech Rep. 130 0.87 (30) 0.56 (37) 0.82 (30) 0.48 (41) 
Poland 83.8 1.05 (26) 0.87 (29) 1.15 (23) 0.84 (31) 
Chile 74.8 0.47 (40) 0.29 (49) 0.38 (46) 0.33 (50) 
Argentina 41.3 0.45 (42) 0.35 (45) 0.37 (48) 0.39 (45) 
Malaysia 177.6 1.30 (23) 0.87 (30) 1.07 (25) 0.91 (30) 
Brazil 23.8 1.32 (22) 0.81 (31) 1.24 (44) 1.71 (17) 
Note a - Ranks in brackets. 
Source World Trade Organisation (WTO) International Trade Statistics, (2012). 
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On the supply side, Malaysia's profile is mixed as depicted in Table 4. It suffers 
a serious deficit in human capital with only 5 per cent of its population aged 25 and 
above having a tertiary education. This outcome is surprising as Malaysia' s budgetary 
expenditure for education is comparable to that of other high-income economies 
(UNESCO 2012). Malaysia also has a problem with income inequality in general but 
more so when compared to other high-income economies. Th~s suggests that the 
benefits of past economic growth have not been evenly distributed. Despite these 
concerning results, Malaysia sti II ranks favourably in terms of national competitiveness 
and technological achievement. 
Table 4 Human development, human capital , technology, competiveness and inequality 
Country HDI Social Tertiary TAic Competitiveness Gini 
(rank in burden (25+) (2009) (2012) index & 
2011-12) (> 65) a 2010 b IMD WEF rank* 
(2011 
est.) 
Japan 12 23 23.9 5 27 9 37.6 (75) 
[2008] 
Taiwan n/a 11 10.6 n/a 7 13 32.6 
(100) 
r'Jnnm 
Korea 15 11 16.2 1 22 24 31.0 
(108) 
rl"'\ A 1 I\ , 
Singapore 26 9 12.3 4 4 2 47.3 (29) 
[2011] 
Slovenia 21 17 9 19 51 45 28.4 
(120) 
Czech Rep 27 16 18 32 33 38 31.0 
(109) 
Poland 39 14 9.1 36 34 41 34.2 (90) 
f2008l 
Chile 44 10 10.4 41 25 31 52.1 (15) 
[2009] 
Argentina 45 11 3.3 46 55 87 45.8 (37) 
[2009] 
Malaysia 61 5 5 23 14 21 46.2 (34) 
2009 
Brazil 84 7 5.2 53 46 53 51.9 (16) 
2012 
Note a - percentage of population over 65 years of age; b - percentage of population over 25 
years old that have completed tertiary education; c - The Technology Achievement Index (TAI) 
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focuses on assessing the technological performance based on a country' s capability in creating 
technology but not on the overall size of its technological development; IMD; * latest available 
data which is given in square brackets 
Source Human Development Report, (2012); CIA World Factbook, (2012); Barro and Lee, 
(2010); Nasir et al. (2011); IMD, (2012) ; WEF, (20 12). 
Except for human capital development, technological capability and income 
inequality indicators, aH other economic indicators in comparison to other high-income 
economies suggest that there is nothing to stop Malaysia from overcoming the middle-
income trap. These indicators demonstrate that Malaysia' s performance has been 
resilient despite declining growth rates in the past decade. This raises the question as to 
the fundamental causes that are contributing to Malaysia's declining economic 
perfonnance .. It also raises other important questions as to whether at this stage of its 
econom ic development, past economic strategies and institutional arrangements will 
suffice in generating the annual growth rates of 7 .6 per cent21 necessary to achieve high-
inoome status over the next 10 years and beyond. 
Puru>OSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Despite significant impro em ents in understanding the causes of economic 
growth, eoonomi.c tJheory has yet to pr:ovide a satisfactory explanation for the great 
di ergence in economic performance among lower -income economies, with some 
growing i:apiidly, others not advancing aind with some regr1essing (Helpman 2004). 
Easterly (2002) notes that the secret to sustained growih is ' elusive' while the 
Connrus. ion of Growth and Development (CGD 2008) notes that: 
o one can identify aU the reasons why some economies lose momentum, and 
others don't ... When a country is far behind the leading economies, says Philippe 
Aghion, a leading giiOwth theorist at Harvard University, "it is very dear what 
you have to do., :so you can nm things like an army." But as au eoonomy catches 
up with the leaders, it beoomes less obvious what it should make and where its 
prosperity lies. 
CGD (2008, p. 83) 
2 1 Calcufations by Ong K.ian Ming and Teh Chi Chang suggest that these are the required growth average 
annual rates to achieve the US$15,000 target. Refsa, 29 March 2012, A critique of the ETP 1, Refsa. 
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Hence, the interest in the study of economic growth has shifted from focusing on 
the accumulation of capital and other productive factors towards a focus on the quality 
of institutions to support growth (Kong 2007). There is now a growing consensus that 
the factors of production may only be the proximate cause of growth, but that they do 
not provide an underlying explanation for the success or failu~e in growth itself, and that 
geography and openness to trade and above all institutions appear to be more important 
factors (Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2005; North et al. 1990). A unique feature 
of Malaysia is its ethnically based political system which is not prevalent among 
developed economies. Moreover, Malaysia ' s multi-ethnic citizenry makes it especially 
different from the homogenous East Asian Tigers'. This characteristic has bearings on 
institutional development too. 
This then raises the possibility that the fundamental challenge that Malaysia 
faces in overcoming the middle-income trap is not exclusively focused on the quality of 
its factors of production, endowments or trade only but more to the quality of 
Malaysia's institutions and its governance. The purpose of this study then becomes 
clear. Firstly, it aims to investigate the impact of current domestic institutions and 
governance on economic growth in Malaysia. In order to do that, it must be established 
that institutions and governance actually do matter to economic performance, and if this 
is the case, then how? More importantly, what type of institutions matter and at what 
levels of income? Finally, how does governance of these institutions relate to the quality 
of these institutions and, in turn, to economic growth? 
The literature review of the various theories that have been put forward to 
explain the middle-income trap also posit that to overcome the middle-income trap 
countries will have to specialise, be driven either by comparative or locational 
advantage, or develop the technological capacity and capability at the higher stages of 
the industrialisation process. This specialisation requires high levels of human capital 
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development and better social policies as this specialisation will have an adverse effect 
on income inequality, which is of paramount importance for social stability in Malaysia. 
In this context, the already mediocre performance of human capital development 
and the high income inequality in Malaysia raises several further important questions. 
What are the institutional and governance challenges that Malaysia is facing in the area 
of human capital development and broader social policies that result in these mediocre 
outcomes and what are the institutional reforms that are required to address these 
outcomes in order to overcome the middle-income trap? 
These raise two broad key issues that underlie Malaysia's challenges in 
overcoming the middle-income trap from an institutional perspective: 
1. What are the domestic institutional issues that are constraining Malaysia's 
economic growth and its ability to overcome the middle-income trap? 
11. What are the possible institutional reforms needed to facilitate Malaysia's 
return to a high growth path? 
This research seeks to address these two broad issues by answering the 
following research questions: 
1. What are the impact of the different types of institutions and governance on 
economic output at the different income levels? 
11. How do the relevant educational and training institutions and their 
governance influence human capital development in Malaysia in the context 
of overcoming the middle-income trap? 
111. How do the relevant institutions tasked to address income inequality in 
Malaysia contribute towards overcoming the middle-income trap? 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Undertaking institutional analysis on economic growth with a country focus can 
be an extremely difficult task; nevertheless, one that is necessary and worthwhile. The 
approach adopted here is drawn from an expert survey undertaken by Arvanitidis et al. 
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(2010). This survey involved 650 experts in the field of economics in the public and 
private sector, and from academia. The experts were asked five questions, one of which 
forms the basis of the research method taken in this study. The experts were asked to 
firstly to evaluate the suitability of the main research methodologies in explaining the 
determinants of economic dynamism and then to rank the research methodologies. The 
results are reported in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Methods to explore determinants of economic dynamism 
Rank Methods Average Rank First choice (%) 
1 In-depth case studies 1.83 42.79 
2 Formalism/modelling 2.08 31.97 
3 Historical analysis 2.08 24.04 
Source Arvanitidis et al. (2010). 
Almost 43 per cent of experts ranked in-depth case studies as the most 
appropriate method in exploring growth dynamism. This is perhaps because case studies 
provide a thorough understanding of the characteristics and peculiarities of the subject 
under focus , which the experts deem necessary for effective policy-making. The experts 
also recognised the importance of econometric modelling and historical analysis. Hence, 
the approach taken in this study takes a combination of all three approaches but with a 
bias towards in-depth case studies that use econometric modelling. 
There is no unique theoretical approach used in the study. Instead, the approach 
is eclectic (see Figure 3). The empirical approach is informed mainly by neoclassical 
economic theory while the institutional analysis is a combination of evolutionary 
economics, new institutional economics and economic sociology. 
This is achieved through two stages. First, the impact of institutions on 
economic grov.rth across all countries over a period ,of time is undertaken. This 
generalised and comparative view that utilises the stochastic frontier model , allows the 
researcher to rank the performance of each country, measure the impact of institutions 
on economic growth, and identify the key trends at the macro level, across individual 
countri~s, for a period of time. 
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However, the generalised view does not explain 'the characteristics and 
peculiarities of the subject under focus, which the experts deem necessary for effective 
policy-making' (Arvanitidis et al. 2010, p. 80). Gerring (2004, p. 342) defines a case 
study as, 'an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger 
class of (similar) units. ' The case study approach therefore can be used to address the 
challenge of analysing the core issues affecting Malaysia as it allows for an in-depth 
analysis of an issue that can be representative of a larger phenomenon. 
This research uses human capital development in the manufacturing sector (as 
the single unit) to understand the fundamental reasons behind, and provide an 
explanation for Malaysia's declining economic performance (the larger class of similar 
units). Human capital development in the manufacturing sector is selected for several 
reasons. Firstly, human capital and technology are now recognised as key proximate 
drivers of long term economic growth (Kohli et al. 2011). Secondly, the two key 
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indicators where Malaysia diverges significantly from successful East Asian economies 
are in human capital development and income inequality. Thirdly, the literature on the 
middle-income trap has also identified that human capital development and income 
inequality are among the two most important issues that must be addressed when faced 
with structural changes that comes with overcoming the middle-income trap. 
The manufacturing sector is selected primarily because of its leading role in the 
Malaysian economy. Furthermore, there are few other sectors that are as trade-exposed 
as the manufacturing sector although several strategic or politically sensitive industries 
have protection. The success or failure of the liberalisation strategies used in the 
manufacturing sector is important in understanding and explaining Malaysia' s middle-
income trap. Finally, the manufacturing sector is also chosen also because it is the 
backbone of Malaysia' s export-oriented-industrialisation strategy and one of the key 
sectors in the government' s strategy in developing technological capacity, capability 
and for industrial upgrading. 
There is no specific theoretical approach used in this research. Instead a 
combination is used. The empirical approach most suitable for this research, the 
stochastic frontier model (Battese and Coelli 1992; 1995; Kalirajan and Shand 1999) 
and a modified industry wage equation model (Allen 1996), are based mainly on 
neoclassical economic theory. The institutional analysis is a combination of 
evolutionary economics and new institutional economics. Table 6 maps out the 
relationship between the three main research questions, the theoretical approach and the 
research method employed. 
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Table 6 Mapping the research questions, methods and chapters 
Research question Theoretical approach Research Chapter 
Method 
1. What is the impact of the Neo-classical Stochastic Chapters 4 
different types of institutions economics frontier and 8 
and governance on economic econometric 
output at the different income analysis 
levels? 
2. How do the relevant Neo-classical Case study Chapters 5, 7 
educational and training economics, and and 8 
institutions and their evolutionary stochastic 
governance influence human economics and new frontier 
capital development in institutional econometric 
Malaysia in the context of economics analysis 
overcoming the middle-
income trap? 
3. How do the relevant Neo-classical Case study Chapters 6, 7 
institutions influence income economics, and and 8 
inequality in Malaysia in the evolutionary econometric 
context of overcoming the economics and new analysis 
middle-income trap? institutional 
economics 
ORGANISA TI0N OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review on the 
theories of economic growth. The review focuses on three key issues: the 
transformation of the growth literature from a focus on 'factor accumulation' to the 
'deep structural determinants ' of growth; what these growth theories say about long-run 
economic growth; and the role of institutions within the analysis of growth. This chapter 
identifies the key role played by institutions in overcoming the middle-income trap. 
Chapter 3 focuses the discussion on institutions and institutional analysis and 
has four objectives. The first three are: to identify a suitable definition for institutions; 
to identify a schema to classify institutions; and to identify an appropriate method to 
measure them. These three objectives are important in developing a framework that can 
meaningfully explain the role of institutions in contributing to Malaysia' s current 
human capital deve lopment and income inequality outcomes which is addressed in 
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Chapter 7. This framework is also relevant in identifying suitable and feasible reform 
measures which are addressed in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 4 analyses the links between institutions and the economic performance 
of a set of countries at different income levels , using a stochastic frontier model. The 
key objective of this chapter is to identify, in general, the types of ' institutions that 
matter' at the different income levels. This analysis is done for a large sample of 
countries over a specified period of time. Malaysia' s economic performance in relation 
to the other economies over this period of time at the macroeconomic level is also 
discussed to identify broad trends. 
Chapter 5 drills deeper into the Malaysian economy by analysing the impact of 
human capital development on manufacturing sector output. It is the first case study that 
provides the basis for the in-depth institutional analysis in Chapter 7 on the links 
between human capital development and manufacturing sector output. In particular, this 
chapter investigates the contribution of the different factors of production to 
manufacturing sector output. The variable of interest is labour, in particular how the 
different skills level contributes to manufacturing sector output. This analysis enables 
the research to determine whether human capital is indeed a constraint to technological 
upgrading in the manufacturing sector as part of Malaysia' s efforts in overcoming the 
middle-income trap. 
Chapter 6 supplies the second case study that also drills further into Malaysia' s 
institutions. It provides the basis for an institutional analysis in Chapter 7 on the 
determinants of wage inequality among the different skill levels among labour in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector. The key determinants that the chapter focuses on are 
trade, technology and migrant labour. This analysis enables the research to determine 
whether current strategies to address income inequality in the manufacturing sector have 
been effective. 
Chapter 7 undertakes an institutional analysis of human capital development and 
income inequality based on the empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 6. This chapter also 
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relates the analysis at the sectoral level with the macro level. In doing so, the chapter 
also identifies the current institutional weaknesses in human capital development and in 
addressing income inequality within the context of overcoming the middle-income trap. 
Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the key research findings, and presents 
several key recommendations on institutional reforms based on the institutional analysis 
in Chapter 7 on human capital development that might assist Malaysia's attempts to 
overcome the middle-income trap. 
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Chapter 2 Economic growth and institutions 
What makes some countries rich and others poor? Economists have asked this 
question since the days of Adam Smith. Yet after more than two hundred years 
the mystery of economic growth has not been solved. 
Helpman (2004, p. 1.) 
The literature on economic growth explores many of the proximate factors that 
influence the success with which countries escape from poverty and become rich. What 
is less clear is why some countries succeed and others fail , and why some countries that 
appear to be on the way to becoming rich, falter while others surge forward. This review 
discusses three key issues: the transformation in the focus of the growth literature from 
the importance of ' factor accumulation' to the importance of ' deep structural 
determinants ' of growth; what these growth theories say about long run economic 
growth; and the role of institutions in the growth process. The key interest in this 
chapter is in the circumstance as it appears to apply to the case of Malaysia. 
THEORIES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Why are some countries rich and many others poor? Why are there significant 
differences in living standards between the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries - 34 of the richest economies in the world - and non-
OECD countries? What are the mechanisms that drive economic growth? Why does 
growth take off in some countries and not in others? Attempts to answer these 
fundamental questions by economists have led to two key approaches in the growth 
literature. Understanding this literature is important to unravelling the puzzles about 
Malaysia' s economic growth performance . 
. The first is the Solow (1956) or the neo-classical growth model. In this model , 
economic growth comes from capital accumulation and it is only temporary. The 
diminishing marginal productivity of capital per worker implies that in the long-run all 
countries should converge to the same level of per capita income. They also have the 
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same growth rate of growth, and that depends on the rate of technological progress. The 
rate of technological progress is assumed to be exogenous and thus does not respond to 
incentives to innovate. 
The key prediction of this Solow growth model is that poor countries will grow 
faster and eventually catch up with the rich countries. While there are examples of 
catching-up economies, empirical data for all countries does _not support this prediction. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al. (1992) argue that the Solow model 
does not predict absolute convergence but conditional convergence. They reason that 
countries differ in their savings rates and population growth rates, and these differences 
lead to differences in their income levels in the long-run. By controlling for these 
determinants of the long-run income levels, they find evidence of conditional 
convergence, where rich countries and poor countries converge to different income 
levels. 
Notwithstanding these findings, the lack of absolute convergence and, more 
critically, the increased divergence between rich and poor countries observed despite 
increased capital flows from capital rich to capital poor countries, implies that 
accumulation is not the driving force behind growth (Helpman 2004). Mankiw et al. 
(1992) did try to address this shortcoming of the Solow model by including human 
capital. However, under the assumption of diminishing rates of return, human capital 
also fails as the determinant of long run growth. 
The theory of endogenous growth is the second key approach in thinking about 
economic growth. It addresses the limitations of the Solow model. The key departure in 
this theory from the Solow model is its assumption of non-diminishing returns to human 
capital accumulation. Proponents of endogenous growth theory argue that positive 
externalities from knowledge creation can generate increasing returns to scale which 
offset the decreasing returns to scale from other factor accumulation. This leads to 
sustainable long run growth. This approach, pioneered by Romer (1986 and 1990) and 
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Lucas (1988) extended the contribution of capital accumulation to encompass intangible 
capital - human skills and the stock of knowledge - as key explanators of growth. 
A typical representative of this approach is Romer (1990). Innovators have the 
incentive to innovate since they have copyrights or patents of their innovation. This 
secures them monopoly profits, at least in the short to medium term. At the same time 
the innovators create knowledge that is not embodied in the innovation that is available 
to the public. This implies that countries that allocate larger resources to R&D will have 
higher productivity growth. 
Unfortunately, endogenous growth models also do not satisfactorily answer 
fundamental questions about economic growth. In identifying R&D and innovation by 
profit-seeking firms as the key determinants of technological advancement that drives 
long term growth, this approach fails to incorporate a crucial variable: the regulatory 
and policy settings - or institutions - that shape firms' incentive structures. Once new 
technology is available, the pace of technological progress largely depends on the 
process of adoption. This is also determined by many institutional factors. Mokyr 
( 1990; 1992; 2001) points out that technological inertia and economic stagnation are 
common in history mainly due to resistance through institutions (and the rules and 
norms that affect whether the market is permitted to be the arbiter of whether a new 
technique is adopted) and organisational opposition embedded within the structure of 
institutions. This has led economists to look for other deep determinants of growth. 
THEORIES OF THE DEEP DETERMINANTS 
There is a growing literature that identifies institutions broadly defined to 
include socio-cultural institutions, geography and trade as ' deep determinants ' in 
explain.ing the variations observed in economic growth across countries. 
29 
Institutions 
There is no consensus on a unified definition for institutions. Institutions can be 
viewed either from a disciplinary, epistemological or geographical perspective (Djelic 
2010). When viewed from a disciplinary perspective, the fundamental role of property 
rights are a key feature of the new institutional economics (Matthews 1986; North 1990; 
Menard and Shirley 2005), the importance of socio-cultural factors are stressed in 
economic sociology (Granovetter 1985; Knack and Keefer 1997), and political science 
focuses its explanation of economic growth on political factors (Lipset 1959; Brunetti 
1997). 
In the economics discipline, Douglass C. North 's definition of institutions has 
come to be accepted as the standard. Institutions, according to North (1991) are: 
The humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both information constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human 
beings to create order and·reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with the 
standard constraints of economics they define the choice set and therefore 
determine transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and 
feasibility of engaging in economic activity. 
North (1991 , p. 97) 
North popularised what is now termed the institutionalist approach. The 
institutionalist approach distinguishes between the proximate and deep determinants of 
growth. It argues that the conventional determinants of economic growth such as 
innovation, economies of scale, education, capital accumulation are the proximate cause 
of growth while the fundamental sources of growth derive from institutions broadly 
defined (North and Thomas 1973; Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2004). This 
approach is gaining widespread acceptance in the analysis and understanding of 
economic growth. 
It was not until after Douglass C. North won a Nobel Prize for his work on 
institutions and economic history in 1993, that the institutional determinants of growth 
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began to be examined empirically in a more formal way (Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Mauro 1995; Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2002 and 2005; Rodrik et al. 2004). 
Rodrik ( 1999) had earlier highlighted five key institutions - property rights, regulatory 
institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation, institutions for social 
insurance and institutions of conflict management - which not only exert direct 
influence on economic growth but also affect other determinants of growth such as 
physical and human capital, investment, technical change and the economic growth 
processes. On these grounds Easterly (2001) argues that none of the traditional factors 
would have any impact on economic performance if there had not been developed a 
stable and trustworthy institutional environment. 
Economic policies - which can be thought of as a function of economic 
institutions - and macroeconomic conditions - which are partially an outcome of these 
policies - have also, attracted much attention as determinants of economic performance 
(Kormendi and Meguire 1985; Grier and Tullock 1989; Barro 1991 and 1997; Easterly 
and Rebelo 1993; Fischer 1993; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Economic policies set 
the framework within which economic growth takes place and influence several aspects 
of an economy, for example, through investment in human capital and infrastructure, 
improvement of political and legal institutions. Macroeconomic conditions are regarded 
as necessary but not sufficient conditions for economic growth (Fischer 1993). In 
general, a stable macroeconomic environment may favour growth, especially, through 
reduction of uncertainty, whereas macroeconomic instability may have a negative 
impact on growth, through its effects on productivity and investment by increasing 
uncertainty. These studies of the links between economic policies and their outcomes 
demonstrate the importance of institutions in the development, implementation and 
monitoring of economic policies. 
Interest in the relation between political factors and economic performance was 
first raised by Lipset (1959). This triggered several other studies which concluded that 
the political environment plays an important role in economic growth (Kormendi and 
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Meguire 1985; Scully 1988 and 1992; Grier and Tullock 1989; Brunetti 1997). These 
studies usually assess the political environment using variables such as political stability 
and degree of democracy. At the most basic level , political stability - like 
macroeconomic stability - would appear to reduce uncertainty, encouraging investment 
and eventually advancing economic growth. 
It is also argued that the type of political regime ( dell?ocratic and non-
democratic) also has an impact on economic growth. However there is no consensus to 
date on which type of political regime is better but political stability has a positive 
impact on growth. The literature has found evidence in support of both types of political 
regimes. For example, democratic regimes may both retard and enhance economic 
growth (Alesina et al. 1996; Helliwell 1994; Barro 1991; Przeworski 2004). Alesina et 
al. (1996) in their study of the links between political instability finds that political 
instability reduces growth. It is more pronounced for the case of unconstitutional 
executive changes such as coups; as well as for changes in ideological composition of 
the executive but less significant for regular and frequent turnovers in industrial 
democracies. They however find no difference in the performance between democracies 
and non-democracies but that the occurrence of a government change increases the 
likelihood of subsequent changes, suggesting that political instability tends to be 
persistent. Przeworski (2004) when examining the mutual relation between political 
regimes and economic growth also comes to the same conclusion, finding no evidence 
that different types of political regimes have different types of impact on the rate of 
investment or the growth of total income while Helliwell (1994) finds that although 
democracy has no direct effect on economic growth, it exerts an indirect effect on 
growth through education and investment. Barro (1991) also found that political 
stability and growth rates are positively linked . 
The theoretical foundations to this ambiguity are related to two diametrically 
opposed thinking of democracy. The opponents argue that democracies are unstable and 
absolutist regimes were more likely to improve public welfare simply because they 
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could not promote their own interests otherwise (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006 
citing Hobbes 1651) while Huntington (1968) argued that democracies have weak and 
fragile political institutions and lend themselves to popular demands at the expense of 
profitable investments. Democratic governments are vulnerable to demands for 
redistribution to lower-income groups, and are surrounded by rent-seekers (Krueger 
1974; Bhagwati 1982). Absolutist regimes can implement coercively the hard economic 
policies necessary for growth, and suppress the growth-retarding demands of low-
income earners and labour in general, as well as social instabilities due to ethnic, 
religious and class struggles. This view also argues that democracies cannot suppress 
such conflicts. Therefore, for economic progress, functioning markets should be 
prioritised and authoritarian regimes can easily facilitate this. 
The proponents argue that rulers are potential looters and democratic institutions 
act to constrain them (North 1990). Authoritarian governments have the tendency to 
confiscate assets if it can expect a brief tenure (Olson 1993), or even in the long-run 
(Bhagwati 1995) for more corrupt and extravagant use of resources, internally 
inconsistent policies, and short-lived and volatile economic progress (Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu 2006). Rodrik (2000) goes further and argues that democratic regimes can 
be the meta-institutions for building market supporting institutions.22 
Religion, culture, ethnicity and language 
Religion, culture, ethnicity and language are important socio-cultural institutions 
that can also impact economic growth (Barro and McCleary 2003; Bjornskov 2005; 
Huntington 1996; Landes 1998; Noland 2003; North 1990 and 1992; Temple and 
Johnson 1998; Weber 1930). 
How they affect economic growth is varied and has been analysed from different 
aspects. Social capital is one popular method that is often used to measure the impact of 
22 Rodrik (2000) discusses five types of institutions: institutions: property rights; regulatory institutions, 
institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation; institutions for social insurance and institutions for conflict 
management. 
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these socio-cultural institutions on economic growth. Other conventional ways have 
been to measure the key components of what makes-up these social-cultural institutions 
such as ethnic and language composition, religious beliefs, attitudes and values. 
Social capital refers to institutions, relationships and norms that shape the 
quality and quantity of society's social interactions. A narrow view of social capital 
regards it as a set of horizontal associations between people, consisting of social 
networks and associated norms that have an effect on community productivity and well-
being (Putnam 1993). 
A broader understanding of social capital accounts for both the positive and 
negative aspects by including vertical as well as horizontal associations between people, 
and includes behaviour within and among organisations (Coleman 1988). The view 
recognises that horizontal ties are needed to give communities a sense of identity and 
common purpose, but also stresses that without 'bridging' ties that transcend various 
social divides (for example, religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status), horizontal ties 
can become the pursuit of narrow interests, and can actively preclude access to 
information and material resources that would otherwise be of great assistance to the 
community (for example information about government programmes that are not 
publicised). 
The broadest and most encompassing view of social capital includes the social 
and political environment that shapes social structure and enables norms to develop. 
This analysis extends the importance of social capital to the most formalised 
institutional relationships and structures such as government, the political regime, the 
rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties (North 1990; 0 Ison 1982). 
This view not only accounts for the strengths and weakness of social capital, and the 
importance of forging ties within and across communities, but recognises that the 
capacity of various social groups to act in their interest depends crucially on the support 
( or lack thereof) that they receive from the state as well as the private sector. Similarly, 
the state depends on social stability and widespread popular support. In short, economic 
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and social development thrives when representatives of the state, the corporate sector, 
and civil society create forums in and through which they can identify and pursue 
common goals. 
Religion - which contributes to social capital - as a deep determinant of 
economic growth can be categorised into two key arguments (Noland 2003). In the first 
argument, religion functions as a club. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (cited in 
Anderson 1988) argued that participation in a religious group could potentially convey 
two economic advantages to adherents. The first could be a reputational signal to 
potential employers, lenders and customers. Second, these religious groups could 
provide an extra-legal means of establishing trust and sanctioning deviants in intra-
group transactions. These translate into a reduction in risk or uncertainty associated with 
a particular individual or transaction and improving efficiency and allocation of 
resources - necessary for long term growth. 
This interpretation does not take into consideration the actual nature of religious 
belief as this reasoning can be extended to a wide range of voluntary associations and 
not just religious organisations per se and is relevant in explaining economic growth. 
The second - the moulder-of-behaviour argument associated primarily with 
Max Weber - is more controversial. In this argument, the content of religion is crucial. 
In 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,' (Yang 1964 cited in Noland 
2003) Weber argued that the Protestant Reformation was critical to the rise of 
capitalism through its impact on belief systems. The point of departure of Weber's 
analysis was 'the ethical discrepancy between religious values and the given world. ' 
(Yang 1964 cited in Noland 2003). From this , religions could be classified according to 
their acceptance or rejection of the world; if acceptance, the presence or absence of 
tension toward the world and whether the fostered orientation of transformation, 
adaptation or escape from the given world. Weber also argued that the Calvinistic 
doctrine resulted in a ' this-worldly asceticism' which focused adherents on diligent, 
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efficient economic activity, thrift and non-ostentatious accumulation of wealth. These 
characteristics, according to Weber, were the bedrock of modem capitalism. 
Landes (1998) would argue along these lines with a focus on the role of religious 
institutions of the different religions (Protestant and Catholic) in promoting or curtailing 
values such as scientific thought and profit-making. Landes ?oncluded that Protestant 
religious institutions did not curtail but supported these values, contrary to Catholic 
institutions (Landes 1998). 
Weber's hypothesis attracted widespread criticism (Noland 2003). A 
contemporary example serves as illustration. Weber had noted that Confucianism was 
inimical to growth and that the Hindu caste system blocked capitalist development. The 
economic success of Confucian China and countries such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
Hindu India in recent times seems to disprove Weber's assertions. 
There appears to be more clarity on ethno-linguistic fragmentation. It is argued 
that higher ethno-linguistic fragmentation in a country has negative direct and indirect 
effects on economic performance and quality of institutions (Okediji 2010). The key 
argument is that there is greater likelihood for competition among the differing interest 
and ethnic groups for the provision of public goods, leading to poor quality decisions 
(Alesina and Drazen 1991; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; 
Alesina and Spoloare 1997; Collier 2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation can also lead to higher levels of government consumption and thus divert 
resources away from macroeconomic variables needed to promote and sustain economic 
development (Annet 1999). 
Geography 
While institutional, religious and cultural theories emphasise the importance of 
man-made factors in shaping economic incentives, an alternative approach is to focus 
on the role of ' nature ', that is, on the physical and geographical environment. In the 
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context of understanding cross-country differences in economic performance, this 
approach emphasises differences in geography. 
The role of geography in economic growth has been long recognised. There are 
several aspects of growth performance that relate to geography. The first aspect is 
climate. With significant differences in incomes per capita between countries in 
temperate and the tropical zones, climate appears an important factor. That climate may 
be an important determinant of work effort, incentives or even productivity goes back at 
least to Montesquieu and Alfred Marshall (cited in Acemoglu et al. 2005). The climate 
argument postulates that people in the tropics are not sufficiently industrious due to the 
extreme heat. Moreover, the easy access and availability of food encourages idleness 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003). 
A scientific explanation for the above claim is provided by Parker (2000, cited in 
Bhattacharyya, 2006) who argues that an individual's desire to maximise utility is 
dependent on motivation and physiological activities. The activity of the hypothalamus 
is heavily dependent on thermodynamics. In hot conditions, the hypothalamus secretes 
hormones which negatively affect motivation and enterprise while in cold climates this 
does not happen - and individuals may be naturally more diligent. 
The second view is that geography may determine agricultural productivity due 
to climatic and soil conditions (Gallup and Sachs 2000; Sachs 2001; Myrdal 1968). The 
tropics, with high relative humidity, high temperatures, soil that lacks nutrients and 
increased number of pests, leads to deficiencies in plant growth and lowers agricultural 
productivity. 
The third perspective is that geography determines technological differences 
among different regions (Diamond 1997). According to this view, Europe's conquest of 
the Americas was possibly due to the differences in all aspects of technology between 
the Europeans and the Americans. The Europeans were far more advanced than the 
Americans because of their longer history as densely populated societies which were 
dependent on food production. The improved food production system created surplus in 
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resources in Europe which allowed for investment in areas such as weapons and 
transport. Europeans' close contact with large mammals in their efforts to domesticate 
them, allowed them to develop immunity to various epidemics which occurred 
regularly. This was not the case in the Americas. A related view is that the agricultural 
technology introduced by the Europeans in countries that they colonised was 
inappropriate. This led to stagnation of the agriculture sector~ in these colonies 
(Diamond 1997). 
A final perspective on geography is the proximity-of-market view which has 
links to trade theories. According to this view, unfavourable geographic location 
characterised by no or limited access to ports or ocean navigable waterways, and being 
landlocked are major impediments to trade and commerce (Sachs and Warner 1995; 
Sachs and Warner 1997; Gallup et al 1998). Access to port facilities or major markets in 
this situation often involves crossing international borders. This raises transportation 
costs and limits international trade. Without international trade, commercial activities 
are confined to the domestic economy which is often small and leads to problems 
associated with closed economies such as inefficient division of labour and 
underdevelopment. 
A related theory is the new economic geography. This theory asks the question 
of why firms locate their establishment's in particular geographical locations. Allowing 
for increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition and non-zero transport costs, new 
economic geography (Krugman 1991; Fujita et al. 1999) argues that economic activity 
tends to agglomerate in specific areas to enjoy plant-level economies of scale and 
proximity to customers and suppliers in order to reduce transport costs. This gives rise 
to ' agglomeration economies ' or advantages of coalescing geographically. The process 
is self-reinforcing, due to increased positive externalities, backward and forward 
linkages between firms and scaled economies. Although negative externalities and 
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intensification of competition can give rise to centrifugal effects,23 these forces are 
unlikely to induce a balanced pattern of growth. This theory suggests that certain 
locations would experience higher economic growth than others due to these factors. 
Trade 
International trade or trade liberalisation is another potentially significant 
determinant of economic growth. In general, it is conventionally argued that trade 
liberalisation enables the exploitation of comparative advantage, technology transfer 
and diffusion of knowledge, increasing scale economies and exposure to competition. 
Therefore, countries that have an open economy can escape from diminishing returns 
because trade allows countries to specialise which increases productivity and returns to 
capital - all of which drives long term growth. Trade also increases market size, reduces 
the duplication of R&D, increases knowledge spill-over, and increases specialisation -
with the cumulative effect of increased R&D and productivity. A large number of 
studies have confirmed such positive relationships (Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 
1995; Edwards 1998; Dollar and Kraay 2003). This also helps to _explain why small 
countries, such as the high performing East Asian economies were able to grow fast. 
Growth theories have now included trade as a key variable. Extensions of the 
endogenous growth theory demonstrate that international trade affects economic growth 
positively by facilitating learning-by-doing, specialisation and spill-over (Lucas 1988; 
Young 1991) transfer of knowledge and R&D activities (Grossman and Helpman 1991) 
and scale-effect (Rivera-Batis and Romer 1991). 
Increased competition due to trade liberalisation can cause factor prices to 
change. This in turn can lead to a decline in productivity. In addition, trade does not 
necessarily imply convergence ·of income levels. If R&D spill-overs are international in 
23 Krugman explains that the ' centrifugal ' effect of widely dispersed resources, which tends to push 
economic activity into spreading out, would be opposed by the 'centripetal ' pull of access to large 
markets, which tend to promote concentration of economic activity. 
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scope, there will be convergence and if they are national in scope, there will be 
divergence (Helpman 2004). 
EMPIRICS OF THE DEEP DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH 
This literature on the theories of the deep determinants of growth suggests two 
possible conclusions. The first conclusion is that institutions ·broadly defined to include 
policy institutions and socio-cultural factors matter in determining incomes and growth 
rates. The second conclusion is that productivity growth and not factor accumulation 
alone may be a main driving force behind growth performance. 
The first to suggest empirically the links between institutions and economic 
growth were Kormendi and Meguire (1985) when they introduced a measure for civil 
liberties in their set of explanatory variables for growth. They found that an index of 
civil liberties, which captured political freedom and democracy supported by 
constitutional law, had a positive relationship with growth. This index of civil liberties, 
however, explained growth only marginally but dominated the other variables when 
explaining investment. 
Political instability as a variable that influences growth was first suggested by 
Barro (1991) in his seminal paper that sought to explain economic growth for a large 
sample of countries. Barro found that average growth rates are positively related to 
political stability. Barro interpreted this as capturing the benefits of secure property 
rights. 
Attempts to measure explicitly the links between institutions and economic 
performance were pioneered by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995). Knack 
and Keefer analysed different proxies that were used to capture the links between 
institutions and economic growth while Mauro investigated the links between 
corruption and growth. Knack and Keefer found that institutions that protected property 
rights were crucial to economic growth and that their effects are persistent while Mauro 
found that corruption lowers investment, thereby lowering economic growth. 
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Knack and Keefer (1997) also measured the impact of social capital on 
economic growth by using indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values 
Survey for a sample of 29 market economies. They use these measures as proxies for 
the strength of civic associations in order to test two different propositions on the effects 
of social capital on economic growth, the 'Olson effects' (associations that stifle growth 
through rent-seeking) (Olson 1982) and 'Putnam effects' (associations that facilitate 
growth by increasing trust) (Putnam 1993). They conclude that trust and civic norms are 
stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain 
predatory actions of chief executives, and with better-educated and ethnically 
homogenous populations. 
Empirical work on the impact of religion on economic growth is inconclusive. 
Bhattacharyya's (2006) thesis which analysed the relative contribution of what he terms 
root causes or deep determinants (institutions, geography, trade openness, religion and 
culture, and knowledge) of economic growth finds that Catholicism is associated with 
poor institutions and is not good for trade. 
The large number of Muslims living in poverty had also raised the possibility 
that Islam was inimical to growth (Kuran 1997).24 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) 
analysing the World Values Survey data, assert that among the adherents of the world ' s 
major religions, Muslim ' s are the most anti-market. However, Noland (2003) disproves 
Guiso et al. ' s findings in his investigation of whether religious contents affected growth 
and noted that that the impact of Islam on economic performance is indeterminate. 
Barro and McClearly (2002) find religious affiliation statistically significant, but they 
find no- robust relationship between adherence to major world religions and national 
economic performance. 
The Islamic religion, proxied through Muslims population share, when 
introduced into standard growth models, does not provide robust statistical results. 
24 Kuran (1997) provides a review of the various arguments put forward to explain the underdevelopment 
of Muslims or Muslim majority nations. 
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Muslim countries do not appear to deviate systematically from the norm in any 
observable way. The economic performance of Muslim countries is what its economic 
fundamentals would suggest (Noland 2003 ; Noland and Pack 2004). 
In the paper titled 'Africa ' s Growth Tragedy', Easterly and Levine (1997) 
attributed Africa's poor performance to its high level of ethnic diversity. They show that 
ethnic diversity affects economic performance by working i1_1directly through public 
policies, political instability and several other economic factors. In a cross-section of 
122 countries, Grafton, Kompas and Owen (2007) show that, even after controlling for 
initial income, investment rate, trade openness, technology, measures of mass 
communication and institutional quality, linguistic barriers to communication reduces 
productivity and capital accumulation. 
There have also been several studies that demonstrate how other aspects of poor 
quality institutions lead to slow growth and low incomes. Corruption has been found to 
impact negatively on investment·and hence capital accumulation (Mauro 1995). 
Furthermore, low quality institutions have also been found to reduce aggregate 
productivity (Hall and Jones 1999). In their analysis, Hall and Jones showed that 
differences in physical and human capital explained only partially the variation in 
output per worker. They note that differences in capital accumulation, productivity and 
hence, output per worker were driven by differences in institutions and government 
policies, which they termed social infrastructure. Differences in growth rates among 
developing countries can also be caused by differences in the quality of institutions 
(Olson et al. 2000). 
There have been a number of recent empirical studies affirming that geography -
natural resources, climate, soil conditions, topography and ' landlocked-ness ' - have a 
direct impact on economic growth affecting (agricultural) productivity, economic 
structure, transport costs and competitiveness (Sachs and Warner 1997; Bloom and 
Sachs 1998). Researchers used numerous variables, including latitude, proportion of 
land close to coast, average temperatures and rainfall , soil quality and disease ecology 
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to measure the impact of geography on economic growth (Hall and Jones 1999; Easterly 
and Levine 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004). 
Others (Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004) found no effect of 
geography on growth after controlling for institutions. Rodrik et al. (2004) for example 
demonstrated that the quality of institutions25 was far more important than geography 
and international trade in determining income levels. Rodrik et al. (2004) demonstrates 
that once institutions are controlled for, international trade has no direct effect on 
incomes while geography, has at best weak direct effects. Rodrik et al. (2004) however 
do not suggest that this establishes the unimportance of international trade and 
geography in influencing income levels. 
The second key conclusion is that productivity rather than factor accumulation 
may be the driving force behind growth performance. This is borne out in several 
seminal studies. The Solow model, which first sought to explain long-term trends in 
economic growth, was found to leave a large unexplained residual, suggesting that 
capital and labour accumulation alone do not fully explain growth (Limam and Miller 
2004). 
Growth accounting analysis generally assumes that this residual, termed the 
Solow residual, captures total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is simply the 
improvements in the efficiency with which the capital and labour inputs are used. By 
defining capital to include physical and human capital, Mankiw (1995), finds results 
that are closer to neo-classical theoretical predications (Limam and Miller 2004). 
Romer and Lucas's endogenous growth theory considers the effect of variables 
such as trade, human capital and endogenous technology on output growth and the 
different mechanisms of technology diffusion. A key finding was that the sources of 
TFP growth differ between developed and developing countries. Technological 
innovations provide the main source of TFP growth in developed economies while 
developing countries face the challenge of acquiring and absorbing foreign technology 
25 Rodrik et al. (2004) focused on the role of property rights and rule of law when evaluating institutions. 
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(Limam and Mi ller 2004 ). Hence, it is the innovation and absorption components of 
TFP growth that determine cross-country differences in income growth rates. 
Helpman's (2004) review of the empirical literature on international knowledge 
spill-over finds positive evidence: that is, less-developed countries do benefit from 
foreign stock of knowledge. However, the output gain in industrial countries is larger. 
Helpman concludes, therefore, that investment in innovation in developed countries 
leads to divergence of income levels between the poor and rich. 
Total factor productivity or 'something else' as Easterly and Levine (2001) put it 
when referring to the residual , and not factor accumulation, is what accounts for the 
most of the income and growth differences across nations. Easterly and Levine, 
however, do not argue that factor accumulation is unimportant in general nor that it is 
not critical at specific junctures. 
HIGH PERFORMING EAST ASIAN ECO OMIES . 
The interesting question is: which of the above two conclusions of the empirics 
of the determinants of growth can explain the economic performance of East Asia. It is 
argued by many that the second conclusion that TFP growth is the main driver of 
economic growth is more relevant to explaining the growth performance of East Asia 
though that view is contradicted by some. 
For example, few authors have argued that the 'East Asian Miracle ' 26 was built 
simply on capital accumulation and that productivity growth played a minimal role 
(Young 1992; Krugman 1994). A counter-view to Krugman (1994) and Young's (1992) 
h pothesis, is that these economies grew spectacularly because of their capacity to 
generate new ideas, put them into practice and to de elop new skills and learn to use 
efficient! , imported technology was ad anced by Romer (1993). In an examination of 
the factors that contributed to the faster economic growth among the East Asian 
-
6 The term •miracle ' was used by the orld Bank (1993) in a comprehensive assessment of the East 
sian growth experience . This , as discussed in the preceding chapter. 
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economies relative to other economies in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) group, Drysdale and Huang (1997) found that TFP growth was an important 
factor in explaining the rapid growth in the East Asian economies while the findings of 
Han et al. (2004) were that the TFP growth and technical efficiency of the East Asian 
economies were normal when compared to developed economies but that their input 
growth was the main contributor to rapid economic growth. 
These contrasting arguments were investigated by Nelson and Pack (1999). In 
their study of the growth literature relating to the East Asian economies, they identified 
two strands of thinking. The first strand was the technology assimilation interpretation. 
This interpretation stresses entrepreneurship, innovation and learning aspects, which 
were encouraged by favourable domestic policies. It argues that these economies had to 
go through this investment in learning before they could master the new technologies 
that they were adopting from developed economies. This view saw human and physical 
capital as a necessary but insufficient condition for growth. 
The second strand was the accumulation theory which argues the converse. It 
suggests that it was the massive investment in human and physical capital that was 
driving growth. Nelson and Pack conclude that the rapid growth in East Asian 
economies was indeed driven by TFP, identifying a major change in the structure of the 
economies including shifts in the size of firms and the sectors of specialisation that was 
associated with rapid economic growth. Nelson and 'Pack (1999) conclude that the 
'marshalling of inputs ' did contribute to part of the story but, more importantly, it was 
the entrepreneurial capabilities, and the emphasis on innovation and learning by doing 
that were facilitated by appropriate institutions that is the big part of the story. 
THE KEY ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The key findings points to .the importance of institutions as deep determinants of 
long term economic growth. The literature demonstrates clearly that although proximate 
factors are important to driving growth, institutions matter most significantly. This is 
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clear in the East Asian case. If only human and capital accumulation explained 
economic growth (as per Krugrnan ' s 1994 argument), or getting the macroeconomic 
environment right, then the lesson for other countries would be simple: raise the levels 
of investment and ensure macroeconomic stability . However, this has not been the case 
in many countries. The East Asian economies also paid close attention to institutions 
that promoted entrepreneurship, learning by doing and innov_ation, and social stability 
abo e and beyond the two principles stated earlier. Institutions therefore function as the 
meta-structure within v hich other factors are able to function. Challenges related to 
managing society trade, geography, human capital ( entrepreneurship, ideas, and 
inno ation) and investment in factors of production - physical and technological -can 
be mitigated or o ercome b appropriate institutional structures. 
These tv o findings provide a framev ork to anal se the circumstances in which 
Mala sia finds itself. The literature re ie noted that regime type did not matter to 
economic performance. What mattered to economic growth as political stability and 
t!ala sia is a political! stable countr , ha ing not experienced any regime change since 
it gained independence. Its competiti e authoritarian regime (Le itsky and Way 2002)27 
is ,, id 1 credited to ha e deli ered on economic growth, ealth distribution and 
political and social stabili orld Bank 1993 ; CGD 2008). 
Despite the success noted abo e, producti i in Mala sia is on a downtrend 
trend while ala sia ' s human capital and technological capaci and capability are 
mediocre at best despite significant in estments into ph sical and human capital. This 
rai e the que tion of the efficac of falaysia sin titutions. Why are Malaysia 's 
in titution not capable of addressing the middle-income trap? at are the significant 
differ nc between the in titution in I fala sia and the successful East sian Tigers? 
-
7 Le it ky and v\ a~ QQ_ defines ompetitive authori tarianism as authoritarian regimes that rely on 
formal demo rati institution a the principle means of obtaining and exercising political authority. The 
in um bent regime however violate the bas ic norm of democracy often and to such exient that the 
regime fail to meet onvent:ional minimum standards fo r a democracy. There is consensus that alaysia 
i a mp t:itive authoritarian regime in that 1a1ay ia i not a liberal democracy, but ne ither is it 
auth ritarian. 
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The literature review also noted that high income inequality and ethnic-
religious-cultural-linguistic fragmentation can lead to weak social capital and/or to 
governments that develop poor institutions which then negatively impact on economic 
growth. Interestingly, these ethnic-religious-cultural-linguistic fragmentations are 
important factors where there is a significant difference between the successful East 
Asian Tigers and Malaysia. Could these factors - the ethnic-religious-cultural-linguistic 
fragmentation in Malaysia - be the deep determinants that have influenced the efficacy 
of the political, economic and social institutions in Malaysia? And could it be that these 
institutions have contributed to Malaysia' s weak human capital development and high 
income inequality? 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a review of the literature on the theories of economic 
growth. The review focused on three key issues: the transformation of the growth 
literature from a focus on 'factor accumulation ' to the 'deep structural determinants ' of 
growth; what these growth theories say about long run economic growth; and the role of 
institutions in the growth process. A key interest is how this theory might apply to the 
case of Malaysia. 
The literature review suggests three important findings that inform this research. 
First, there is currently no unified economic growth theory to adequately explain the 
growth phenomenon. This has led researchers to rely on partial theories and frameworks 
to explain the role of various factors in determining economic performance and growth. 
Theories such as neoclassical economics, endogenous growth theory, the new trade 
theory, the new economic geography, new institutional economics, and evolutionary 
economics, are some ways in which economists have tried to explain economic growth. 
The various empirical strategies employed have also led to differing conclusions. This 
provides strong support for a research approach that uses a combination of economic 
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theories and approaches to investigate the challenges that Malaysia is facing in 
overcoming the middle-income trap. 
The second important finding is that institutions broadly defined to include all 
forms of social-economic-political and cultural constructs, matter in determining 
incomes and growth rates. These factors influence combine in different ways to 
influence political stability which matters for economic growth. Societies with high 
social capital contribute positively to economic growth, and the converse in societies 
with weak social capital. Regimes, either democratic or non-democratic, can achieve 
economic growth, if there is political stability. 
The third important finding is that productivity growth and not factor 
accumulation alone may be a main driving force behind growth performance. In the 
East Asian Tigers, institutions that promoted the entrepreneurial capabilities and the 
emphasis on innovation and learning by doing were instrumental in driving this 
productivity growth. 
These three key findings provide the framework within which this research 
undertakes further analysis on Malaysia ' s economic circumstance. This literature review 
identifies the possibility that ethnic-religious-cultural-linguistic fragmentation can lead 
to weak institutions and poor economic policies, which then leads to weak economic 
growth. 
Chapter 3 discusses institutions more comprehensively and seeks to identify an 
appropriate research strategy to answer the issues that have been raised. 
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Chapter 3 Institutions, human capital development and income 
inequality 
How do we account for the persistence of poverty in the midst of plenty? If we 
knew the source of plenty, why don't poor countries simply adopt policies that 
make for plenty? ... We must create incentives for people to invest in more 
efficient technology, increase their skills and organise efficient markets. Such 
incentives are embodied in institutions. 
North (2002, p.3) 
Institutions are like a black box and are often not defined but taken as a given. 
This chapter has three objectives: to identify a suitable definition for institutions; to 
identify a schema within which to classify institutions; and to identify an appropriate 
method to measure them. This threefold set of objectives is important in developing a 
framework that can meaningfully explain the role of institutions in contributing to 
Malaysia's current human capital development and income inequality outcomes. This is 
relevant in identifying suitable and feasible reform measures. 
DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING INSTITUTIONS 
Chapter 2 identified the importance of institutions in long term economic 
growth. Despite the importance of institutions in economic growth, the challenge in 
analysing the impact of institutions on economic growth ·derives from the inability to 
define what institutions are. Some of the basic difficulties come from the complexity in 
identifying the focal point of analysis. Is it the rules and regulations, the organisations, 
the actors, or particular behaviour or a combination of these factors in which interest 
lies (Dje"Iic 201 0)? The functions of institutions themselves are complex. An institution 
could be serving more than one function and at the same time many institutions could 
be serving the same function. Conversely the same function could be served by different 
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institutions in different societies or in different time periods (Chang 2006). This 
complexity is also experienced in Malaysia28 . 
There are three major perspectives on institutions. The first is the disciplinary 
perspective (for example sociology, political science and economics); the second an 
epistemological or conceptual perspective (for example rational choice, historical or 
cultural); and the third a geographical perspective (such as the German or the American 
school) (Djelic 2010). In general, the institutional perspective across the various 
disciplines begins with the basic recognition that human activities, including economic 
activities, are embedded and framed within larger institutional schemes and tends to be 
stable (Djelic 2010). Since, human activities are at the core of institutions, then 'what' 
constraints and incentivises human activities can be defined as institutions. In this logic, 
North's (1991) widely used definition of institutions as ' the rules of the game in society ' 
is most appropriate. North defines institutions as: 
... the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both information constraints ( sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules ( constitutions, laws, 
property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human 
beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with the 
standard constraints of economics they define the choice set and therefore 
determine transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and 
feasibility of engaging in economic activity. 
North (1991 , p. 97) 
This definition provides the broadest possible conceptualisation of what 
institutions are. By defining institutions to include formal and informal constraints and 
incentives, North (1991) effectively includes all aspects of human activity, be it in the 
field of economics, socio-cultural and political institutions such as religion, culture and 
political systems and their impact on economic growth into the analysis. 
28 There is sufficient literature both praising and deriding Malays ia ' s leaders, organi sations and policies. 
The Commission of Growth and Development (2008) and the World Bank (1994) are examples ofreports 
praising Malaysia, while the works of KS Jomo and E.T. Gomez are indicative of the literature that 
highlights Malaysia ' s leadership, institutional and policy weakness and fai lures. 
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Using North ' s definition allows the research to incorporate all aspects of the 
deep determinants that relate to institutions that were highlighted in Chapter 2. This 
ranged from regime type or system of government, organisations and government 
policies and the interaction of religion, culture, ethnicity and language of the key 
stakeholders on them - that eventually has an impact on economic growth. Religion, 
culture, ethnicity and language are particularly important as it appears that Malaysia 
differs significantly in these characteristics from the successful East Asian Tigers. 
North's definition however does not fully address the challenge of institutional 
analysis for identifying the links between institutions and their impact on economic 
growth. Undertaking analysis on institutions requires analysis at multiple levels. This 
challenge is partly resolved by Hollingsworth's (2000) mapping of institutions as set-
out in Table 7. As noted, an important characteristic of institutions is their persistence 
and its stability. One way then of classifying or organising institutions is to rank them in 
terms of their resilience or resistance to change. Hollingsworth (2000) does precisely 
this. Theoretically, each of the components in the various levels is related. For example, 
rules, markets, education system, ministries, schools, statutes and sectoral performance 
are all different types of institutions and are inter-related. The ability to reform these 
different components differs depending on their resilience or resistance to change. 
Changing a statue or an administrative decision is much easier than changing a rule. 
Hollingsworth organises these components in a descending order of stability or 
permanence. The components at higher levels are more permanent and durable, while 
those at lower levels change more rapidly. 
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Table 7 Institutional levels and components of institutional analysis 
Institutional level 
Level 1 - Institutions 
Level 2 - Institutional 
arrangements 




Level 5 - Outputs and 
performance 
Components 
Norms; rules; conventions; habits and values; 
Markets; states; corporate hierarchies; networks; 
associations; communities; 
Financial system; system of education; business system; 
systems of research 
Entities in civil society and public and private sectors e.g. 
firms; government departments; ministries; schools; non -
governmental organisation 
Statutes; administrative decisions; the nature, quantity and 
the quality of industrial products; sectoral and societal 
performance 
Source Hollingsworth, (2000). 
At the first level, there are the basic norms, rules, conventions, habits and values 
of a society. These are the most fundamental properties of institutions and are the most 
enduring and resistant to change. Most human activity is organised and regulated by 
norms and rules and systems of rules, both formal and informal (Burns and Dietz 2001 ). 
The components in level 1 are the most important as they exert the greatest influence on 
the components at the next four levels. The approach undertaken in this research argues 
that norms, rules, habits, conventions and values both reflect and shape the preference 
of actors. These Level 1 institutions influence and determine 'who' and 'what' are 
included in different types of decision making (Shepsle 1986; 1989). Although it is 
recognised that there is heterogeneity in the 'rules of the game' (institutions) at the 
different levels of institutions and that this may vary from situation to situation, there 
are meta-rules and norms which encompass all other lower level rules or situations. 
This schema is useful as it allows for the identification of where the actual 
institutional reforms have been made in the hierarchy of Malaysia' s institutional 
architecture and where despite attempts to reform, have stalled. The schema also allows 
the research to undertake specific institutional analysis relating to human capital 
development and income inequality. Finally it provides a context in terms of the limits 
to institutional reforms in Malaysia. Plausible reasons for these limits can then be 
explored. The identification of these limits is critical as implementing successful 
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institutional reforms requires a thorough understanding of where the strongest 
challenges will arise against the proposed reforms. 
ANALYSING AND MEASURING INSTITUTIONS 
This research undertakes an analysis of institutions at two levels to answer the 
research questions posed and, in particular, to examine the challenges posed by 
Malaysia' s racial , religious and cultural diversity. The analysis of institutions at the first 
level examines the impact of institutions on the macroeconomic performance of the 
economy. The analysis of institutions at the second level investigates the links of 
institutions regulating a single factor of production - human capital - in the 
manufacturing sector. The analysis of the effect of institutions on human capital in the 
manufacturing sector in this research is limited to a discussion on Malaysia' s formal 
public education and training system. 
Chapter 2 surveyed the literature on the theory and empirics of the links between 
institutions and economic growth. The literature surveyed highlighted the challenges in 
modelling this link. The process of integrating institutions and institutional change into 
economic theory is still in its infancy and most attempts are less than satisfactory (Tao 
Kong 2007). Moreover, the growth literature does not subscribe to one overarching 
definition of economic, political or social institutions, their process of change, and their 
' 
likely channels of influence on economic outcomes (Aron 2000). 
To address these challenges, the empirical literature on economic growth uses a 
wide range of indicators to capture the various aspects of institutions. This includes 
including institutional quality (for example the enforcement of property rights), political 
stability (for example the frequency of riots , coups or civil wars), characteristics of 
political regimes (for example how free and fair elections are, how liberal is the 
constitution, and how strong are executive powers), social capital (the extent of civic 
activity and organisations), and social characteristics (differences in income and in 
ethnicity, languages spoken, religious, and historical background). Some of these 
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indicators reflect processes, while others capture performances. These indicators also 
differ in terms of quality of coverage, both geographically and temporally (Quibria 
2006). 
The character of these institutional indicators can be divided into two categories. 
The first are the objective measures of institutions or governance such as (i) measures of 
political instability and violence and (ii) political institutions: Relevant databases for 
this category are the Polity Database and the Database of Political Institutions and 
Political Constraints Index (Williams and Siddique 2008). The second are the subjective 
measures of institutions. This category includes (i) Freedom House index of civil and 
political liberties and (ii) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). There are also 
many other political risk ratings such as Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
(BERI) and Business Monitor International (BMI) (Williams and Siddique 2008). 
Researchers often rely on several of these types of individual indicators to 
capture the features of institutions although each has a potentially different channel of 
influence on growth. Suffice it to say that all these definitional and empirical challenges 
make modelling institutions and institutional change highly complex and difficult. This 
research does not attempt to model institutions and institutional change except in 
analysing the links between institutions and economic output at the macroeconomic 
level in Chapter 4. All of the empirical strategy is based on standard neoclassical theory 
which is discussed comprehensively within the chapters in which it is utilised. 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is used as the measure for 
institutional quality in Chapter 4. The WGI consists of six composite indicators of broad 
dimensions of governance covering over 200 countries since 1996. The six composite 
indicators are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption. These six composite indicators are based on approximately 150 
different indicators that are obtained from 31 different data sources, capturing 
governance perceptions as reported by survey respondents (experts and non-experts), 
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non-government organisations, commercial business information providers and public 
sector organisations worldwide. 
It is also important to recognise that governance is different from institutions. If 
institutions are defined as the 'rules of the game' then governance is the 'rules for the 
rulers within the rules of the game. ' 
The WGI definition of governance has three key elements: 
... the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country are exercised. 
This includes (a) the process by which government are selected, monitored and 
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and ( c) the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them ... 
Two measures of governance are constructed to correspond to each of the three 
areas, resulting in the six composite indicators. 
Table 8 Industrial development patterns and human capital profile 
Governance area 










The respect of 
citizens and the state 
for the institutions 
that govern 




(1) Voice and accountability (VA) - capturing perceptions of 
the extent to which a country' s citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and free media. 
(2) Political stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) 
- capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically motivated violence and 
terrorism. 
(3) Government effectivene,ss (GE) - capturing perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, a!1d the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
(4) Regulatory quality (RQ)- capturing perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
(5) Rule of Law (RL)- capturing perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police and the courts as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
(6) Control of Corruption (CC) - capturing perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
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including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
'capture' of the state by elitist and private interests. 
Source World Governance Indicators, (2012). 
The WGI have been criticised from several standpoints (Arndt and Oman 2006; 
Thomas 2007; Langbein and Knack 2009; Kurtz and Scharank 2007). These various 
critiques can be organised into four major categories (Kaufmann et al. 2010; Carmen 
2009). The first is the usefulness of the WGI or the aggregation methodology used; the 
second are the various 'sorts of biases' in the individual indicators underlying the WGI, 
the third concerns the independence of the assessment of governance provided by 
different data sources, and finally identifying the causality between governance and 
growth. 
The authors of the WGI have responded by explaining that the usefulness of the 
WGI stems from the fact that (a) they provide a very broad country coverage, greater 
than that provided by any individual data source on governance; (b) by averaging 
information from many different data sources, the WGI is able conveniently to 
summarise the existing information on governance; (c) by averaging, the WGI also 
smooth ens out some of the inevitable idiosyncrasies of individual measures of 
governance. This allows the WGI to be more informative about the broad notions of 
governance that they are intended to measure than any individual data source; and (d) 
the estimates of governance are accompanied by explicit margin of errors that 
transparently indicate the unavoidable degree of uncertainty associated with measuring 
governance by any means (Kaufman et al. 2010). 
This research uses the WGI for three reasons. First, measuring institutions is still 
imperfect. Each institutional measure has its strengths and its weaknesses. Several of the 
critiques of the WGI indicators are also equally applicable to other indicators that 
attempt to measure institutional quality and institutional change. Second, the WGI is a 
long standing research project to develop cross-country indicators of governance that is 
constantly improving the method of its measurements. It is also accepted as an industry 
benchmark (Quibria 2006). Thirdly and most important, the WGI meets one of the key 
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objectives of this research, which is to identify a suitable method to measure the impacts 
of institutions on economic output at the macroeconomic level. This is necessary to 
identify the type of institutions that matter at the different levels of income. These 
results can provide some measure for Malaysia to focus on improving institutional 
quality in specific areas as it faces the middle-income trap. 
INSTITUTIONS IN HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
The second level of institutional analysis undertaken here is at the sectoral level 
in the manufacturing sector, focusing on human capital. As an economy industrialises 
and incomes start to rise, it will experience structural change and ideally, as a response, 
industries move up the value chain. This involves upgrading technological levels, which 
exerts demand for more skills, for higher skills and for different types of skills. 
Institutions in tum evolve to meet this demand for more, higher, and different types of 
skills. Lall (1999) provides a general description of the evolution of institutions; the 
demand for human capital and technological capabilities as the pattern of industrial 
development and the structure of the economy changes as set-outjn Table 9. Lall ' s 
(1999) exposition provides us with an overview of the required institutions and the 
required human capital development at the various stages of industrial development, and 
the attendant technological level. 
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Table 9 Industrial development patterns and human capital profile 









level , with 
export-oriented 
activities in light 
industry, some 















own design and 
technology base 
Source Lall , (1999). 
Skills 
Literacy, simple technical and 
managerial training. Practically 
no in-firm training except 
informal on-job learning 
Good secondary and technical 
schooling and financial 
management training. Low base 
of engineering and scientific 
skills. In house training mainly 
by export oriented enterprises. 
SMEs have low skill levels 
Broad but often low quality 
schooling, vocational and 
industrial training. Broad 
engineering base. In-house 
training lagging. Management 
and marketing skills weak. 
SMEs have some modern skills 
Excellent quality schooling and 
industrial training. High levels 
of university trained scientists, 
engineers and managers. 
Training institutes responsive to 
industrial needs. Large 
investment in formal and 
informal in-firm training. SMEs 
have high skill levels and 
competence. 
Technological capabilities 
Ability to master assembly 
technologies, copy simple 
designs, repair machines, but 
many activities operate well 
below world best practise levels 
of technical efficiency 
World class assembly, layout, 
process engineering and 
maintenance in export oriented 
industries. In other, capability 
to undertake minor adaptations 
to processes and products. 
Little or no design/development 
capabilities. Technology 
institutions weak. 
Process mastery of capital and 
skill intensive technologies but 
with inefficiencies. 
Considerable backward 
linkages. Significant adaptation 
of imported technologies. Little 
innovation, low linkages with 
universities and technology 
institutions. 
Ability to monitor, import and 
adapt state of art advanced 
technologies. Good design and 
development capabilities in 
sophisticated technologies. 
Deep local linkages with 
suppliers, buyers, consultants, 
universities and technology 
institutions. 
The role of educational and training institutions, research and development 
institutions, firm networks and labour markets will change concurrently through the 
different stages of development as the demand for skills changes (ADB 2004). As an 
example, at low-income levels, the education and training system focuses on providing 
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the basic education and low level skills. As the economy moves to middle-income 
levels, the focus is on delivering universal secondary education, the deepening of 
vocational and technical education particularly at post-secondary technical level. The 
up-skilling and retooling of the labour force is also given emphasise through life-long 
learning. When countries achieve high-income levels, education and training institutions 
focus on delivering labour force with higher education especially in science and 
engineering. There are also high rates of social learning with strong linkages between 
universities, specialised R&D agencies and firms in the economy. 
A developed economy will have most of its labour force and therefore its human 
capital, within the skilled workforce category. However developing countries that are 
transitioning from middle-income to high-income face several challenges in creating the 
demand for knowledge; for the provision of education and training for knowledge and 
the creation of effective demand for this skilled labour, for several reasons discussed 
below. 
The provision of education and training is vulnerable to collective action and 
coordination problems. Two specific conditions give rise to this problem. The first 
relates to the public good nature of knowledge. Outcomes from education and training 
have certain public good characteristics. Once these outcomes are produced, those who 
have not paid for them are not easily excluded from benefitting from this investment. 
Furthermore, many skills are generic rather than firm specific, and as such are 
transferable. Although such skills are important for the efficient allocation of labour 
across industries which leads to economy wide efficiency gains and improved labour 
mobility, it often leads to firms under-investing because of the risk that a free riding 
firm will, poach the worker once he/she has been trained (Booth and Snower 1996). 
State interventions in market institutions in cases such as these are necessary as the 
social returns exceed the private returns (Arrow 1962). 
· The second aspect of the public good nature is that the generation of human 
capital requires investment in learning institutions such as schools, technical and 
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vocational colleges, universities and institutions that specialise in research and 
development. In developing countries there is an added imperative of acquiring frontier 
technologies, the knowledge of these technologies and disseminating the knowledge to 
local firms to enable them to catch up. This raises a collective action challenge. 
Institutions can play a critical role in acquiring these technologies and making them 
publicly available to speed up the learning process (Gerschei:iJ<ron 1962). Korea and 
Taiwan are said to have raised the availability and quality of human capital and 
shortened the learning the learning experience of developed Western economies and 
Japan through institutional interventions (Johnson 1987; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). 
Thirdly, the demand for skilled labour is positively correlated with firm level 
innovation (World Bank 1997; Zeufack 1999) and a firm's knowledge assets are 
positively associated with firm level innovation (Thornbill 2006). Private agents are 
unlikely to participate in market-driven activities when the risks involved are not 
matched by commensurate returns. This includes investing in employee training and 
R&D initiatives. This has important implications to tacit and implicit knowledge and the 
demand for skilled labour. Given the tacit and spontaneous nature of a number of 
entrepreneurial actions, formal contracts can never be exhaustive and hence will always 
involve moral hazards. 
There is a considerable body of literature that has demonstrated how a systemic 
framework with a blend of influence from markets and social capital (trust and loyalty) 
have been instrumental in driving productive networks of industrial synergies (Rasiah 
and Lin 2005). Social capital (trust and loyalty) then becomes a critical mode of 
governance to ensure that entrepreneurial synergies are expanded rather than contracted. 
This social capital is best engendered through formal integrated cluster networks 
(Rasiah 2002; 2005). The term ' cluster' refers to a network of inter-connected firms , 
institutions and other organisations that enjoy systemic links from integrated 
coordination relationships. The synergy created and appropriated in industrial districts 
depends on the strength of clustering and the presence of these institutions. 
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Agglomeration of firms enjoying strong network cohesion between them and 
institutions are likely to offer greater flexibility in the use of human capital, knowledge 
and technology, and market synergies than those of individual firms. 
Fourthly, there may be various imperfections in the factor markets that lead to 
sub-optimal levels of human capital. These could be labour market imperfections such 
as: (i) the presence of transaction costs caused by matching and search frictions ; (ii) the 
presence of asymmetric information such as that between the employer and worker, 
between current employer of the worker and other firms in the economy, and between 
workers and educational and training providers about the quality of training; and (iii) 
capital market imperfections caused by credit constraints or when workers are uncertain 
about future wages; and (iv) various policies that alter the supply and demand of labour 
in the manufacturing sector. 
These challenges of developing human capital and technological catch-up are 
exacerbated further by Malaysia's political system. Malaysia is classified as an electoral 
authoritarian state (Levitsky and Way 2002). Regime types as discussed, does not 
matter to economic growth but political stability does. Malaysia ' s ruling coalition is 
essentially a distributional coalition that represents the main ethnic groups in Malaysia 
(Ritchie 2005). This ruling coalition has provided stability through both repressive and 
responsive measures (Crouch 1996). The repressive measures included harsh treatment 
of labour (Ritchie 2005; Kuruvilla 1995; 1996). Conventional literature suggests that the 
ruling coalition had ensured stability to a large extent: (1) by significant amount of 
social spending ( especially in the areas of health, education and infrastructure); (2) by 
ensuring that the interests of the majority ethnic indigenous community (the 
Bumiputeras in general but the Malays in particular) that were economically backward 
were met through extensive affirmative action policies and control of the political 
system; and (3) by guarantying the rights of the different minority ethnic groups were 
not curtailed excessively through these extensive affirmative action policies through a 
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relatively liberal economic and cultural system (Athukorala and Menon 1997; Faaland 
et al. 2003; Ragayah 2011). 
The institutional analysis undertaken in this research explores the interaction 
between the distributional coalition with policy outcomes in the area of human capital 
development and addressing income inequality and its impact of manufacturing sector 
performance. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter had undertaken three important tasks that have laid the groundwork 
for the framework to undertake the institutional analysis to address the research 
questions. Firstly, this chapter identified North's (1991) widely used definition of 
institutions as 'the rules of the game in society ' . Secondly, the chapter recognised that 
undertaking institutional analysis requires analysis at multiple levels. Hollingsworth' s 
(2000) mapping of institutions according to their resistance to change was identified as 
a suitable way of classifying, organising and subsequently analysing institutions. 
Finally, the chapter also identified the WGI as the most suitable set of indicators to 
measure the quality of institutions at the macroeconomic level. 
This research undertakes analysis of institutions at two levels. First, at the 
macroeconomics level, this research will analyse the impact of institutions on the 
macroeconomic performance of the economy. The WGI is utilised in this analysis 
which is undertaken in Chapter 4. Second, the analysis of institutions is undertaken at 
the sectoral level , and more specifically, the manufacturing sector. The discussion is 
centred around the nature and the challenges that institutions regulating education and 
training faces in the provision of education and training in general, but more 
specifically, research and development institutions, firm networks and labour markets in 
relation to human capital development, technological upgrading and addressing income 
inequality in the manufacturing sector. The chapter also identified that these challenges 
are exacerbated by the nature of Malaysia ' s political system which institutionalises 
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ethnically based distributional coalition. All of these taken together, sets-up the 
framework that is used in explaining the outcomes of Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 8 
extends the institutional analysis using Hollingsworth (2000) schema to explain possible 
root causes of the outcomes in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 discusses the links 
between institutional quality and economic output. 
63 
Chapter 4 Institutions that matter: a comparative analysis 
Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the 
lowest barbarism, but peace easy taxes and tolerable administration of justice; all 
the rest being brought by the natural course of things. 
Adam Smith (1776, cited in Bhattacharya 2006, p. 16). 
There is growing agreement on the influence of the various types of institutions 
on economic growth at the different stages of development and levels of income. In this 
chapter, the relationship between institutional quality (measured by the governance 
indicators) and economic performance (measured through selected macroeconomic 
variables) for a broad sample of countries from all income levels over the period 1990 
to 2008, is investigated. The objective here is to determine the influence of the various 
types of institutions on economic growth across the different country income levels. 
THE HYPOTHESIS 
Chapter 2 suggested that a useful distinction between proximate causes and deep 
determinants of economic growth. The proximate causes of growth are accumulation of 
both tangible and intangible factors of production and productivity (how effectively 
these factors of production are combined to produce outputs). The deep determinants of 
growth are the underlying main factors that determine the rate of factor accumulation 
and productivity. Chapter 2 also argued that institutions, more than any other deep 
determinant, contributed significantly although not exclusively to economic growth. 
Chapter 3 provided the definition, classification and some appropriate ways for 
measurement of institutions that can be applied in this research. 
Building on the findings of Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter tests the hypothesis 
that poor quality or weak institutions should on average be associated with lower 
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economic performance. 29 The chapter also investigates whether different types of 
institutions matter at the different levels of income. 
There are three possible channels via which poor quality institutions can affect 
economic performance. The first channel is through dysfunctional aspects of institutions 
acting as a tax on productive activities and therefore reducing the amount of production 
that accrues to productive units. This would not only provide a disincentive to 
accumulating productive resources but also to using those resources intensively, and 
results in lower productivity. Corruption, political violence and instability are examples 
of these 'taxes'. These institutional characteristics are a form of tax because they 
increase the risk associated with economic activity and have the effect of reducing the 
returns on investments and production. 
The second way in which poor quality institutions may result in lower efficiency 
is by providing an incentive to divert effort away from productive activities. As 
illustration, weak rule of law that results in widespread theft or expropriation constrains 
agents to invest in the protection of their property. Similarly, an ill-designed regulatory 
framework may encourage agents to spend resources in trying to take advantage of the 
loopholes in the protection of intellectual property rights through litigation instead of 
trying to innovate. Likewise, if the government is ineffective or unpredictable, agents 
will find it more profitable to devote time and effort to rent-seeking activities. 
Depending on the rest of the institutional framework; rent-seeking appears either in the 
guise of lobbying or corrupting activities that can often be viewed as the two sides of 
the same coin. 
Thirdly, mal-functioning institutions may encourage the accumulation of 
unsuitable production factors. Henisz (2000) for instance argues that political risk 
results in the accumulation of generic30 instead of specific, and therefore more efficient, 
capital. As the argument goes, generic capital has an option value because it can be 
29 Economic performance here means the actual performance relative to potential performance 
(Armstrong et al. 2011). This concept is derived from the production literature and is explained in detail 
in the method section. 
30 Generic and specific capital relate to the type or specificity of the technology or assets that are used by 
a firm in its production process. Specific capital is more costly than generic capital although it will 
increase the competitiveness of the firm (Henisz 2000). 
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more easily reallocated to other purposes if, for instance, when the government 
suddenly cancels a license that had previously been attributed. Bad institutions, 
moreover, may slow down the diffusion of new ideas and technologies, especially if 
they inhibit foreign investment as Wei (2000) or Harms and Ursprung (2002) suggest. 
Nevertheless, counter arguments also exist. Some claim that less democratic 
regimes may be instrumental in initiating and implementing development. China and 
Malaysia stand out as illustrations of this line of reasoning. As suggested in Chapter 2, 
empirical work does not provide unmitigated evidence that democracy is associated 
with higher growth. Among the list of high-income economies, are several less 
democratic regimes such as Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and so 
on as set-out in Table 52. 
It can also be argued that corruption may raise efficiency in a country plagued 
with a desperately slow and inefficient bureaucracy. This 'grease the wheels 
hypothesis ' , where corruption is used to lubricate the stiff wheels of rigid government 
administration, was put forward by Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) and later by 
Schleifer and Vishny (1994). Although it has not received much support in the recent 
empirical literature, it cannot be dismissed on a priori grounds. More importantly, it can 
also be argued that permissive intellectual property rights might facilitate and speed up 
technology transfers. 
An inference from this literature is that different institutions matter at different 
levels of income. There are reasons for remaining cautious about the a priori 
relationship between institutions and economic performance. Although the main 
contention is that poor quality institutions hamper efficiency, qualified results should 
not come as completely surprising. Through empirical testing, a more definitive answer 
as to how the relationship between institutions and economic performance works can be 
gauged. 
THE METHOD 
The main objective here is to test the relationship between institutions and 
economic performance and to rank the performance of Malaysia in relation to 
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comparable economies over a period of time, in order to explain how this changes over 
time and explain why it does. Studies of long run economic performance are focusing 
increasingly on institutions (political, economic and social) as an explanatory of long 
run economic growth. This fits in with the broad argument that economic growth is no 
longer considered to be linear or gradual, involving the inevitable transformation from 
self-sufficiency to specialisation or from low-income to high-income (Helpman 2004). 
Instead, economic growth follows the creation and evolution of institutions that support 
social and commercial relationships (Klien and Luu 2002) and the ability to mitigate 
external shocks. Within the framework of this research, institutions that help to achieve 
this promote economic growth. 
Institutions facilitate growth by reducing the potential hazards to economic 
transactions (trade and/or commercial relationships) such as shirking, opportunism, 
predatory behaviour, risks, and the like. This is done through institutions that enforce 
secure property rights, reliable procedures for resolving disputes and the ability to 
enforce contracts in the absence of close social ties. These institutions reduce 
information costs, encourage capital formation and mobility, allow risks to be priced 
and shared and facilitate cooperation (North 1990; Drobak and Nye 1997; Levine 1997). 
In particular, political authorities must make credible commitments not to expropriate 
private resources once investments are made successfully (Furobotn and Richter 2010; 
North 1991). 
Despite widespread agreement that institutions matter, there is no consensus on 
how institutions should be incorporated into analysis or what model to use, as discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 3. The current approach in the growth literature is eclectic in nature. 
Different.researchers have their owri preferences, dependent on the theory, which they 
deem important. 
In terms of model specification, growth theories are usually built on either the 
neoclassical models or endogenous growth models and their extensions. The approach 
here is slightly different and analyses the relationship between institutions and overall 
economic perfonnance by appealing to production literature. This research models 
economic performance using a stochastic frontier approach following the production 
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literature. Stochastic frontier analysis is a sophisticated way to benchmark performance 
of productive units. It analyses economic units - firms or nations - by identifying ' best 
practice ' and evaluating each economic unit's performance relative to the best practice 
frontier. The results produce not only rankings of the quality of all economic units but 
also numerical measures of performance that can be used to assess the effects of various 
policies or characteristics. 
Another reason why the stochastic frontier approach is used is because of its 
ability to differentiate between under performance per se and random events that impact 
on performance. Traditionally, cross-country empirical analysis based on neo-classical 
economics has assumed the efficient use of inputs (Kalirajan and Shand 1999). This 
assumption that economic units are always efficient implies that actual output is the 
maximum attainable output given available inputs and that all economic units are 
equally productive for a given level of input and technology. In reality, economic units 
may use technology with varying degrees of efficiency (Bos et. al 2010). 
The stochastic production frontier analysis was first introduced independently by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, and Meeusen and van den Broeck in 1977 (Kalirajan and 
Shand 1999). They note that in the production literature, ' the production process is 
subject to two economically distinguishable disturbances, with different characteristics ' . 
The error term is therefore ' composed ' into a non-negative term that captures 
production inefficiencies and a more conventional symmetric error term, which captures 
random disturbances. The ability to differentiate the disturbance terms allows 
differentiation between inefficiency and random events (Armstrong 2009). 
This ability to differentiate the disturbance terms and hence measure 
inefficiencies has several important implications. Firstly, the inefficiency measures 
facilitate compari sons across economic units within a dataset and indicate relative 
efficiency. Secondly, where the inefficiency reveals variations, further analysis can be 
undertaken to identify the factors causing these variations. Thirdly, these analyses can 
identify policy implications (Kalirajan and Shand 1999). 
Figure 4 below presents the key concepts of the stochastic frontier approach. A 
production frontier is estimated with the stochastic frontier, providing a benchmark for 
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each economic unit regardless of its inputs. This benchmark is named as he potential 
output in the literature. Then, the inefficiency is computed by comparing the potential 
output with the observed or actual output. This measurement can then be termed the 
efficiency score of the particular economic unit. 
Figure 4 The efficiency frontier 
y 
Potenrl output /ntier 
Source Adapted from Kalirajan and Shand, (1999). 
THE MODEL 





The basic model follows the stochastic frontier31 model specified for panel data 
by Battese and Coelli's (1995). This is written as: 
Y,1 = exp(x;1 /J + V,1 -U;1) (1) 
31 The stochastic frontier approach in this study associates efficiency with respect to the ' intercept' only 
and not in the use of specific factors of production. It is however recognised that in practice, the role of 
institutions may vary in the utilization of specific factors of production (p. 62-63). In this context, the 
varying stochastic frontier maybe used (Kalirajan and Obwana, 1994). 
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Where r;, denotes the production at the t -th observation ( t = 1,2, ... , T) for the i -
th economic unit (i= 1, 2, ... , N); 
x;, is a (1 x k) vector of values of known functions of inputs of production and 
other explanatory variables associated with the i -th economic unit at the t-th 
observation; 
/3 is a ( k x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; 
V,, s are assumed to be identical and independently distributed (iid) N(O, er: ) 
random errors that are independently distributed of the U;, s; 
the U;, s are non-negative random variables, associated with technical 
(in)efficiencies of production, which are assumed to be independently distributed, such 
that U ;t is obtained by truncation at zero of the normal distribution with mean, zit a, and 
• 2 d vanance, a- ; an 
a is an ( m x 1) vector of unknown coefficients. 
Equation (1) specifies the stochastic frontier production function in terms of the 
original production values. However, the technical inefficiency effects, the U ;t s are 
assumed to be a function of a set of explanatory variables, the z it s and an unknown 
vector of coefficients, a . 
The technical inefficiency effect, U it , in Equation (1) is specified in Equation (2) 
as: 
Where the random variable, ~ t, is defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance, a- 2 such that the point of truncation is 
~ t ~ -Zita 
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(2) 
The method of maximum likelihood is proposed for simultaneous estimation of 
the parameters of the stochastic frontier and the model for the technical inefficiency 
effects and the likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters, 
2 2 2 2; 2 
a s = a" + a and r = a a s . 
The technical inefficiency of production for the i -th economic unit at the t -th 
observation is defined by equation (3): 
TE;1 = exp(-U) = exp(-z;,8-W;,) (3) 
THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
The model is applied to measure the economic performance of a country at the 
aggregate level. The efficiency of a country ' s economic performance in this context, 
measures how close a country' s output is to what its maximum production could be 
using the same set of inputs. This approach to evaluate the relationship between 
macroeconomic performance with institutional variables has already been used by 
several authors. For example, Meon and Weill (2005) tested the relationship between 
governance and macroeconomic performance for 62 countries, both developing and 
developed while Adkins et al. (2002) tested the economic performance of countries 
according to their economic freedom. 
Chapters 2 and 3 identified that physical and human capital accumulation, while 
being a necessary condition, without consideration of productivity, is insufficient in 
explaining long term growth. To analyse this, the models use output per worker to 
represent productivity and capital per worker and human capital per worker to capture 
physical and human capital accumulation. These models also assume a constant retums-
to-scale Cobb-Douglass production technology. This kind of model can then be 
rewritten as: 
(4) 
Where: i = I , 2, . . . , x, indexes countries; 
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( ~), {:) ,'( 1), are respectively output per worker, capital per worker, 32 and human 
capital per worker; 
v; is a random disturbance reflecting measurement errors and u; u; is an 
inefficiency term, capturing inefficiencies relating to governance, trade openness, 
geographical location and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. 
In the present study institutions are seen as crucial to ensuring economic and 
productivity growth as institutions determine how well factors of production are used. 
Institutional variables are captured by an index of the quality of governance and 
are model led in the inefficiency equation in the following manner: 
(5) 
Where u; is country i's iqefficiency; 
w; is the random variable defined by the truncation of the normal distribution; 
Latitude, Openness and Fractionalisation are control variables described below; and 
Governance is the relevant index of governance. 
The introduction of control variables is a natural robustness check of the simple 
bivariate relationship between governance and efficiency. The model uses three control 
variables which have been identified as deep determinants of growth in the literature: 
geography, and trade. Race and religion per se is discarded as a deep determinant as it 
does not stand empirical scrutiny. Instead social capital, which measures the 
cohesiveness of a society, is selected as an institutional variable, as it has been 
demonstrated to affect economic growth. Higher religious, cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
fragmentation has negative direct and indirect effects on economic performance and the 
32 As noted, (KIL) is the capital stock per worker or it can be stated differently as the investment per 
worker (p . 70). Capital stock is measured using gross capital formation on fixed assets (p. 72). Investment 
rates for developing countries, especially for the High Performing East Asian (HPEAs) economies are 
often much higher than in developed economies in relation to their GDPs. However this investment rate 
includes investment into human capital often in the provision of education and training (non-asset based 
investment) (p. 73). Hence, there is a difference in capital per worker and investment per worker. 
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quality of institutions (Okediji 2010). Chapter 2 reviewed the literature analysing the 
impact of heterogeneous societies on economic performance. To measure social capital, 
an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) is used as a proxy. The ELF 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals will not belong to the 
same ethno-linguistic group. Higher values of the ELF correspond to greater levels of 
fractionalisation. The index takes on a value between O and 1, where O indicates high 
ethnic homogeneity and 1 indicates high ethnic heterogeneity. The ELF index in this 
study is taken from Okedji (2010). 
Geography is proxied by latitude. A negative correlation between distance from 
the equator and growth has been repeatedly observed. The reason for this is most likely 
due to widespread disease in the tropics. Chapter 2 noted that the geography theory 
argues that the tropics carry with it several geographical burdens which impact 
negatively on growth (Sachs et al. 1999, 2001 and 2004; Diamond 1997). 
The third deep determinant is trade or economic openness. Openness to trade is 
proxied by the ratio of trade to GDP. The relationship between trade and growth is 
unsettled although there is near consensus about the theory of the positive association 
between trade flows and growth in the economics profession (Yanikkaya 2003). 
However, the evidence is mixed with some finding that openness may be significantly 
and positively related to productivity and productivity growth (for example, Edwards 
1998) with others finding the converse (for example, -Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001). 
The influence of the six different indices of governance is tested on economic 
performance at the aggregate level. Six efficiency frontiers are computed so that the 
information on the relationship between governance and economic performance for 
each index of governance are available for further analysis. Next, the presence of all 
governance variables is included in the model to test them against each other and to 
allow for comparison. All the governance variables are also tested for countries in three 
different income levels: (i) OECD economies; (ii) upper middle-income economies and 
(iii) lower middle-income and low-income economies to examine the influence of 
income levels on the relationship between governance and efficiency. 
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The Frontier 4.1 c software by Coelli (1996) is used to perform the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the stochastic frontier model. 
THE DATA 
The macroeconomic data is from the World Development Indicators dataset. 
The measurement for output (Y) is gross domestic product based (GDP) on purchasing 
power parity (PPP). These data are in constant 2005 international dollars. 
Capital (K) is measured using gross capital formation which consists of outlays 
on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of 
inventories. The data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
Total labour force (L) comprises people age 15 and older who meet the 
International Labour Organisation ' s (ILO) definition of the economically active 
population: all people who supply labour for the production of goods and services 
during a specified period. 
Human capital (H) is proxied through educational attainment which is a measure 
of the average number of years of schooling in the working-age population over 15 
years old which is similar to the ILO definition. This index had been computed by Barro 
and Lee (2000) and updated up to 2010. 
The focus is on the period from 1990 to 2008. This period is chosen for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the measurement of governance indicators began only in 1996 and 
is available biannually up to 2002 (that is, for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002), after which 
it is available annually. The governance indicators for 1996 are utilised for the period 
1990 to 1996, the 1998, 2000 and 2002 measures are used for that year and also the 
pnor year. 
Secondly, there has been a significant downtrend in Malaysia 's growth 
performance since the East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC) of 1997/98 especially when 
it is compared to the period 1990-96. One of the causes of the EAFC is argued to be 
weak governance (Wilson and Drysdale in Drysdale 2000). By testing the period from 
1990 to 2008, this study will be able to see if there have been significant changes in 
efficiency in Malaysia since the EAFC and if governance is a key influence. 
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The sample has 101 countries from all income levels. The descriptive statistics 
of the sample are displayed in Table 10. 
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Table 10 Summary statistics for non-governance variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Output per worker (In Y /L) 9.571 1.147 6.69 12.01 
Capital per worker (ln K/L) 7.181 1.547 2.48 10.34 
Human capital per worker (In H/L) 1.977 0.425 - 0.11 2.55 
Latitude 20.533 28.394 -44.28 64.15 
ELF .428 .282 0 .98 
Openness 60.176 32.294 7.99 192.12 
Note Y /L, K/L and H/L are output per worker, capital per worker and human capital per worker 
The analysis requires quantitative estimates of the quality of institutions to test 
the relationship between institutional quality and performance. Since institutional 
quality cannot be measured entirely in an objective manner, the quantitative indicators 
are measured through subjective evaluations. Chapter 3 discussed the suitability of the 
various measurements of institutional quality and identified the Governance Indicators 
as the most appropriate for our needs. 
Chapter 3 noted that the qualitative evaluations that form the basis of the 
governance indicators, come either through experts commissioned to assess the quality 
of a country' s governance or through surveys of residents carried out through profit or 
not-for-profit enterprises. Naturally these evaluations suffer from two common 
drawbacks. Firstly, as these indicators are by construction subjective, they may be 
biased. Secondly, they may not be comprehensive and maybe limited to a select number 
of countries. 
These shortcomings were addressed by Kaufmann et al. (1999a; 19996; 2010) 
by building composite indices that combined indicators developed by the two groups 
using a method termed the 'unobserved component model. ' This method allows the 
biases of individual indices to partly cancel out each other. Furthermore, as the 
Kaufmann composite indices aggregate several other indices, they provide data for a 
wider sample of countries, all-owing one index to fill the gaps left by others. 
The Kaufmann governance indicators are classified into six clusters, creating six 
composite indices which measure a particular dimension of governance. They range 
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from -2.50 to +2.5033 with higher values reflecting better quality of governance. These 
indicators capture the essence in how institutions facilitate economic growth. 
The first pair of indicators refers to the process of 'selection of the authority' and 
therefore measures aspects of governance that have been the focus of the literature 
devoted to the impact of democracy and political stability. This indicator therefore 
provides an assessment of political risk in a country. 
1. Voice and accountability (VA) captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country 's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media; 
11. Political stability and absence of violence (PV) measures the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism; 
The second pair of indicators assesses the soundness of a country's policies and 
the quality of the administration as well as how free the economy is . This pair of 
variables is termed as 'government action. ' 
111. Government effectiveness (GE) captures perceptions of the quality of public 
service, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies; 
1v. Regulatory quality (RQ) captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development; 
The final pair of indicators focuses on the assessment of the way in which a 
country's citizens feel bound by the countries legal framework embodied in its 
constitution. This pair is termed as ' respect for institutional framework.' 
v. Rule oflaw (RL) captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
33 The estimate for governance range from approximately -2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong 
governance) performance but there are anomalies, usually for countries suffering extreme violence, when 
the point estimates exceed the range. The standard errors reflect the variability around the point estimates. 
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contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence; and 
v1. Control of corruption (CC) captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ' capture' of the state by elites and private interests. 
Table 11 Summary statistics for governance variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
VA 0.172 0.932 -1.95 - 1.83 
PV -0.004 0.921 -2.57 1.58 
GE 0.217 1.018 -1.66 2.24 
RQ 0.272 0.825 -2.21 2.01 
RL 0.144 1.004 -1.88 1.96 
cc 0.120 1.072 -1.79 2.47 
Before the results of the stochastic frontier (SF) computations are discussed, the 
expected signs, based on theory, of the bivariate relationships between output per 
worker and each of the explanatory variables utilised in this research are noted. Table 
12 provides a summary of the expected signs. _ 
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Table 12 Summary hypothesis of the expected signs of the selected variables 























The higher the capital per worker, the higher the 
productivity 
The higher the human capital per worker, the 
higher the productivity 
The higher the ethno-language fractionalization, 
the lower the productivity. 
The further from the equator, the higher the 
productivity. 
In theory, the more open the economy, the higher 
the productivity although empirical evidence is 
not definitive. 
The higher the voice and accountability, the 
higher the productivity although empirical 
evidence is not definitive. 
The less the incidence of political violence, the 
higher the productivity. 
The higher the government effectiveness, the 
higher the productivity. 
The higher the regulatory quality, the higher the 
productivity. 
The higher the adherence to the rule of law, the 
higher the productivity. 
The higher the control of corruption, the higher 
the productivity. 
A visual inspection of the bivariate relationship between these variables and 
output per worker provides the expected outcomes. The scatter plots matched against 
fitted values34 do support the hypothesised relationships although it is not 
unambiguously clear for all bivariate relationships. Most importantly, at this stage, it is 
also unclear what the direction of causality is. 
THE RESULTS 
The results of the stochastic frontier analysis when only one governance 
indicator is included in the inefficiency model are produced in Table 13, Table 14 and 
34 Refer to Appendix 1, Figure 20 to 30. 
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Table 15 while Table 16 summarises the results for selected governance variables alone. 
Table 17 sets out the results when all governance indicators are used jointly as 
explanatory variables in estimating the inefficiency model. Table 18 estimates the 
inefficiency for (a) the Organisation of Economic Development Countries (OECD) - 31 
countries; (b) Upper middle-income economies - 26 countries, and (c) lower middle-
income and low-income economies - 44 countries. A minus_ sign in the inefficiency 
equation indicates that an increase in the explanatory variables causes a reduction in 
inefficiency or a rise in efficiency. 
The control variables are first analysed. Latitude always has the correct sign and 
is significant in all six models demonstrating that the further an economy is from the 
equator, the better its economic performance. Nevertheless, its explanatory power on 
efficiency when holding all other variables constant in all models is less than one per 
cent. This supports Rodrik et al. (2004) views that when institutions are taken into 
account, geography loses its importance as a major influence on efficiency. The ELF 
variable is counter-intuitive as it is wrongly signed in all the models with the exception 
of model three. However, it is significant in all models with the exception of model one 
and three. It is counter-intuitive as it suggests that an increase in ethnic-linguistic 
fractionalisation will improve performance. This requires further investigation. 
Openness is the least conclusive. It is statistically insignificant in all models except in 
model two. Furthermore, its coefficient values in most cases were zero or close to zero. 
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Table 13 ML determinants of the stochastic production function and the determinants of 
technical efficiency: Results for the 'selection of the authority ' variables 
Variable VA PV 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept P, 7.112 49.306* 6.419 47.432* 
ln KIL Pi 0.415 38.593* 0.475 48.733* 
ln H/L P, 0.110 3.146* 0.109 3.164* 
Inefficiency Intercept s, 0.916 10.974* 0.539 6.015* 
Latitude 11 -0.007 -10.134* -0.006 -10.378* 
ELF 8, -0.017 -0.270 -0.120 -1.868** 
Openness 8i -0.001 -1.152 0.001 2.256* 
Variable of interest 0, -0.378 -12.957* -0.208 -10.900* 
Sigma2 0- 2 0.359 29.344* 0.391 29.169* 
Gamma , 0.101 1.867** 0.001 0.160 
Note Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels are denoted respectively by *, * * and * * *. 
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Table 14 ML determinants of the stochastic production function and the determinants of 
technical efficiency: Results for the 'government action ' variables 
Variable GE RQ 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept P, 8.137 50.313* 7.046 43.795* 
ln KIL P1 0.303 19.243* 0.421 38.847* 
In H/L P, 0.113 3.466* 0.108 3.099* 
Inefficiency Intercept 0.930 10.912* 0.935 8.594* 
oo 
Latitude ~1 -0.009 -9.370* -0.007 -10.317* 
ELF 81 0.090 1.015 -0.091 -1.398*** 
Openness 01 0.000 0.283 0.000 -0.297 
Variable of interest 8, -0.802 -14.436* -0.394 -14.569* 
Sigma2 a 2 0.454 17.503* 0.364 27.129* 
Gamma , 0.646 13.290* 0.049 1.143 
Note Significant at the 1, 5 and IO per cent levels are denoted respectively by *, * * and * * *. 
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Table 15 ML determinants of the stochastic production function and the determinants of 
technical efficiency: Results for the 'respect for institutional framework ' 
variables 
Variable RL cc 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept /Jo 7.249 44.859* 6.971 60.352* 
ln KIL /31 0.403 32.254* 0.429 41.908* 
ln H/L /32 0.101 2.959* 0.107 3.194* 
Inefficiency Intercept 0.885 9.133* 0.878 15.917* 
t5a 
Latitude 51 -0.006 -9.526* -0.008 -11.838* 
ELF 0 2 -0.102 -1.567*** -0.221 -2.714* 
Openness 03 0.000 0.911 0.000 0.696 
Variable of interest 04 -0.390 -13.642* -0.376 -17.266* 
Sigma2 0" 2 0.358 28.821 * 0.343 29.699* 
Gamma r 0.087 1.356*** 0.013 0.649 
Note Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels are denoted respectively by *, * * and * * *. 
All the governance indicators, the variables of interest, are correctly signed and 
are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This suggests that all governance 
indicators are important. It can be concluded from this bivariate relationship that a rise 
in the overall quality of institutions is associated with using factor endowments of a 
country more efficiently. Among the governance variables, GE has the strongest impact 
on efficiency followed by RQ, RL, VA, CC and PV. Therefore the pairing of 
'government effectiveness ' is more important that the ' selection of the authority' and 
'respect for institutional framework ' in determining efficiency. 
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Table 16 ML determinants of the stochastic production function and the determinants of 
technical efficiency: Summary results for relationship between output per 
worker and individual governance indicators 
Variable Coefficient 6 • 2 S1gma2 CY Gamma r 
(l)VA -0.378 (-12.957)* 0.359 (29.344)* 0.101 (1.867)** 
(2) PV -0.208 (-10.9)* 0.391 (29.169)* 0.001 (0.16) 
(3) GE -0.802 (-14.436)* 0.454 (17.503)* 0.646 (13.29)* 
(4)RQ -0.394 (-14.569)* 0.364 (27.129)* 0.049 (1.143) 
(5) RL -0.39 (-13.642)* 0.358 (28 .821)* 0.087 (1.356)*** 
(6) cc -0.376 (-17.266)* 0.343 (29.699)* 0.013 (0.649) 
Note Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses. Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent 
levels are denoted respectively by*, ** and***. 
In the seventh model , all governance variables are included to test them against 
each other. The results for the control variables are correctly signed but ELF and 
openness are not significant. Once again, GE demonstrates that it has the most 
important impact on the efficiency of an economy. This is followed by VA, CC, RL and 
PV. RQ was statistically insignificant. Gamma is also statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level and has the value 0.703. This implies that approximately 70 per cent of 
the variation across countries during this time period is due to inefficiencies. 
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Table 17 ML determinants of the stochastic production function and the determinants of 
technical efficiency: Estimation with all governance variables 
Variable Coefficient t-stats 
Intercept /Jo 8.409 60.520* 
1n KIL /31 0.272 20.736* 
ln H/L /32 0.105 3.531 * 
Inefficiency Intercept 50 1.057 14.360* 
Latitude 61 -0.013 -13.025* 
ELF 62 0.052 0.708 
Openness 60 -0.001 -1.040 J 
VA 64 -0.480 -10.731* 
PV 5s 0.143 3.882* 
GE 56 -0.573 -9.888* 
RQ 51 -0.002 -0.031 
RL J s 0.281 4.496* 
cc 69 -0.425 -10.919* 
? 0.437 19.772* Sigma2 O'-
Gamma Y 0.703 20.023* 
Note Significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels are denoted respectively by *, * * and * * *. 
When the governance indicators were tested against each other in different 
country groupings, the results were altogether different, as reported in Table 17. Human 
capital was not significant in the OECD and upper middle-income economies and 
significant at the 90 per cent level for low-income economies. Latitude was not 
significant for upper middle-income economies while openness was not significant for 
OECD economies. ELF was significant but wrongly signed. 
All governance variables are significant except RQ and CC for OECD 
economies. A very strong relationship between governance indicators and efficiency 
was observed for low-income economies. Almost 95 per cent of variations in low-
85 
income economies are explained by inefficiencies compared to only 29 per cent for 
upper middle-income economies and 36 per cent for OECD economies. RL was most 
important for OECD economies while GE was most important to upper middle- and 
low-income economies. 
This suggests that institutions impact on economies differently at different levels 
of income. For example, CC was insignificant for OECD economies but very important 
for low-income economies but the reverse was true for RL. One possibility is that, once 
all variables are included, some of the variables lose their importance as reflected by GE 
in OECD economies. 
Table 18 ML determinants of the stochastic production function and the determinants of 
technical efficiency: Estimation with all governance variables for different 
economies classified by income 
Variable OECD UMIE LIE 
Intercept /Jo 10.562 (68.28)* 9.227 (88.408)* 6.938 (67.415)* 
In KIL /31 0.036 (3.414)* 0.101 (8.658)* 0.329 (27.491)* 
In H/L /32 0.039 (0.751) 0.025 (0.985) 0.055 (1.568)*** 
Inefficiency Intercept 80 0.966 (5.296)* 0.254 (2.059)** -2.896 (-7.418)* 
Latitude 51 0.007 (3.537)* 0.001 (0.382) -0.104 (-22.554)* 
ELF 62 -0.454 (- -0.568 (-3.703)* -2.049 (-6.495)* 
1.543)** 
Openness 63 0.001 (0.914) -0.002 (- -0.053 (-28.855)* 
1.767)** 
VA 64 0.762 (3.321)* -0.201 (- -2.535 (-15.277)* 
2.364)** 
PV 8s -0.189 (- 0.309 (5.315)* 1.515 (9.386)* 
1.637)*** 
GE 86 -0.386 (-3.091)* -0.729 (-6.165)* -2.386 (-9.669)* 
RQ 81 0.165 (0.870) 0.308 (3.003)* 0.418 (2.369)** 
RL 8s -1.125 (-4.26)* -0.596 (-4.078)* 0.920 (2.929)* 
cc 89 -0.019 (-0.436) 0.648 (5.633)* -2.212 (-12.354)* 
Sigma2 a- 2 0.064 (8.842)* 0.070 (10.704)* 2.555 (22.529)* 
Gamma r 0.357 (5.14 7)* 0.289 (3.688)* 0.944 (139.073)* 
Note Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses; OECD - Organisation for Economic and 
Cooperation Development; UMIE - Upper middle-income economies; LIE - Lower middle-
income and low-income economies. 
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MALAYSIA 
Malaysia's aggregate economic efficiency improved from about 45 per cent of 
its potential in 1990 to 61 per cent of its potential in 2008. In the sample of 101 
economies, Malaysia ranked 44 in 1990 and improved to 3 7 in 2008 in terms of relative 
efficiency as illustrated in Figure 5. This might have been expected given Malaysia' s 
position as upper income economy. It also indicates that there is room for further 
improvement and that significant reforms will be needed to graduate to a high-income 
economy. 
Malaysia's performance in respect of the governance indicators is moderate 
recording performance within the range of -0.6 to 1.2. It scored the lowest in 'Voice and 
Accountability' and highest in 'Government Effectiveness.' This is not surprising. 
Malaysia is classified as less democratic but a successful one. In Chapter 2 it was noted 
that regime type did matter for economic growth, but rather political stability. A major 
reason for Malaysia's success is that the regime35 has achieved political and social 
stability and this enabled economic growth. 
The East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC) appears not to have impacted on 
Malaysia' s economic efficiency as it continued to improve over the period. Also, 
despite deterioration in the ' Control of Corruption' and stagnating performance in all 
other indicators, with the exception of GE, Malaysia economic efficiency continued to 
improve. These fit certain arguments that deterioratio!1 in the control of corruption and 
in the rule of law does not impact on economic efficiency. However, if Malaysia wants 
to graduate to being a high-income economy, it may need to improve several aspects of 
its gover:riance, as the indicators that inf)uence OEC:1) economies are different from 
those of upper- and middle-income economies. 
There is also cause for concern that while Malaysia ranks as expected in terms of 
economic performance, it ranks poorly in term_s of human development index for its 
income level as set-out in Table 52. The quality of Malaysia's institutions and their 
governance may have contributed to this. 
35 As noted in Chapter 2, Malaysia is classified as an ' electoral authoritarian regime ' (Levitsky and Way 
2002). 
87 
These results call for further in-depth investigation of the Malaysian case and of 
factors which may have been missed in the cross-country regressions to identify more 
thoroughly how governance has impacted on economic outcomes. For example, ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation was incorrectly signed in the cross-country regressions. 
However, in the Malaysian case, the literature suggests that ethnic fraction has led to 
precisely the situation that has been put forward in theory - which it has led to the 
ruling regime rewarding its supporters especially its key stakeholders. For example, 
Malaysia has among the largest public sector in the Asia Pacific with almost 85 per cent 
of the elite diplomatic and administrative services dominated by the Malays (CPPS 
2006). Furthermore public policy is driven primarily to ensure social stability or 
' national unity' considerations and not economic efficiency (Ritchie 2005; Doner et al. 
2005). Also, openness was insignificant in many of the models. In the Malaysian case, 
the literature suggests that openness was instrumental in driving economic growth in 
Malaysia although its impact on efficiency is still debatable. All of these inconsistencies 
warrant a thorough study of Malaysia to identify more precisely how governance 
impacts on Malaysia. This is the subject of Chapters 5 and 6. 
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This chapter focused on demonstrating the importance of institutions in 
improving the efficiency of the way in which factors of production are employed to 
produce outputs. Physical and human capital accumulation alone will not be sufficient 
to ensure long-term economic growth without improvements in productivity. In this 
context institutions play a key role. Institutions which are represented by the governance 
indicators, impact differently at different levels of income. For upper middle-income 
economies such as Malaysia, 'Government Effectiveness,' 'Rule of Law' and 'Control 
of Corruption' have strong influence in improving efficiency. Although Malaysia 
performs marginally well in these indicators, a more thorough treatment of issues 
affecting Malaysia, will bear out these challenges better. There is sufficient evidence to 
argue that these very areas - government effectiveness, rule of law and control of 
corruption - are problematic areas in Malaysia. 
The findings from the cross-country regressions suggest that a further study of 
how institutions impact on the Malaysian economy is needed to unpack inconsistencies 
between these results and what is perceived to be happening in MaJaysia. These issues 
are taken up in the case studies in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5 Human capital development and its contribution to 
manufacturing sector performance 
The human capital situation in Malaysia is reaching a critical stage. The rate of 
outward migration of skilled Malaysians is rising rapidly [and] the education 
system is not producing the skills demanded by firms. 
NEAC (2010a, p. 6) 
Human capital is one, if not the most important, determinant of economic 
growth. Educational institutions and training systems have a significant impact on the 
quality and quantity of human capital that exists in an economy. This chapter 
investigates the contribution of the different levels of human capital along with other 
factors of production on manufacturing sector output. The study suggests that 
Malaysia's manufacturing sector continues to rely on unskilled labour which has a 
dampening impact on technology adoption, despite government intervention to move 
the sector up the value chain. The findings of this chapter provide the basis for the 
institutional analysis of human capital development in Chapter 7. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 had identified the literature which argued that Malaysia was caught in 
a middle-income trap. This brings with it a set of challenges for policymakers. Some of 
the features that differentiate growth beyond middle income growth from low income to 
middle income are clear. As it attempts to transition into a high income economy, 
Malaysia's output growth should become more capital and skill intensive. The domestic 
market should expand and become a more important engine of growth, especially 
through the growth of services. With higher growth, wages should start to rise, most 
rapidly for highly skilled workers, and labour shortages are likely to emerge (Kohli et 
al. 2011). Thus, increasing the stock and the flow of skilled human capital is therefore 
imperative in overcoming the middle-income trap and also sustaining the economic 
growth in the economy. 
92 
Rapid technological change has increased the demand for workers with higher 
skills and/or education everywhere. The World Employment Report 1998-99 notes: 
In both developed and developing countries, employment of skilled workers has 
been on the rise ... The rate of growth of employment in the period 1981 - 1996 
in advanced countries has usually been highest for professionals and 
technicians ... In developing countries too, this occupational category has 
witnessed a high growth rate, though one less disproportionate to other 
categories in comparison to developed countries. In contrast, the rate of growth 
of employment for the production and related workers category (which contains 
skilled manual and craft workers but mainly unskilled and semi-skilled) has 
been very low, often negative for developed countries. In the developing 
countries for which data are available, with some exceptions ( e.g. The 
Philippines), this group has witnessed much lower employment growth than the 
highly educated and trained group of professionals and technicians. 
ILO (1998, p. 32) 
This phenomenon is also observable in the newly industrialising East Asian 
economies (ADB 2011). Due to the intensification of competition from labour surplus 
economies such as China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam, upper middle income 
economies with tight labour markets, such as Malaysia, have sought to further 
restructure their economies to produce more skill- and capital- intensive goods and 
services. This has created significant skills shortages and mismatches as the workforce 
try to upgrade skill levels to meet the demand (Thangavelu and Hu 2006). The inability 
to develop sufficient skilled human capital is identified as one of the reasons for 
Malaysia as being stuck in a middle income trap or not being able to transfonn and 
transition into a high income economy (Ohno 2009; Kohli et al. 2011 ; NEAC 2010a). It 
is also argued that the acute skills shortages and mismatches in Malaysia are 
exacerbated by a unique factor: affirmative action policies that favour the majority 
Malay race (World Bank 2011 b; Woo 2009). 
Human capital is one of the key drivers of economic growih. The development 
of human capital contributes fundamentally to drive the structural changes and 
maintaining the competitiveness of domestic industries (Lall 1999). This chapter 
examines the development of human capital and the institutions that underpin it by 
exploring the human capital constraints in the economy as it transitions towards a higher 
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value added activities. This is done by exploring the contribution of human capital to 
the performance of the manufacturing sector. The chapter makes an important 
contribution to the understanding of human capital development and economic growth 
of Malaysian economy. It measures the impact of labour at the different skills levels to 
the manufacturing sector's performance. The analysis also differentiates the local 
human capital from foreign human capital. It is believed that this chapter is the first to 
account for the productive performance of local and foreign human capital in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector. The chapter also discusses the importance of 
institutional developments in education as one of drivers of human capital as the 
economy transits to higher value-added activities. The findings of this chapter also 
provide the basis for the institutional analysis on human capital development in 
Malaysia undertaken in Chapter 7. 
The manufacturing sector provides an interesting case study of the impact of 
human capital on the Malaysian economy for three important reasons. First, the 
manufacturing is a leading sector in the Malaysian economy. Rapid expansion of the 
manufacturing sector has been the key driver of economic growth in Malaysia (Yusuf 
and Nabeshima 2009). Second, the manufacturing sector has been in a declining trend in 
output growth since the 1997 /98 East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC) as illustrated in 
Figure 7. Manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP has declined from the all-
time high of more than 30 per cent just before the East Asian financial crisis to about 25 
per cent in 2009. Manufacturing exports (around 70 per cent of total merchandise 
exports in 2009), declined from an all-time high of 80 per cent in 2002. There is a close 
association between the fluctuations in the growth fluctuations of the Malaysian 
economy and the manufacturing sector that underlines the importance of this sector. 
Finally, the manufacturing sector is targeted by the Malaysian government as the driver 
to become a high income economy (NEAC 201 0a). 
94 
Figure 7 The manufacturing sector' s performance 
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Source World Development Indicators, (2012). 
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Stochastic frontier production analysis, explained in Chapter 4, is again used to 
study the contribution of human capital to the performance of Malaysia's manufacturing 
sector. The stochastic frontier production analysis enables the study to measure the 
impact oflocal and foreign human capital on the productivity of the manufacturing 
sector. The study covers data from 187 industries from 2000 to 2005 and examines the 
effects of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled human capital on the productivity growth 
of the manufacturing sector. The labour input is further decomposed into local and 
foreign human capital. The measurement of the technical efficiency in this model is 
based on is based on the neo-classical framework of profit maximisation, where firms' 
maximise profits with a given set of inputs and using the available best-practice 
technology. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, a survey of the outcomes 
and issues affecting human capital development in Malaysia is presented and is 
compared to selected similar economies. Second, a brief overview of the ways that 
human capital is measured is provided and the literature examining the links between 
human capital development and economic output is reviewed. The stochastic production 
function model is implemented and the results are presented. Finally, based on the 
empirical results, the role of educational and training institutions in the development of 
human capital for transition to a higher value-added economy is discussed briefly. 
HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES IN MALAYSIA 
A common measure of human capital development is school enrolment rates. 
Table 19 sets out enrolment rates in Malaysia. Malaysia has high schooling enrolment 
rates from primary to upper secondary school level. This reflects three important policy 
measures: schooling is compulsory in Malaysia; public schooling is provided at a 
nominal cost by the government; and students have automatic promotion until upper 
secondary level. These three policies do not apply to the pre-university and tertiary 
level. This may partly explain the drastic drop in enrolment at the pre-university and 
tertiary level. 
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Table 19 Participation rates by educational level , Malaysia, 1970-2010 (per cent) a 
Educational level and 1970 b 1980 1990 2000 2010 
age 
Primary (6 -11) 88.2 93.6 99.8 96.8 94.2 
Lower secondary (12- 52.2 81.9 83.0 85.0 86.8 
14) 
Upper secondary (15- 20.1 40.8 49.1 72.6 77.2 
16) 
Pre-university (17-18) c 3.1 9.7 18.9 16.2 15.0 
Tertiary (19 - 24) 0.6 1.8 2.9 8.1 16.0* 
(20**) 
Note a - Refers to participation rates in public and government-aided institutions only 
(Enrolment/Population* 100); b - Data refer to Peninsular Malaysia only; c - referred to as 
' Post-secondary ' in the source tables; * - author ' s calculation of domestic students in public 
universities; ** author' s calculation of Malaysians from ages 20-24 enrolled for basic degree in 
domestic public and private universities and all Malaysian students enrolled overseas in 201 0; 
Source Hill et al. (2012) for data from 1970 to 2000; Ministry of Education, (2011) and 
Ministry of Higher Education, Malaysia, (2010) for all other data. 
Table 20 sets out the educational attainment of the Malaysian labour force. It has 
shown considerable improvement, with the percentage of the labour force having no 
formal education being less than 5 per cent with more than half having secondary 
--
education. 





























Note *·For 1985 to 2005, the educational level is classified as in the table, but for 2010 the 
classification includes several additional classifications; a - no certificate 
Source Hill et al. (2012); Department of Statistics, (2012). 
Despite the commendable outcomes described above, human capital constraints 
are now recognised as a critical bottleneck in the Malaysian economy. There are several 
important studies and reports that provide evidence of this. Firstly, two comprehensive 
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surveys (World Bank 2005; World Bank 20096)36 on the Malaysian economy, the 
Malaysian Firm Competitiveness, Investment Climate and Growth report (PICS-1)37 and 
the Malaysia Productivity and Investment Climate Assessment Update (PICS-II)38 
provide evidence of this. Both these extensive surveys identify skills shortage as the 
main constraint to doing business in Malaysia. 
In both the PICS-I and PI CS-II survey, about 40 per cent of the firms stated that 
skills shortage is a critical problem that they face. The skills shortage identified relates 
to deficiencies in the area of English language skills, ICT skills and professional and 
technical skills. This outcome was similar to the first survey undertaken in 2002 
suggesting that the situation had not improved (World Bank 2005; 20096). 
PICS-1 also noted that 70 per cent of the managers surveyed identified the 
insufficient supply of university graduates as the main cause of skilled labour shortage. 
Furthermore, PICS-1 report noted that 14 per cent of workers did not have the relevant 
educational background for their work. The situation appears to be deteriorating with 
PICS-II reporting that 25 per cent of workers with high school certificate felt they 
needed a university education to do their jobs properly. Only 10-15 per cent of workers 
believed their chosen field of education suited their current job and more than 15 per 
cent believed their educational qualifications were irrelevant to their occupation. The 
findings also reported that university graduates not choosing the fields of study that 
were of relevance to the growing high-technology industries and the manufacturing 
sector is also experiencing low incidence of training among firms , notwithstanding the 
fact that Malaysia possesses a good skills-development infrastructure. 
36 See Appendix 2 fo r a description of th e surveys. 
37 Malaysian Firms Competitiveness, Investment Climate and Growth report - PICS-I. 
38 Malaysian Productivity and Investment Climate Survey - PICS-II. 
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These findings are not surprising as, another important report, the National 
Economic Advisory Council ' s (NEAC) report39 highlighted that in 2007, 80 per cent of 
Malaysia's labour force received education only up to Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM)40 
(NEAC 2010a). The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of Malaysia reported that in 2007, 
25 per cent of workers in Malaysia were classified as skilled or managerial while 63 per 
cent were semi-skilled and 12 per cent unskilled, suggesting that almost three-fourths of 
Malaysia' s labour force was only moderately skilled as illustrated in Figure 8. 
The NEAC report also highlights not only that was Malaysia facing skills 
shortages but also that there was an actual reduction in the percentage of skilled labour 
. . 
in several industries, between 2002 and 2007 as illustrated in Figure 9. A possible cause 
could be the reduction in net FDI and 'brain drain'. The effects of the 'brain drain' are 
mostly experienced when skilled Malaysians leave the country or are not returning after 
completing studies abroad. In addition, the strict regulations and controls on importing 
foreign skilled labour are also believed to have further exacerbated the country ' s skills-
39 New Economic Model (NEM) Part 1. 
40 The Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM or MCE/Malaysian Certificate of Education) is equivalent to the 
British O -Levels or Australia's Year 10. 
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shortage problem (World Bank 2011 b; NEAC 201 0a; Thangavelu and Hu 2006). It is 
estimated that in 2010, approximately 33 per cent of the Malaysia ' s diaspora had 
tertiary education (World Bank 2011 b ). This percentage had risen from 28 per cent in 
2000. Similarly, the number of expatriates had also been declining while the number of 
unskilled and semi-skilled migrant labourers has continued to rise in Malaysia. 








Wood Food E&E Chemical Textile Business Telecom IT 
■ 2002 ■ 2007 
Source National Economic Advisory Council, (2010). 
MALAYSIA IN COMPARISON TO ITS REGIONAL COMPETITORS 
Malaysia's skills base can be compared with that of similar countries. A focus on 
East Asia is appropriate because Malaysia is highly integrated into the global production 
networks in the region. The upper bound is the technologically advanced economies in 
the region while the labour surplus economies in the region provide the lower bound. 
The comparators include the world ' s new economic giants, China and India, Malaysia' s 
important regional competitors, Indonesia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, and 
high income economies, Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Australia and 
India although not part of the East Asian global production network, are included 
because of their increasing strategic importance to the East Asian region. 
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Malaysia's public spending as a percentage of GDP is highest among the 
countries with which it is compared over the past decade although it has been tapering 
off in the last few years. 











L > 4.11 
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-MYS - PHL - SGP --THA - VNM 
Note Public expenditure on education ( current and capital) includes government spending on 
educational institutions (both public and private), education and administration as well as 
subsidies for private entities (students/households and other private entities). 
Source World Development Indicators, (2012). 
Malaysia's public spending in education as a percentage of government 
expenditure was second highest among those countries for which data are available. 
These data can be taken as an indicator of the Government of Malaysia's commitment 
to investment in human capital development. 
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Note Public expenditure on education (current and capital) includes government spending on 
educational institutions (both public and private), education and administration as well as 
subsidies for private entities (students/households and other private entities). 
Source World Development Indicators, (2012) . 
Investment in education however is not equally distributed at the different 
educational levels. There has been a bias towards investment in tertiary education 
compared to primary and secondary education although the gap appears to be tapering 
off as illustrated in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Investment per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
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Note Public expenditure per student is public current spending on education divided by the total 
number of students by level, as percentage of GDP per capita. Public expenditure ( current and 
capital) includes government spending on educational institutions (both public and private), 
education and administration as well as subsidies for private entities (students/households and 
other private entities). 
Source World Development Indicators, (2012) . 
Despite significant investment in human capital development, the educational 
outcome for Malaysia appears less than satisfactory by international standards. The 
percentage of Malaysians over 25 years old who had completed tertiary education was 
below that of all high income economies and also that of the Philippines and Thailand 
as reported in Table 21. 
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Table 21 Educational attainment 
Country Primar Secondar Tertiar Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. 
y y (25+)a y year of year of year of year of 
(25+)a (25+)a total pnmary secondar total 
schoolin schoolin y tertiary 
g g schoolin schoolin 
g g 
OECD economies 
Australia 2.1 38.5 22.4 12.04 5.92 4.99 1.12 
Korea 10.2 37.8 17.3 11.64 5.74 4.41 1.09 
Japan 14.1 30.2 23.9 11.48 5.85 4.42 1.20 
High income non OECD economies 
Taiwan 11.9 30.9 10.6 11.03 5.71 4.41 0.91 
Singapore 16.7 15.8 12.3 8.83 5.08 3.13 0.62 
Upper middle income economies 
China 17.7 40.2 4 7.55 4.97 2.37 0.2 
Malaysia 12.9 33.8 5 9.53 5.16 3.99 0.38 
Thailand 27.3 10 8.9 6.57 4.86 1.34 0.36 
Middle income economies 
India 16.6 1 3.7 4.41 2.83 1.39 0.19 
Indonesia 32 22.1 1.6 5.82 4.17 1.56 0.083 
Philippine 18 19.8 22.4 8.67 5.34 2.28 1.04 
Vietnam 38.8 11.6 2.9 5.49 3.98 1.38 0.15 
Note The Barro-Lee dataset (2011) provides estimates for educational attainment data for 146 
countries in five year intervals. It is the most commonly used dataset to measure educational 
attainment. a - percentage of population aged 25 years old and over that have completed 
various levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary); Average year of schooling of 
population aged 25 years and over for different levels (total, primary, secondary and tertiary) . 
Source Barro-Lee, (2010). 
A key source of growth is the application of knowledge as manifested in 
entrepreneurship, innovation and research and development. A strong human capital 
base is one of several factors that are a pre-requisite for the application of knowledge. 
Indicators that measure the knowledge capability of economy provide an idea of the 
capability of the human capital base of an economy. Two commonly used indexes are 
selected to discuss Malaysia' s performance in this area. 
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The first is the World Bank's Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM). 
The KAM consists of 109 structural and qualitative variables that measure the 
performance of 149 countries in four knowledge economy (KE) pillars: economic 
incentives and institutional regime; education and skills; innovation; and information 
and communication technology. Variables are normalised on a scale of 0 to 10 relative 
to other countries in the comparison group. The KAM global ranking is as follows: 
Australia (11 ); Taiwan (18); Singapore (19); Japan (20); Korea (29); Malaysia ( 48); 
Thailand (63); China (81); The Philippines (89); Vietnam (100); Indonesia (103) and 
India (109). Malaysia' s 48th position out of 149 is a cause for concern when compared 
to the fact that it ranks 80 out of 215 in terms of per capital income (WB database, 
2011).41 
The most commonly cited ofKAM's indexes are the Knowledge Index and the 
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI). The KI measures a country ' s ability to generate, 
adopt and diffuse knowledge. This is an indication of overall potential of knowledge 
development in a given country. The KEI takes into account whether the environment is 
conducive for knowledge to be used effectively for economic development. There are 
four key components as noted earlier. Malaysia performs slightly better than average (> 
5) in both KI and KEI but performs below average in the education component ( < 5). 
41 The World Bank's Knowledge Index and Knowledf e Economy Index. 
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Source Computed from the World Bank Knowledge Assessment Methodology database 
The Technology Achievement Index (TAI) is a composite index which 
aggregates national technological capabilities and performance in terms of: 
creation/diffusion of new technologies, (ii) creation/diffusion of old technologies, and 
(iii) development of human skills. The third component, the development of human 
skills, along with high technology exports42 which is a sub-component of the diffusion 
of new technologies are the areas of our interest. 
Mean years of schooling can be used as an indicator for the basic level of human 
ski lls. The idea behind the use of gross enrolment ratio (GER) is that a higher GER 
(primary secondary and tertiary) ratio in a country over a period ohime would 
ultimately result in a higher mean years of schooling. The sub-indicator which assesses 
human skil ls necessary to adapt to new technologies is the enrolment in tertiary 
42 High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity such as in aerospace, computers, 
pharmaceuticals scientific instruments, and electrical machinery. 
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education in the field of science, mathematics and engineering as a percentage of the 
population at the tertiary level. This research also looks at the high technology export 
share of manufacturing goods to provide an indicator of the ability of human capital to 
absorb the diffusion of new technology. 
Table 22 The Technology Achievement Index (TAI) 
Country Overall TAI a High Gross Gross enrolment 
ranking (2009) technology enrolment ratio in science, 
exports (% of ratio. All engmeermg, 
manufactured levels manufacturing 
exports) (2005- combined and construction 
2006) (2005- (tertiary) (2005-
2007) 2007) 
OECD economies 
Australia 14 0.536 13 113 16 
Korea 1 0.765 32 97 35 
Japan 5 0.630 22 86 11 
High income non OECD 
Taiwan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Singapore 4 0.642 57 87 24.2 
Upper middle income economies 
China 54 0.334 31 69 3.2 
Malaysia 23 0.490 55 71 11 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Middle income economies 
India 81 0.215 5 61 2.235 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Philippines 37 0.411 71 81 8 
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Source Nasir et al. (2011) 
In a sample of 91 countries, Malaysia was ranked 23 overall with Australia, 
Japan, Korea and Singapore ranked higher (Taiwan was not included in the sample). 
Malaysia' s GER for all levels and· the GER in science, engineering, manufacturing and 
construction at the tertiary level provide a stark reminder of the lag between Malaysia 
and the successful East Asian economies that have graduated into high income 
economies. It is also of interests that in certain indicators, Malaysia performs even more 
poorly than other lower and middle income countries. It can be concluded that 
107 
Malaysia ' s performance in the various indicators within the context of graduating from 
the middle-income level, is a cause for concern. 
THEORY AND EMPIRICS OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
Human capital can be broadly defined as the 'ability and efficiency of people to 
transform raw materials and capital into good and services ' (Son 2010) or ' the 
knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals, which facilitate 
personal, social and economic well-being' (OECD 2001). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature of modern growth theory emphasises 
the importance of the accumulation of factors of production especially human capital 
and technology in contributing towards economic growth. There are two main 
perspectives in human capital theory - one macroeconomic and the other 
microeconomic. From a macroeconomic perspective, the accumulation of human capital 
improves labour productivity, facilitates technological innovations and increases returns 
to capital. This in turn contributes to long term growth. Thus human capital is seen at 
the macro level to be one of the critical factors of production in any economy. From a 
microeconomic perspective, the accumulation of human capital increases the probability 
of being employed and improves an individual ' s lifetime earning capacity. Hence, at the 
micro level , human capital is considered to be the component of education that 
contributes to an individual ' s labour productivity and earnings. Micro level analysis also 
incorporates the impact of human capital on firm performance. 
It is important to note that the literature relating to human capital theory 
distinguishes among several types and means of education. There is formalised 
education at primary, secondary and higher levels (Cohn and Geske 1990), informal 
education at home and at work (Schultz 1981), on-the-job training and apprenticeship 
(Mincer 1974) in the workforce and specialised vocational education at secondary and 
higher levels (Corazzini 1967). 
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Human capital first came to prominence in the Solow model (1956), the first 
generation of neo-classical growth models. Although not explicitly, the central role of 
technology in the Solow model provided the impetus for the focus on human capital via 
education. Nelson and Phelps (1966) made the link explicit. They argued that 
'investments in humans' through education were necessary for workers to utilise new 
technologies that were exogenously developed, thereby increasing total factor 
productivity and spurring economic growth. 
In endogenous growth theory, the central role of human capital was made even 
more explicit as it was central in technological development which spurred economic 
growth. The works of Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, (1997) demonstrated that the accumulation of human capital 
through education and on-the-job training fosters economic growth by improving labour 
productivity, promoting technological innovation and adaptation. 
Numerous cross-country empirical studies have established a positive correlation 
between human capital and economic growth. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) find that a 
country's literacy rate in 1960 is a significant determinant of per capita GDP growth for 
1960 - 1980, and literacy rates and initial per capita GDP in 1960 together account for 
38 per cent of the variation in the economic performance in the 20 year period. Using 
school enrolment as the measure of human capital, Barro (1991) finds that primary and 
secondary school enrolment rates are positively linked with economic growth and 
investments while being negatively linked with fertility rates. Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) find that the elasticity of per capita GDP to enrolment rate is 0.66 for non-oil 
exporting countries and 0.76 in OECD countries . 
. Applying the Mincerian specification, Barro and Lee (2010) estimate that 
increasing average years of schooling by one year increases per capita GDP by 1. 7 to 
12.1 per cent depending on how the model is specified. Cohen and Soto (2007) calculate 
returns to years of schooling at 12.3 to 22.1 per cent. By testing the impact of school 
' 
quality on growth, Hanushek and W oessmann (2009) find that a unit increase in a 
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country' s cognitive test scores increases its per capita GDP growth rate by 1.2 - 2.0 
percentage points. Furthermore, increasing average mathematics and sciences scores by 
one unit increases per capita GDP growth rates by 2.0 points, and by 2.3 points for low-
income countries. Overall, these studies find that education is significantly and 
positively correlated with economic growth and argue that causation runs from 
education to growth in line with human capital growth models. 
The literature on human capital and economic growth however suggests that the 
above finding is far from inconclusive. Firstly, there are some who suggest that the 
causation runs in the reverse, that is, economic growth increases returns to education 
and thus causes people to attain more education (Bills and Kienow 2000; Krueger and 
Lindahl 2001). Secondly, there is a lack of consistency between human capital theory 
and empirical testing. While Solow (1956) and Nelson-Phelps (1966) defined the basis 
of human capital, testing them has been a problem. Mincer (1974) tested the 
relationship between human capital and growth by measuring human capital as years of 
schooling and growth as personal income, and derived a log-linear specification for 
output and schooling. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) argue that the cognitive ability, as 
measured by achievement test scores, is a more relevant measure of human capital, 
since cognitive ability directly relates to the ability of a worker to implement technology 
as required by the Nelson-Phelps model. 
Another set of debates revolves around the trade-offs between general education 
against vocational education. Some countries focus on general education (for example, 
the United States) which focuses on broad knowledge and basic skills that serves as 
foundation for further learning and on the job-training. Others focus on vocational 
training (as in Germany and Denmark) which provides specific skills that improve the 
entry of workers into the economy. The skills generated by vocational education may 
facilitate the transition into labour market but may later become obsolete at a faster rate 
(Hanushek et al. 2011). Hanushek et al. (2011) find that people with general education 
initially face worse employment outcomes but experience improved employment 
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probability as they become older relative to individuals with vocational education. 
Meanwhile, in the US (and countries without well-known vocational education system), 
the employment probability of individuals with different types of education does not 
vary with age at all whereas in most European countries, the age-employment pattern 
differs and sometimes quite significantly between individuals with general and 
vocational education. This difference is most pronounced in the well-known 
apprenticeship countries of Denmark, Germany and Switzerland. 
Another way to analyse the contribution of human capital to economic growth is 
through the growth accounting method, which assigns the contribution of various inputs 
such as labour, physical capital and factor productivity towards outputs. An advantage 
of this approach is that it avoids the ambiguities of measuring human capital and is 
internally consistent (Stevens and Weale 2004). To this extent, Bosworth and Collins 
(2003) proposed an interesting growth accounting method that is an exact 
decomposition quantifying the contribution of growth in factors of production 
(including human capital, physical capital and total factor productivity) to growth in 
labour factor productivity. 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND APPLICATION 
Notwithstanding the growth accounting method, two broad classes of growth 
models in relation to human capital can be disting~ished. The first emphasises capital 
ae:cumulation as a source of growth. In particular, in this analysis the rate of growth 
depends on the rate of qCcumulation of human capital and not the stock of human 
capitai. The works ofMankiw et al. (1992) and Lucas (1988) are in this class. The 
second.class describes growth as being driven by the stock of human capital, which in 
turn affects a country's ability to innovate or to catch up with mme advanced countries. 
A novel approach in analysing the relationship between economic growth and 
human capital by appealing to the production literature that was first used in Chapter 4 
is deployed once again in this context. Following the production literature, 
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manufacturing sector output, or manufacturing sector performance, is modelled using 
the stochastic frontier approach. Stochastic frontier analysis, as explained in Chapter 4, 
is used to measure the productive performance of a firm in relation to the productive 
performance of firms following the best-practice techniques of the technology, as the 
later firms are defined as fully technically efficient. Such analysis produces not only a 
qualitative rankings of all economic units but also numerical efficiency scores that can 
be further used to identify the determinants of why some firms are more technically 
efficient than others. Specifically, the analysis in this chapter examines how important 
human capital development (measured through the three different skills level and 
through citizenship) is towards contributing to the differences in technical efficiency 
across manufacturing firms in Malaysia. 
Another important reason for adopting the stochastic frontier approach is 
because of its ability to differentiate between efficiency factors such as technology 
adoption and improvements on organisational structures and random events. 
Traditionally, cross-country empirics based on neo-classical economics, have assumed 
full technical efficiency across firms, which tends to bias the productivity measurement 
(Kalirajan and Shand 1999). This assumption that economic units are always efficient 
and producing on the production possibilities frontier (instead of within it), implies that 
actual output is the maximum attainable output and that all economic units are fully 
technically efficient. In reality, not all economic units may use the best-practice 
technique of the chosen technology due to various reasons such as lack of human capital 
development (Bos et al. 2010). 
The impact of human capital on productivity is implemented in two stages. The 
technical efficiency measure is estimated from the stochastic production frontier. The 
sources of productivity growth including local and foreign human capital such as local 
skilled, local unskilled, foreign skilled and foreign unskilled labour on manufacturing 
productivity is analysed using the technical efficiency measured derived in the first 
stage. 
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The stochastic production frontier is applied in a Cobb Douglas framework from 
panel data. The stochastic production frontier in the Cobb Douglas framework is given 
as: 
Ln(Yit)= Po + P1Ln (Kit)+ P2Ln(Lab_local)+ p3Ln(Lab_foreign)+ /34Ln(Estab) +vi1 - Uit 
(4) 
where Yu is gross output, Ku is fixed assets, Lab _localu is local labour, 
Lab Joreignu is the foreign labour, and Estabit is the number of establishments,43 which 
a simple proxy to measure industrial concentration. All variables are given in natural 
logs. vu is the random error term that is assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed (i.i.d) as Vit ~ (0, CJ/). The vu is also the stochastic element of the production 
function that captures random shocks to each firm. 
The technical efficiency term is given as Uit. Both Vit and Uit are distributed 
independently of each other. The technical efficiency term, Uit , is estimated in two ways: 
as a time-invariant, which means that technical efficiency remains the same for a firm 
over the years and time-varying (decay), which means that technical efficienc~, changes 
over the years, specifications. The time-invariant form is given as uu = Ui, and Ui ~ N + (µ , 
CJ/). The time-varying (decay) specification of Uit is given as: 
Uit=exp{-11(t-T)} Ui (5) 
where tis the current period and Tis the last period in the fh panel and 17 is the 
decay parameter. The decay parameter indicates the movement of the inefficiency over 
time where the degree of inefficiency declines over time towards the baseline when 17>0 
and degree of inefficiency increases over time when 17<0. 
43 The total number of establishment is used in the production function to analyse the impact of firms in 
the manufacturing sector on output while local and foreign establishments are used to see if ownership 
have different impact on productivity. There could be externalities and spill-overs that could be correlated 
with the local and foreign establishments and technical efficiency. However, there is no biasness in the 
estimation. 
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DATA AND RESULTS OF STOCHASTIC PRODUCTIO FRONTIER 
The data for the study were obtained from the Malaysian Manufacturing Survey, 
Department of Statistics. The data are obtained from 2000 to 2005 for 5 digit industrial 
classification44 which consists of 187 industries. All data are based to 2000 prices. 
The results are presented in Table 23. The results indicate that capital investment 
and local labour makes the most significant contribution to output growth in the 
manufacturing sector. In contrast, the contribution of foreign ·labour to manufacturing 
sector is very small and not statistically significant for the time-varying specification. 
Table 23 Stochastic production for Malaysian manufacturing industry, 2000-2005 
Variable Time-Invariant Time-Varying (Decay) 
Constant 5.045 (0.270) 4.666*** (4.820) 
Ln(Kit) 0.567*** (20.440) 0.566*** (21.090) 
Ln(Lab _local) 0.519*** (11.630) 0.553*** (12.770) 
Ln(Lab _foreign) 0.041 *** (2.170) 0.0002 (0.120) 
Ln(Estab) -0.140*** (4.720) -0.123*** (-4.510) 
µ 2.500 (0.130) 2.086*** (2 .200) 
y = cr2u I cr2S 0.703*** (24.240) 0.703*** (21.980) 
cr2S = cr2u+ cr2v 0.334*** (11.399) 0.303*** (10.820) 
cr2u 0.235*** (8.103) 0.213*** (7.613) 
cr2v 0.099*** (19.800) 0.090*** (18.000) 
Tl 0.024*** (2.320) 
Observations 761 761 
Log likelihood --398.06 
-369.01 
Note T-statistics in the parenthesis; *-10% level of statistical significant, * *-5% level of 
statistical significant, *** - 1 % level of statistical significant 
Ln(Estab) is negative and statistically significant. The negative coefficient 
suggests that the output tends to decrease with the increase in the industrial 
concentration. The negative coefficient could indicate there are little linkages and 
externalities from the increase in the manufacturing activities and competition. 
The statistical significance of the parameter y suggests that modelling the 
production behaviour of Malaysian manufacturing firms in a stochastic frontier 
framework rather than the conventional production function framework is appropriate 
44 The industri al classification fo llows the Malaysian Standard Industrial Classification 2000 (MSIC 
2000) 
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for the present data set. This means that the production performance differences across 
firms occur mainly due to differences in technical efficiencies across Malaysian firms. 
Table 23 shows that the variances of error terms is a2 v is 0.099 and a2 u is 0.235 
respectively. The variance of the one-sided error (technical efficiency), a2u, is more than 
twice that of the variance of the random error and indicates that a greater part of the 
variation in the residual is due to technical efficiency rather than random error 
associated with the production function. It is also interesting to observe that Y/ is positive 
and statistically significant indicating that technical efficiency improves over time. In 
could suggest that firms have been improving their technical efficiency by making 
significant efforts to follow the best-practice techniques of their chosen technologies as 
illustrated in Figure 14. It is interesting to examine whether human capital development 
has contributed to the improvement in technical efficiency over the years, which is 
attempted in the next section. 
Figure 14 Improvement in technical efficiency in the Malaysian manufacturing sector 
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To understand the impact of local and foreign human capital on technical 
efficiency, the sec'ond stage analysis using the technical efficiency measure derived 
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from the Stochastic Frontier is implemented. The impact of human capital development 
on technical efficiency improvement of the manufacturing sector is explored by 
estimating the following equation in a panel framework: 
TE = ao + a1Ln(local_skilled) + a2Ln(local_semiskilled) + a3Ln(local_unskilled) 
+ a4Ln(foreign_skilled) + asLn(foreign_semiskilled) + a 6Ln(foreign_unskilled) 
+ a1Ln(local_estab) + a1Ln(foreign_estab) + £it (6) 
Positive coefficients should be expected if human capital development 
complements and improves the technological capacity and productivity of the firms. 
Conversely, there is a possibility that negative coefficients might be observed due to 
skill mismatches if the workers do not have the relevant skills to meet the skills 
demands of the firms. In this case, firms might experience high search cost and also 
might be impaired from adopting new technologies and had to implement inferior 
technologies to complement the inferior skills of workers. Given the negative impact of 
establishments in the stochastic frontier estimation, it is likely that ownership (either 
local or foreign) may have different impact on the productivity of firms. It is expected 
that foreign firms create positive externalities and higher productivity due to better 
technology and specialisation through the global production network. Hence, the need 
to introduce both local and foreign establishments in the second stage regression. 
The scatter plots of technical efficiency to local and foreign variables are 
provided in Appendix 2 as are illustrated through Figures 31 to 40. The scatter plots 
show that local establishments tend to have a negative correlation with technical 
efficiency. In terms of human capital, both skilled local and foreign workers tend to 
have a positive trend line with technical efficiency, thereby indicating human capital 
accumulation tends to increase the technical efficiency in the manufacturing industries. 
However, it was also noticed that local semi-skilled workers tend to have a negative 
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trend line with technical efficiency. This indicates that local semi-skilled workers do not 
contribute substantially to the productivity and technical efficiency within the 
manufacturing sector. The negative coefficient could be mainly driven by skills 
mismatch of the semi-skilled workers in meeting the demands of the firms. 
The results of the second stage regression are set out in Table 24. The results 
indicate that local human capital in terms of skilled and semi-skilled workers do not 
contribute significantly to the technical efficiency in the manufacturing sector. In fact, 
local semi-skilled workers have a negative impact on the manufacturing technical 
efficiency. However, the results do indicate that local unskilled workers contribute 
positively to the technical efficiency in the manufacturing sector. This might reflect the 
low technology adoption in the manufacturing sector that complements low-skilled 
workers as compared to more skilled workers. 
The contribution of foreign workers also makes for interesting analysis. Foreign 
skilled and semi-skilled workers are not associated with positive effects on technical 
efficiency. Rather, it was observed that foreign unskilled contributed positively to the 
technical efficiency of the manufacturing sector. 
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Table 24 Determinants of Technical Efficiency in the Manufacturing Industries in 
Malaysia, 2000-2005 
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Ln(local_ skilled) 0.006 0.009 0.009** 0.006 
(0.004) (0.950) (2.060) (1.170) 
Ln(local _ semiskilled) -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.021 ** -0.017*** 
(-5.460) (3.390) (-6.100) (-3.540) 
Ln(local_ unskilled) 0.003* 0.004*** 0.004** 0.006** 
(1.650) (2.870) (1.910) (2.450) 
Ln(foreign _ skilled) -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.011 
(-0.640) (-0.500) (-0.910) (-0.720) 
Ln(foreign _ semiskilled) 0.0025* 0.011 0.002 0.001 
(1.750) (1.520) (1.060) (0.650) 
Ln(foreign _ unskilled) 0.002** 0.035* 0.001 * 0.001 * 





Ln(foreign _ estab) 0.001 0.001 
(0.160) (0.004) 
Constant 0.195*** 0.501 *** 0.202*** 0.287** 
(10.79) (3.560) (9.920) (2.190) 
R-Square 0.239 0.234 0.234 0.210 
Observation 232 232 232 232 
Note T-statistics in the parenthesis; *-10% level of statistical significant, **-5% level of 
statistical significant, *** - 1 % level of statistical significant 
Local establishments (Ln (local_ estab )) tend to have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on technical efficiency within the Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
At this stage of the analysis, it is difficult to detennine precisely the reasons. However, 
several hypotheses that are commonly cited such as low levels of technology uptake and 
lack of innovation in domestic firms as most of the local establishments are small and 
medium scale enterprises are plausible reasons for these outcomes (Yusuf and 
Nabeshima 2009; Rasiah 2002; 2009a; 201 O; Menon 1998). 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR PERFORMANCE 
Based on the results of this study and the literature on the links between human 
capital development and economic growth, there are several issues which emerge that 
are of relevance to the development of human capital as Malaysia aims to transit 
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towards high income economy. It appears very likely that there are skills mismatch in 
the Malaysian manufacturing sector. This is reflected mainly by the negative impact of 
semi-skilled workers to manufacturing sector output. The negative coefficient could be 
mainly driven by skilled mismatches of the semi-skilled workers in meeting the 
demands of the firms. 
The results here raise several important issues coalescing around the first 
question posited in this thesis: what are the domestic institutional issues that are 
constraining Malaysia's economic growth and its ability to overcome the middle-
income trap. 
The first relates to the critical issue of aligning human capital development and 
the changing industrial structure of the Malaysian economy. The East Asian economies 
of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore invested heavily in higher education and aligned their 
educational policy to changing demand conditions in the economy. Why has Malaysia, 
despite significant investment in human capital development, failed to produce 
comparable results? 
Secondly, recognising that the Malaysian economy is an open economy driven 
importantly by foreign direct investment and export growth, are Malaysia's educational 
and training institutions geared towards accommodating changing demand conditions in 
terms of the needs of multinational corporations and large corporations that dominate 
Malaysia's manufacturing sector? 
The literature highlights that the probability that the demand for science and 
technical skills will increase as the Malaysian economy transitions towards an 
innovation-based economy. Therefore there is an imperative in investment in science 
and technology (S&T) at the tertiary level and concurrently a need for the intake for 
S&T to be increased. This additionally suggests a need for investment in laboratories 
and research centres at universities that wiU provide the link between academic 
institutions and industries in transferring technologies and knowledge to industry. This 
is an important conduit for aligning the educational system to the changing needs of the 
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industries. Increases in intake would need to be complemented with strong academic 
staff in S&T. Malaysia appears to have undertaken all of the above beginning since the 
early 1980s (Rasiah 2002). Why then is Malaysia still failing in producing the needed 
human capital? 
The literature also highlights the importance of training and re-tooling (or re-
training) workers to sustain their human capital in rapidly changing industrial structure. 
Malaysia has a good number of industrial training centres and polytechnics yet once 
again Malaysia fails in producing the required number of skilled- and semi-skilled 
workforce. Why? 
The literature further highlights the importance of proper certification of the 
arious training programmes at the national level as vital for the recognition of the 
training and suggests that a national agency be set to up to accredit the various training 
institutes and maintain the quality of skills training. Malaysia has all of these in place 
but appears still unable to produce the required .human capital. Why? 
The recognition of changing demand for skilled workers needs to be aligned 
ith the need for an English-speaking ork force with high educational attainment 
emplo ed in rapid! changing S&T production activities. For example, the significant 
increase in information and telecommunication technologies requires workers with good 
communication and softv are skills to support activities ranging from business services 
to sophisticated financial services. ala sia, a former British colony and whose 
education s stem has English incorporated as a subject from primary school, has seen 
it English language proficienc of its citizens regress. Why? 
Immigration polic is another important component able to create flexibility in 
th labour market and the skilled foreign orkers could be used to augment domestic 
human capital. Howe er in the I fala sian case, the con erse appears to be the case. 
The regression results indicate that skilled and semi-skilled foreign workers do not 
contribute positively to technical efficienc of the manufacturing sector and purely act 
as factor inputs. The con erse is true with unskilled foreign labour which does 
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contribute positively to technical efficiency. This raises two possible policy 
considerations: (i) that skilled foreign workers have not been sufficiently or effectively 
utilised in the manufacturing sector; and (ii) the current policy of promoting unskilled 
foreign labour, while beneficial in the short run, can stifle human capital upgrading. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the contribution of labour at the different skill levels to the 
manufacturing sector' s performance in two stages. In the first stage, the stochastic 
frontier framework was utilised to analyse the contribution of local and foreign labour 
( categorised into three skill levels), towards the manufacturing sectors performance in 
terms of output and productivity, in addition to other conventional factors such as 
capital and the number of establishments in the manufacturing sector. The results 
indicate that capital investment and local labour contributes most significantly to output 
growth in the manufacturing sector. Conversely, the contribution of foreign labour was 
insignificant. 
The chapter also estimated the contribution of the variol!_s types of human capital 
(local and foreign; skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) to the technical efficiency of 
manufacturing industries in Malaysia through the second stage analysis using technical 
efficiency measure derived from the stochastic frontier model that was utilised in the 
first stage. The results suggest that local skilled and semi-skilled human capital has little 
impact on the technical efficiency of the manufacturing sector. In fact, the contribution 
of semi-skilled workers has a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
technfoal efficiency of the manufacturing sector. In contrast, it was observed that it was 
the statistically significant impact of unskilled labour that improved the technical 
efficiency of the manufacturing industries. Given the complementarity of low value-
added technology to unskilled labour, it is v·ery likely that the Malaysian manufacturing 
sector is experiencing low technology innovation and adopting low value-added 
technology. 
121 
The second stage results also indicate that local establishments have a negative 
impact to the efficiency in the manufacturing sector. This supports existing arguments 
that manufacturing firms in Malaysia, which comprise predominantly of small and 
medium scale enterprises, are highly inefficient. 
The above results also confirm existing studies which suggests that educational 
development and institutions that enhance human capital and technological capacity and 
capability will be crucial to increasing the competitiveness of Malaysia' s manufacturing 
sector in order to overcome the middle income trap. 
The chapter also raised several important questions about how these results 
might be explained more comprehensively. The proximate reason appears to be low 
technology innovation and not following the best-practice techniques of the chosen 
technology by the manufacturing sector. If this is due to the fact that most of the local 
manufacturing firms are small and medium scale enterprise, then the question must be 
asked, as to why they have remained so despite various public pronouncements by the 
government of Malaysia to further develop small and medium scale enterprises, and to 
move them up the value chain. 
Chapter 7 explores and addresses these questions more comprehensively. 
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Chapter 6 Human capital development and income inequality in the 
manufacturing sector 
Inequality however remains a real challenge for Malaysia. While overall income 
disparity improved ... the disparity seems to have increased over the past decade 
for certain groups. The disparities among the urban groups remain high ... 
Moreover, the results of household income surveys over the years suggest that 
income growth has been strong only for the top 20 per cent of Malaysian income 
earners ... The bottom 40 per cent of households have experienced the slowest 
growth of average income. 
NEAC (2010a, p. 57-58) 
High income inequality has always been a major concern of Malaysian 
policymakers as it is judged to have a destabilising effect on the country. In response, 
the Malaysian government has introduced some of the most extensive measures in the 
world to address inequality especially in favour of the majority Bumiputera community 
who were identified as lagging behind in socio-economic indicators. This concern has 
been further aggravated as growth beyond the middle income threatens to accentuate 
income inequality in Malaysia further if left to its own devices. This chapter investigates 
issues relating to income inequality in Malaysia and by examining three common 
determinants of wage inequality in order to understand this phenomenon better: 
technology and trade and the impact of migrant workers in the manufacturing sector 
THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP AND INEQUALITY 
Inclusive growth has been a key objective of policymaking in Malaysia since 
independence. Malaysia has achieved high rates of growth over the last four decades 
although the growth has been at slower rates in the recent past decade. Growth rates, 
although highly volatile, were achieved through sound macroeconomic policies, 
investment in infrastructure, human capital and other complementary measures. 
Concomitantly, income per capita and household consumption have all risen steadily 
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over the first four decades of independence although their growth has decelerated in the 
past decade. 
Government policies have also been successful in reducing disparities between 
urban and rural areas and among ethnic groups (Mat Zin 2011; World Bank 1993). Key 
to this has been the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in 1971 which sought to 
eradicate poverty and to restructure society to eliminate the identification of ethnicity 
from economic function. The underlying principles of the NEP were carried through 
into successive long term plans such as the National Development Policy (NDP); the 
National Vision Policy (NVP); the National Mission; and now in the Government 
Transformation Programme, Economic Transformation Programme and Strategic 
Reform Initiatives. 
These successful national strategies which had a strong emphasis on 
industrialisation and wealth redistribution, have seen the Malaysian economy not only 
achieve these social and political objectives, but also shift away from reliance solely on 
agricultural commodities and minerals to having a broader industrial and manufacturing 
base since the early 1970s. 
The value-added contribution of the industrial sector 45 had surpassed agriculture 
as early as 1970 but more importantly, the value added of the manufacturing sector to 
GDP -Malaysia's vehicle for industrialisation - surpassed the contribution of 
agriculture in 1987. 
Malaysia first experimented with import oriented industrialisation. The strategy 
however proved to be a failure and it has been argued contributed to the May 13, 1969 
race riots . Since the early 1970s, Malaysia embarked on an export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI) strategy. The EOI strategy saw Malaysia's nominal trade to GDP 
ratio rise to almost 2:1, making Malaysia one of the more open economies in the world 
especially in the manufacturing sector. Since the mid-l 990s, the Malaysian government 
45 The industrial sector broadly defined includes manufacturing, mining and energy. 
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has begun pursuing a strategy that seeks to move towards a knowledge-based economy 
with emphasis in the services sector. 
The signs are clear however that Malaysia's growth is decelerating and that it 
has hit the middle-income trap as noted in Chapter 1. The transition towards a high 
income country brings with it a different set of challenges due to the nature of economic 
growth beyond middle income levels, significantly different challenges from those 
associated with growth from low income to middle income. Growth beyond middle 
income tends to be more capital and skills intensive as the economy moves towards 
specialised industries. This leads to increased demand for skilled workers, and wage 
rises for skilled workers relative to semi-skilled or unskilled workers. 
Hence, the argument runs, to revive growth Malaysia will need to boost 
innovation capabilities and increase the knowledge intensity of economic activity. This 
is likely to accentuate disparities across skill levels. Spatial disparities may also widen 
as geographical clustering leads to greater concentration of high value-adding economic 
activity, which is likely to favour urban areas. The restructuring of the sources of 
growth, along with the need to expose the economy to greater competition entails 
additional risk that some groups will be left behind. The government is therefore 
rethinking its strategies to reduce poverty and address income inequality between and 
among the races in the context of returning to higher and sustainable growth rates. 
Several studies have highlighted the widening wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers in developed countries, due to the rising demand for skilled workers 
as the new technologies used in modern workplaces have altered employers ' demand for 
skills (Machin 2001 ; Autor et al. 1998; Acemoglu and Autor 2010). The key aspect is 
that theJe has been an up-skilling of the labour force as the demand for workers shifted 
to requiring higher educational qualifications and skill levels. This has led to a dramatic 
fall in the demand for unskilled workers and thus the widening wage gap in the labour 
market. The widening wage gap is expected to have drastic social and economic impact 
on developed countries in terms of unemployment and widening income inequality. 
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This chapter reviews and analyses features of income inequality in Malaysia, 
looking at whether indeed there is a widening wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers in the manufacturing sector in Malaysia and what are its causes. The focus is on 
the impact of migrant workers, trade and technology on wage divergence. The results 
will enable evaluation of the institutional arrangements that underpin Malaysia ' s efforts 
at addressing income inequality more broadly. 
INCOME INEQUALITY IN MALAYSIA 
Over the years, Malaysia has performed remarkably well in addressing absolute 
poverty. The incidence of absolute poverty has been reduced from approximately 52 per 
cent in 1970 to 4 per cent in 2009. However this stellar performance at the national level 
masks differing achievements in poverty reduction at the regional level and also high 
levels of income inequality. 
Table 25 illustrates that there are high levels46 of income inequality, represented 
by the Gini index, present in all regions of Malaysia. Income inequality and poverty is 
highest in the states of Sabah and Sarawak which are on the island of Borneo and 
geographically separated from Peninsular Malaysia by the South China Sea. There has 
been negligible improvement in income inequality over the past 40 years. 
46 The Gini Index which is a measure of income inequali ty is considered high if it is above 0.4 
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Table 25 Broad trends in incidence of poverty and income inequality 
1970 a 1990 2009 
IP GI IP GI IP GI 
Peninsular Malaysia 49.3 0.506 15.0 0.445 2.0 0.439b 
Rural 57.7 19.3 
Urban 21.3 7.3 n.a 
Sabah 34.3 0.459 19.2 0.451 b 
Rural 39.1 
Urban 14.7 
Sarawak 21 0.448 5.3 0.442b 
Rural 24.7 
Urban 4.9 
Malaysia 52.4 0.513 17.1 0.446 3.8 0.441 
Rural 0.469 21.8 0.409 0.407 
Urban 0.503 7.5 0.445 0.423 
Note IP - incidence of poverty in percentage terms; GI - Gini coefficient is an index; Poverty 
incidence for 1970 - 2002 were based on the 1977 methodology while the incidence of poverty 
for 2004 - 2009 is based on the 2005 methodology; a - Figures refer to Peninsular Malaysia 
only; b is GI for 2007; ... - data not available 
Source Hill et al. (2012). 
Figure 15 provides information on the distribution of population by income 
group based on data from household surveys of consumption expenditure. It is 
important to note that while Malaysia has managed to reduce absolute poverty, almost 
83 per cent of its citizens still earn less than US$ IO a day, with only 3 .4 per cent earning 
in excess ofUS$20 a day in 2004. 
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Figure 16 sets out the income shares held by different quintiles of the 
population. These data confirm, in a different way, what was shown, in Figure 15: that 
the majority of Malaysians (or approximately 87 per cent of total household) are in the 
middle three quintiles and that there has been very little change in Malaysia over the 1 7 
years surveyed. The number of people in the top quintile fell by 0.1 percentage point 
while the bottom 20 fell by 1.4 per cent. The three quintiles in the middle experienced a 
marginal increase. This raises several interesting questions on the nature of economic 
growth and its distributional impact in Malaysia. 
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Figure 17 confirms that the distributional effect of Malaysia' s strong economic 
growth has been skewed towards the top 20 per cent of Malaysian households. Almost 
50 per cent of income is captured by the top 20 per cent of households in Malaysia 
while the middle 40 per cent has 36 per cent of the income and the bottom 40 per cent 
has only 14 per cent of total income. This trend has been consistent since the 1970s. 
This observation is reflected in the mean monthly income for households in the 
three groups. The mean monthly income for the top 20 households in Malaysia was 
RM998647 in 2009 while the mean monthly household income for all groups was 
RM4025. More than 80 per cent of Malaysian households had mean monthly incomes 
that were below this line. The mean monthly income for the bottom 40 per cent of 
Malaysians was RM1440 and the middle 40 per cent was RM363 l. What is of interest 
is that the ratio of the top 20 to the bottom 40 had only been reduced marginally, from 
47 RM9986 is approximately US$3295.l 7; RM4025 = US$1328 .16; RM3631 = US$1198 .15 and 
RM1440 = US$475.l 7, if the exchange rate is set at RMl =US0.3300 
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approximately 10: 1 in 1970 to 7: 1 in 2009 despite extensive income redistribution 
programmes. 
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Malaysia ' s income inequality outcomes are higher than all of its comparators, 
except for Singapore and Thailand, when the Gini index is used as a measure of income 
inequality, but highest when using the ratio between the highest and bottom 10 per cent 
as the measure. The OECD countries all have Gini indexes that are below 0.4. Although 
these numbers are not directly comparable (for example the year of the surveys used are 
different) , they provide context and a compelling reason for analysis the situation in 
Malaysian . 
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Table 26 Gini index for selected comparators 
Country Survey year, Source Gini Survey year, Top 10 / 
coefficient Source Bottom 
10* 
Japan Late-2000s, OECD 2011 0.329 1993, WDI 4.54 
Korea Late-2000s, OECD 2011 0.315 1998, WDI 7.79 
Taiwan 2010, Taiwan Statistical 0.340 n.a 
Data Book, 2011 
Singapore 2007, Dhamani, 2008 0.485 1998, WDI 17.73 
Malaysia 2009, Martins and 0.462 2009, WDI 19.49 
McKinley, 2011, WDI 
Thailand 2009, Martins and 0.536 2005 , WDI 12.74 
McKinley, 2011 , WDI 
India 2005, Martins and 0.368 2005 , WDI 8.54 
McKinley, 2011, WDI 
Indonesia 2009, Martins and 36.8 2009, WDI 9.14 
McKinley, 2011 , WDI 
Philippines 2006, Martins and 44.0 2006, WDI 14.06 
McKinley, 2011, WDI 
Vietnam 2008, Martins and 37.6 2008, WDI 9.35 
McKinley, 2011, WDI 
Note 1 - World Development Indicators, *Ratio of the income share of the top 10 per cent over 
the bottom 10 per cent 
Source various. 
EXPLAINING INCOME INEQUALITY 
Theory and evidence in the literature both suggest that high levels of income 
inequality in developing countries affects growth through three channels: (i) through 
interaction with incomplete and underdeveloped markets for capital and information; 
and (ii) by discouraging the evolution of the economic and political institutions 
associated with accountable government which in turn enables a market environment 
conducive to investment and growth; and (iii) by undermining the civic and social life 
that sustains effective collective decision-making (Birdsall 2007). Furthermore, 
widening gaps in the wage structure manifest themselves in family income and 
consumption inequality and associated social problems (Autor and Kats 1998). These 
issues are also being experienced in M~laysia. In particular, the nature of Malaysia' s 
economy, especially in the manufacturing sector, which has been fully liberalised, could 
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lead to income inequality caused by international trade, via technological change or 
more specifically, skills-biased technological change. 
Technology 
The skills-biased technology change hypothesis is based on the proposition that 
a shift in production technology favours skilled over unskilled labour by increasing its 
relative productivity, and therefore its relative demand (Berman 1994; Machin 2001; 
Violante 2005). Conversely, low-skilled workers either lose their jobs or have their 
wages cut as new technologies are introduced. Hence the wage gap increases as the 
relative wages (and employment) of the high-skilled workers increases due to skills-
biased technological change. 
Traditionally, technical change was viewed as factor-neutral. The observed rapid 
rise in the relative wages of skilled workers in conjunction with an upward trend in their 
relative supply suggests, however, that recent technological changes have been skills-
biased. Theory and empirics both suggest that new technologies (for example, 
information and communication technologies) are complementary with skilled labour, at 
least in their adoption phase. There is ample micro-econometric research and several 
case-studies that document the statistical correlation between the use of new 
technologies, like computers, and either the employment share of skilled workers 
(Bartell and Lichtenberg 1987) or their wage share (Autor et al. 1998) across industries. 
There are several hypotheses in the literature that provide the foundation for 
believing that technical change is skills-biased (Acemoglu 2002; Aghion 2002; 
Hornstein et al. 2005). The first hypothesis is built on the sharp decline of the constant-
quality relative price of investment equipment (Gordon 1990; Greenwood et al. 1997), 
especially evident in information technologies where prices fall every year. Krussel et 
al. (2000) argue that substantial cheapening of capital equipment is the force behind 
skills biased technical change. Giriliches (1969) in turn set forth in motion empirical 
papers that supported the idea that skilled labour is more complementary to capital 
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equipment than is unskilled labour. As a result of capital-skill complementarity in 
production, the faster growth of the equipment stock pushed up the relative demands for 
skilled labour and in turn the skills premium. 
The second hypothesis is inspired by the Nelson-Phelps view of human capital. 
Nelson-Phelps (1966, p. 70) noted that, ' educated people make good innovators, so that 
education speeds the process of technological diffusion ' . In particular they contend that 
more educated people and able or experienced labour deal better with technological 
change. Skilled workers are less adversely affected by the turmoil created by major 
technological transformations since it is less costly for them to acquire the additional 
knowledge needed to adopt a new technology. Rapid technological transitions - such as 
witnessed in the past three decades and likely are likely to continue in the future - are 
skills biased, as more able workers adapt better to change (Greenwood and Yorukoglu 
1997; Caselli 1999; Galor and Moav 2000). 
The Nelson-Phelps conjecture implies that the rise in the skill premium is 
transitory. It is only in the early adaptation phase of a new technology that those who 
adapt more quickly can reap some benefits. As time goes by, there will be enough 
workers learning how to work with the new technology to offset the wage differential. 
The significant difference between the first and the second fonnulation is that the effect 
of capital deepening on the skill premium is permanent in the first. 
The third hypothesis is that information technologies reduce the costs of data 
storage, communication, monitoring and supervising activities within the firm and that 
triggers a shift towards new organisational design (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). In 
particular, the layers in hierarchical structures can be reduced, so that organisation of 
the firm becomes ' flatter.' Workers no longer perform routinised, specialised tasks but 
they are now responsible for a wide range of tasks within teams. Therefore, adaptable 
workers who have general skills and who are more versed with multi-tasking activities 
benefit from this transformation. Hence, the change in technology induces an 
organisational shift which is skills-biased. Microeconomic evidence consistent with all 
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these hypotheses of the technology-skill complementarity hypothesis is offered by 
Autor et al. (2003). 
There are other reasons for skills-biased technical change. Firstly, the direction 
of technological change favours skilled workers. Profit incentives of innovators 
determine the amount ofR&D activity directed towards different factors of production 
(Acemoglu 1998). The expansion of educated labour since post-war in the developed 
economies, and in many former colonies after independence, and the expansion of 
global trade made it profitable to develop the complementary of machines to skilled 
workers. Secondly, labour institutions that keep wages high despite reductions in 
productivity also induce firms to direct efforts towards labour-saving technologies 
which again favour skilled labour. 
Trade 
The argument that trade is· responsible for the increase in wage inequality stems 
largely from Heckscher- Ohlin theory (Wood, in Arestis and Eatwell 2008). According 
to this theory, countries specialise in the production of those commodities which use 
intensively the factors of production with which they are abundantly endowed. 
Developing countries that are abundant in unskilled labour but scarce in skilled labour 
tend to export goods that are intensive in the former. Developed countries export ski ll-
intensive commodities. Under such specialisation, trade expansion results in predictable 
inequality trends.48 In the poor country- where abundant unskilled labour is cheap and 
scarce skilled labour is expensive - trade expansion drives up demand for unskilled 
labour and drives down the demand for skilled labour, thus erasing some earnings 
inequality. In the rich country (where relative to the poor country, unskilled labour is 
expensive and skilled labour is cheaper) trade expansion drives up the demand for the 
skilled labour and drives down the demand for the unskilled labour, both assuming that 
48 While the results are clear in a comparative static context, it is not so clear in a dynamic context. 
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labour markets are efficient and flexible. If there is any wage rigidity especially for 
unskilled labour, unemployment would result. 
Conventional trade theory also predicts that the increase in exports of goods 
intensive in unskilled labour, due to improved transport and rapid growth in East Asia in 
the past three decades, might explain the rise in skilled-wage differentials observed in 
capital rich countries such as the UK and the US. A growing empirical literature has 
tried to sort out how much of the increase in the skill premium can be explained by 
trade within newly industrialising countries as opposed to alternative explanations such 
as skilled biased technical change. Trade between high-skill and low-skill economies 
should cause an increase in the demand for domestic skill-intensive commodities in the 
high skill economy at the expense of the demand for domestic unskilled intensive 
commodities. This in tum would induce a reallocation of labour between low-skill and 
high-skill industries. In contrast, skill-biased technical change would induce a shift in 
labour demand towards skilled labour within all industries. 
Berman, Bound and Giriliches (1994) tested this hypothesis in the United States 
and found the within component to be the most important. It accounts for 70 per cent 
of the rise in the white collar share in employment between 1979 and 1987. Using a 
similar method for the UK between 1979 and 1990, Machin (1996) reports that 82 per 
cent of the increase in the non-manual share is due to within industry shifts. Hence 
only a minor part of the shift away from manual/blue-collar workers to non-
manual/white-collars is due to reallocation of skilled labour between industries. 
While these studies confirm that skills-biased technical change as part of the 
wage inequality story, the fact that the shift in labour demand has taken place mainly 
within industries is not a sufficient condition to disregard international trade as a factor 
in explaining the observed increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
labour. These arguments rely critically on the assumption that traded goods are 
primarily final goods and consequently, international trade would shift demand from 
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unskilled-intensive to skill-intensive goods. If this assumption was changed from final 
goods to inputs into further production, the implications would be very different. 
A lower price of intermediate goods would shift the demand for other inputs, 
increasing demand for factors of production that are complementary and reducing the 
demand for substitutes. If unskilled labour were more substitutable for intermediate 
goods than skilled labour, cheap intermediate goods would increase the demand for 
skilled labour, shifting the within-industry labour demands to all industries that use such 
inputs, irrespectively of whether they are skilled or unskilled-labour intensive. In this 
scenario, international trade that reduces the price of intermediate goods would shift 
relative labour demands but not the demand for final goods. One cannot therefore 
interpret the evidence of an absence of between-industry shifts as refuting the role of 
trade (Aghion et al. 1999). Evidence for this is provided by Falk and Koebel (1997) and 
Koebel (1997) as they find that unskilled labour is more substitutable for material inputs 
than skilled labour in the manufacturing and construction sectors in Germany. 
Migrant labour 
Malaysia is currently the largest importer of migrant labour in Asia. The amount 
of registered migrant labourers increased from 3.2 per cent of the labour force in 1990 
to 21 per cent in 2008 (Athukorala and Devadason 2011). This does not take account of 
the number of irregular migrant workers who are estimated to total conservatively 2 
million people49 or approximately 1 7 per cent of the labour force. 
The impact of migrant labour on domestic wages is well researched for 
developed economies. The possible impact of migrant labour on wages and employment 
outcomes for domestic workers at the most basic level involves a simple analysis of 
supply and demand. This supply and demand model rests on a key assumption: about 
49 The number of irregular migrant ~orkers is estimated to be between 2 to 3 million. A recent amnesty 
programme (6P) for irregular migrant workers saw 2.3 million foreign workers registered of whjch 1.3 
million were irregular ' , 'Myanmar and Malaysia to swap detainees ', Martin Carvalho, Yuen Meikeng, 
Rahimy Rahim and Calvin Yeo, 18 October 2011 , The Star. 
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whether or not migrant labour is perfectly substitutable with domestic labour (Dustmann 
et al. 2008). 
If migrant labour is assumed to be perfectly substitutable with domestic labour, 
then in a competitive labour market setting, the wages paid to foreign labour in the 
importing country are likely to exceed those paid in the sending country wage by an 
amount just necessary to cover the cost of migration plus a premium for the higher cost 
of living in the importing country. Once the premium is established, and if this new 
wage is lower than the going rate in the importing country, then there will be downward 
pressure on the price of labour in the importing country until an equilibrium is reached, 
where the price of labour in the importing country is the same as the price in the sending 
country plus the cost of migration and higher living cost 
An alternative view is that migrant labour does not compete with but rather 
complements domestic labour. This view argues that foreign workers are not perfect 
substitutes for two important reasons (Kindleberger 1967; Bhagwati 1979). Firstly, 
foreign workers enter the country primarily to take up occupations shunned by local 
workers as the growth process generates more attractive employment opportunities or 
greater preference for leisure. The jobs filled by foreign workers generally tend to fall 
into three categories which are not mutually exclusive: dirty, dangerous and difficult 
(3D) jobs, jobs that have tasks that are based on monotonous work processes, and static 
jobs (dead- end jobs) that do not provide a setting-for future career advancement. In 
essence these jobs are undesirable to domestic labour (Athukorala and Devadason 
2011). 
Secondly, governments in contemporary times have the autonomy to restrict 
labour mobility within their territorial borders either at the border or behind the border 
(Bhagwati 1979; Hatton and Williamson 2005). Irregular migrants do not have the 
rights to compete directly with the domestic labour. This limits irregular labour to being 
part of labour that takes up jobs in which domestic labour is uninterested. 
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This view also suggests that the entry of migrant labour can have a favourable 
economy-wide impact on overall employment and wage levels in the host country 
through two channels. Firstly, augmentation of domestic labour supply with migrant 
labour may yield higher profits, permitting the economy to expand investment and 
output (Kindleberger 1967). Secondly, migrant labour shifts the demand curve outward 
for domestic goods and services and this increases the demand of labour further. Hence, 
it can be concluded that the impact of migrant labour on wages is a question of empirics 
rather than universally determined. 
There is a dearth of literature analysing how migrant labour affects wage 
inequalities in Malaysia compared to the rich literature on developed economies. Three 
papers do, however, provide analysis of the various determinants of income inequality 
that set the stage for the analysis here. In his paper, ' Inequality and determinants of 
earnings in Malaysia', Milanovic (2006) investigates the changes in inequality of 
earnings, their determinants and how earnings are influenced by the changes in supply 
and demand of different types of labour over the 13-year period, 1984-1997. The study 
provides a number of interesting results on the determinants of wage inequality 
identified - gender, educational attainment, age, ethnicity, geographical location, type 
of employer and type of occupation. 
The results of the Milanovic (2006) study, although not conclusive, provide 
three important inputs into the analysis here. Firstly, there are many determinants -
eight that are tested in this study - that influence wages in Malaysia. Secondly, despite 
substantial spending on education and improvement in educational attainment, the rates 
of return on education remained high during the period 1984-1997, suggesting 
continuing demand for an educated workforce. Finally, there appears to be a bias 
against women in the private sector in general but in support of the Malaysian Chinese 
community. 
Another relevant study" is that, on 'Earnings differentials determinants between 
ski ll s in the Malaysian manufacturing sector', by Ismail and Ragayah (2003). This paper 
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attempts to measure the determinants of earnings differentials among three classes of 
workers categorised by skill (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector. The authors used data from a survey of 2065 workers in six 
major50 industries for the year 1999. The paper estimates the determinants of earning 
differentials by using the coefficients of the earning functions. The factors are then 
decomposed into three categories; human capital ( education, training, and experience), 
gender, location and the residual. 
Ismail and Ragayah's paper reiterates the findings that differences in labour 
earnings are determined by skills level, gender, location and types of industries although 
with different levels of importance. The paper notes that educational level plays a 
crucial role in determining earnings as well as in explaining the earnings differentials. 
Other types of human capital, such as training and working experience, are less 
important in determining the earning levels of the workers. Nevertheless, training 
appears to be an important determinant of the incomes of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. The decomposition of earnings differences confirms the importance of human 
capital variables: 41 per cent between skilled and semi-skilled, 19 per cent between 
skilled and unskilled and 55 per cent between semi-skilled and unskilled. There is also 
very high divergence among the coefficients when comparing semi-skilled and 
unskilled and skilled and unskilled. The study does not capture explanations but the 
authors speculate that they may be related to discriminatory practices. Compared to the 
Milanovic (2006) study, this stu~y did not find that location and gender were an 
important determinant of wage differences . 
. Athukorala and Devadason (2011) analyse the impact of migrant labour on 
Malaysia. Their study finds that, although migrant workers do suppress manufacturing 
sector wages, the magnitude of the impact is small. The paper notes that real 
so The six industries were electrical and electronics, textile, wood-based; transport equipment, food, and 
chemical industries. 
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manufacturing wages are tied to the structure and performance of the manufacturing 
sector. 
These three papers highlight that there are many determinants of income 
inequality in Malaysia and in the manufacturing sector in particular. It is evident from 
the literature review that human capital (education, training and experience), gender, 
age, location, occupation, industry, type of firm , level of unionisation, capital intensity, 
exposure to competition both domestic and foreign, research and development intensity, 
regulatory framework and several other factors, are all determinants of wage levels in 
differing significance. The particular interest in this chapter is how trade, technology 
and migrant workers impact on the wages of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
in the manufacturing sector in Malaysia. The focus is on three key proximate 
determinants that impact the manufacturing sector (human capital, technology and 
trade) on income inequality. 
MALAYSIA'S MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
The manufacturing sector in Malaysia has been seen as a major source of 
economic growth, economic diversification, technological development, and 
employment generation. Through these objectives that government has also tagged 
various affirmative action targets, especially entrepreneurship, employment and equity 
targets in favour of the Bumiputera community. There is no doubt that the 
manufacturing has played a leading role in transforming the structure of the Malaysian 
economy (Jomo 2007; Jomo et al. 1999). Manufacturing has been Malaysia ' s leading 
sector since 1989, being the most important sector in terms of contribution to 
Malaysia' s GDP and exports. 
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Table 27 Malaysia - GDP by economic activities at constant RM 2000 price 
Sector 2000 2005 2009e 
GDP @ constant 2000 price (RM million) 356,401 449,250 522,001 
Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery 9 8 8 
Mining and quarrying 11 9 8 
Manufacturing 31 31 27 
Construction 4 3 3 
Utilities 3 3 3 
Wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants 13 14 16 
Transport, storage and communication 7 7 8 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business 14 15 17 
services 
Other services 6 6 6 
Government services 6 7 8 
Total 104 103 104 
Note e- estimates; * the total of the sectors is more than 100 as it has yet to less FISJM 
(Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured) and add import duties. 
Source Department of Statistics, (2012) . 
The manufacturing sector dominates exports by contributing almost two thirds 
of Malaysian exports. Within manufacturing, electronics, electrical machinery and 
appliances dominate with 40 per cent of total manufacturing exports. 
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Table 28 Gross manufactured exports by sectors and key industries (per cent) 
Sector 2000 2005 2008 
Manufactured goods 85.2 80.7 74.1 
Electronics, electrical machinery and 61.7 52.7 41.8 
appliances 
Chemicals and chemical products 4.0 6.0 6.2 
Textiles, clothing and footwear 2.8 2.0 1.6 
Manufacture of metal 2.8 4.4 4.4 
Optical and scientific equipment 1.8 2.2 2.3 
Wood products 1.8 1.3 1.5 
Rubber products 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Transport equipment 0.8 1.3 1.4 
Agriculture commodities 4.8 5.8 9.0 
Minerals 7.0 9.3 12.9 
Other exports 3.0 4.2 4.0 
Total 100 100 100 
Source Nambiar, (2010). 
The manufacturing sector is also the third most important contributor of 
employment. It contributes almost 17 per cent of total registered employment in 
Malaysia. Only the wholesale and retail , hotels and restaurants and government services 
within the services sector have a larger number of registered employed workers. 
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Table 29 Malaysia - Number of employed persons by industry 
Sector 2000 2005 2009 
Total labour force ('000) 9269.2 10,045.4 10,897.3 
Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery 16.7 14.6 13.5 
Mining and quarrying 0.3 0.4 0.6 
Manufacturing 23.5 19.8 16.6 
Construction 8.2 9.0 9.3 
Utilities 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants 19.3 22.8 24.2 
Transport, storage and communication 4.7 5.4 5.4 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business 5.1 7.0 8.0 
services 
Other services 21.7 4.9 5.2 
Government services 15.4 16.7 
Total 100 99.9 100 
Note Industry classifications have changed twice (2000 and 2008). This table is classified 
according to the 'Malaysian Standard Industrial Classification' (MSIC) 2000. 
Source Department of Statistics, (2012). 
Nevertheless, in recent years, the manufacturing sector has seen a decline in its 
performance both at the macro and micro level. This is evident especially since the East 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98. The growth rate of the manufacturing sector' s gross 
export value is coming close to a plateau while the rate of growth of manufacturing 
exports has been trending downwards since the early 1990s (see Figures 38, 39 and 40). 
This declining performance is also observable at the micro level. A simple 
average growth rate (AGR)51 reveals that the period from 2005-2009, average growth 
rates for the key indicators in the manufacturing sector slowed down further compared 
to the 2000-2005 period as reported in Table 30. Another important concern is the 
significant fall in research and development (R&D) expenditure in 2009 compared to 
2005. 
51 The average growth rate (AGR) is the simple average for each of the indicators for the stated period. 
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Table 30 Key indicators in the manufacturing sector 
Key indicator 2000 2005 AGR 2009 AG 
a R b 
No of establishments 20,455 28,257 6.36 30,607 1.66 
Total labour 1,574,797 1,675 ,163 1.06 1,693 ,154 0.46 
Salaries and wages 26,123,409 32,767,343 4.24 39,397,457 1.06 
Value of assets (RM '000) 164,077,38 190,914,47 2.73 195,869,77 0.21 
5 1 0 
Value added (RM ' 000) 88,240,323 118,210,25 5.66 138,480,70 1.58 
7 8 
Sales value (RM '000) 428,413 ,64 636,150,11 8.08 705,046,26 1.28 
3 8 0 
Export value 226,059,76 283 ,409,23 4.23 227,307,02 1.23 
2 9 5 
R&D (RM '000) 683,718 2,363,153 40.9 1,847,411 
4 7.07 
Training costs 222,988 326,801 7.76 462,606 3.36 
University degree/above 60,370 94,626 9.46 111,755 1.58 
Di12loma/STPM/eguivalent 137,450 178,633 4.99 198,065 1.53 
SPM/SPVM/equivalent/belo 1,376,977 1,401 ,904 0.30 1,383,335 0.24 
w 
Note AGR- average growth rate; a-AGR for 2000-2005 and b-AGR for 2005-2009. 
Source Department of Statistics, (2011 ). 
Migrant workers are concentrated mainly in the manufacturing, where it is the 
highest, and also in the agriculture, domestic services and construction sector. It is 
evident that these are labour intensive industries.52 
Table 31 Malaysia - Distribution of foreign workers by key sectors (per cent) 
Sector 1985 1990 2000 2005 2008 
Agriculture 1 50.1 37.7 24.8 26.0 25.0 
Manufacturing 6.9 8.8 38.1 32.1 36.0 
Construction 15.0 34.4 8.5 15.5 14.0 
Non-domestics 20.3 2 19.1 6.7 8.8 9.0 
services 
Domestic services 22.0 17.6 16.0 
Total(%) 95.3 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total ( ' 000) 212 440 807 1815 2020 
Note 1 Includes forestry, fishing and mining; 2 - Includes domestic services; ... - Not available 
Source Athukorala and Devadason, (2011). 
52 The possible reasons for this outcome are discussed comprehensively in Chapter 7. 
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Labour in the manufacturing sector can be classified into three broad categories 
skilled, semi - skilled and unskilled. The Revised International Standard Classification 
of Occupation (ISCO-88) by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) provides for a 
standardised definition of occupational classification as reported in Table 32. The 
Malaysian Standard Classification of Occupation (MASCO) follows this ILO 
classification. 








Tertiary education leading to a 
university or postgraduate 
university degree; Malaysian 
Skills Advanced Diploma 
(DLKM) 5-8 
Tertiary education leading to an 
award not equivalent to a first 
university level; Malaysian 
Skills Level 4 or Malaysian 
Skills Diploma (DKM) Level 4. 
Secondary or post-secondary 
education; Malaysian Skills 
Certificate (SKM) Level 1 - 3 
First Primary education 
(Unskilled) 
Source MASCO, (2008). 
Major groups 
2. Professions 
3. Technicians and associate 
professionals. 
4. Clerical support workers 
5. Service and sales workers 
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry 
and fishery workers 
7.Craft and related trades 
workers 
8. Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 
Elementary occupation 
In this study, skilled workers are those who are classified as managerial and 
professionals and technical and supervisory. Those in this group are conceptualised to at 
least have a degree, a diploma and extensive on the job training53 . Semi-skilled workers 
are those classified as clerical and related occupation and production workers while 
unskilled workers are general workers. Table 33 describes the structure of labour in 
53 On the job training is not captured in this analysis. 
145 
Malaysia' s manufacturing sector in 2000 and 2005. Skilled workers constitute no more 
than 22 per cent of the manufacturing sector with low skilled (semi-skilled and 
unskilled) workers dominating. Semi - skilled workers dominate with almost 75 per 
cent of the workforce with unskilled workers amounting to less than 5 per cent. 
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Table 33 Skills structure in the manufacturing sector (per cent) 
Skills structure 2000 2005 
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
Total labour (in numbers) 1574797 1675163 
Total labour by citizenship (in 86.1 13.9 78.1 21.9 
percentage) 
Skilled workers (total) 16.5 18.6 
Skilled workers by classification 16 0.5 18 0.6 
Managerial and professional 5.1 0.3 6.9 0.3 
Technical and Supervisory 10.9 0.2 11.1 0.3 
Semi-skilled workers (total) 78 74.44 
Semi-skilled workers by classification 64.7 13.3 53.8 20.64 
Clerical and related occupation 6.2 0.03 6.4 0.04 
Production/operation workers (Direct) 53.9 11.5 41.1 16.6 
Production/ operation workers 4.6 1.6 6.3 4.0 
(Contract) 
Unskilled labour (total) 3.5 4.3 
Unskilled workers (by classification) 3.3 0.2 3.9 0.5 
General workers 3.3 0.2 3.9 0.5 
Source Department of Statistics, (2011). 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND APPLICATION 
The dataset of Malaysia ' s manufacturing sector is at the 5 digit level. It covers 
187 industries over a 6 year period from 2000-2005. This dataset enables us to analyse 
the impact of trade, technology and composition of labour on wage difference in the 
manufacturing sector in Malaysia for the given time period. 
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Table 34 Summary statistics of the dataset 
Variable Obs Mean Std div 
Domestic firms 1059 81.12181 107.5545 
Foreign firms 924 11.22511 14.99596 
Joint ownership 203 1.596059 0.9822102 
Total establishment 1060 90.74434 113.0665 
Gross output 1079 2830026 7553661 
Cost of input 1079 2285411 6398808 
Value of assets 1079 982881.6 2181132 
Total labour 1079 8504.781. 14599.09 
Domestic labour 1079 7001.963 11882.43 
Foreign labour 765 294.2235 268.9766 
Skilled domestic labour 641 347.8846 271.2153 
Skilled foreign labour 962 54.69751 96.33097 
Skilled wages 1078 67800.8 135754.5 
Semi-skilled domestic labour 1078 4592.956 8149.408 
Semi-skilled foreign labour 789 275.5019 265.431 
Semi-skilled wages 1078 75302.15 131787.6 
Unskilled domestic labour 1079 318.7216 455.5921 
Unskilled foreign labour 1069 29.36134 101.6561 
Unskilled wages 1078 4760.717 6758.265 
Share of R&D/capital 1118 0.0054 0.0117506 
Share of exports/sales 1118 0.32444 0.2058766 
Several studies have highlighted the widening wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers in developed countries, due to the rising demand for skilled workers 
as the new technologies used in modem workplaces have altered employers' demand for 
skills (Machin 2001; Autor et al. 1998; Acemoglu and Autor 2010). Wage gap is 
defined as the differences in the wages of the skilled and unskilled workers. This is 
primarily driven by several factors such as (a) skilled biased technological factors that 
increased the demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers , (b) increasing 
export intensity in skilled and technology based products that increased the demand for 
the skilled workers, and ( c) government policies to structurally adjust the industries to 
higher value-added activities. 
In exploring the explanations behind the wage gap, it is useful to adopt the 
Supply-Demand-Institutions (SDI) framework that was suggested by Katz et al (1998), 
where both demand and supply factors affect the wage gap in the labour market. In 
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addition to 'competitive' market forces increasing, it is also the observing the effects of 
'non-competitive' forces affecting the demand for skilled and unskilled workers in more 
matured economics such as wage bargaining strength of workers, discrimination due to 
aging, institutional factors such as minimum wage, the effectiveness of educational 
institutions, etc. Thus the wage of an individual can be thought of as consisting of two 
components: the 'competitive' component of wages as determined by relative labour 
supply and demand, while the 'non-competitive' component is determined by 
institutional factors owing to unions, minimum wages and other structures. This study 
attempts to address the non-competitive effects on the wage gap of the Malaysian labour 
market. 
In contrast, the supply-side effects such as increase in educational level of 
workers will increase the supply of skilled workers thereby by having a depressing 
effect on their wages, thereby narrowing the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled 
workers, ceteris paribus. As government improves the higher educational institutions, 
there should be an expectation of greater supply of educated and skilled workers to enter 
the labour force, which will reduce the wages of the skilled workers. 
However, recent studies of the OECD countries on the wage gap highlight that it 
has widened in many OECD countries. The wages of the better-skilled workers relative 
to the low-skilled workers continue to increase despite the relative increase in the 
supply of the more educated and presumably, more .skilled workers in the 1980s and 
1990s (OECD 1993; 1996). This implies that demand has risen at a faster rate than 
supply due to rapid technological innovations spurred by research and development. 
. The international literature has. tended to focus on relative demand shifts to 
explain the wage gap illustrated through Figure 18. 
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D ' L 2 
Ns!Nu=n 
Where WL relative wage rate for local skilled and unskilled workers 
nL relative local labour force of skilled and unskilled workers 
Ls local labour supply 
L D local labour demand without levy 
F Initial equilibrium 
D new equilibrium with shift in only labour demand 
C new equilibrium with shift in labour demand and labour supply 
WL * market-clearing wage 
WL' new market-clearing local wage after shift in labour demand 
WL'' new market-clearing local wage after shift in labour demand and supply 
nL * initial number of local workers employed 
nL' number of local workers employed after shift in labour demand 
nL" number of local workers employed after shift in labour demand and supply 
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Point D Relative wages increases due to shift in labour demand due to increase demand 
for skilled workers as new technologies are introduced. 
Point C Relative wages falls due to shift in labour demand and supply. The supply shift 
due to technology inducement effect is stronger than the shift in labour demand. 
To implement the model empirically, this study adopts the industry wage 
equation framework of Allen (1996) and applies it to the Malaysian labour market by 
creating a panel of 189 industries from 2000 to 2005. The industry wage equation 
framework of Allen (1996) is modified to study the wage gap at the industry level for 
the Malaysian economy. The modified model is given in the following equation (log 
form): 
ln(Wage of skilled-Wage ofUnskilled)it = ao+ a1 In (share of skilled types of foreign to 
local workers)it + a2 ln(Fixed Assets)+ a3 ln(Value-Added Output)it+ 84 Time Trend+ 
(1) 
where industry=i ............. , , and time=t ...... . 
ln(Wage of skilled-Wage of Unskilled)it = wage gap between skilled and unskilled local 
workers; 
ln (share of skilled types of foreign to local workers.)it = share of skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled foreign workers to local workers 
ln (FixedAssets)it = capital accumulation effects and structural changes from capital 
accumulations 
ln (Valu.e-Added Output)u= the output and scale effects in the economy 
The model was estimated by pooling.the cross-section and time-series data 
consisting of 189-digit industries from 2000 to 2005 . The model was estimated with the 
fixed-effect framework that accounts for both the industry and time specific effects. 
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The graphical relationship between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
to wage gap are given in Figures 41 to 43 54• A negative relationship is observed between 
the share of skilled foreign to local workers and wage gap as illustrated in Figure 41. 
This indicates that a greater inflow of skilled foreign workers tends to reduce the wage 
gap in the manufacturing sector. In contrast, the wage gap tends to show a positive 
relationship with the share of unskilled foreign workers as illustrated in Figure 43. The 
wage gap widens with greater in-flow of unskilled workers. No distinct relationship is 
observed between wage gap and the share of semi-skilled foreign workers as illustrated 
in Figure 42. 
The results of the model are reported in Table 35 for OLS, fixed and random 
effect estimations. As OLS estimation is biased due to industry effects, estimations with 
fixed and random effects are also undertaken. The results are consistent across the fixed 
and random effect estimation. 
Table 35 Wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector 2000-2005 
Variable OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
In (share of skilled foreign to -0.043*** -0.051 -0.016 
local workers)i1 (-3.010) (0.630) (-0.351) 
In (share of semi-skilled 0.254*** 0.032 0.066 
foreign to local workers)i1 (2.540) (0.410) (0.900) 
In (share of unskilled foreign 0.061 *** 0.025*** 0.031*** 
to local workers)i1 (5.160) (3 .200) (3.960) 
Ln (Fixed Assets)i1 
-0.090** 0.169*** 0.083* 
(-1.820) (2.710) (1.650) 
Ln (Value-Added Output)it 0.0294*** 0.088* 0.058 
(6.230) (1.650) (1.170) 
Constant 0.980 1.370*** 0.380 













The results are interesting on several counts. The increase in the share of skilled 
foreign workers to local workers tends to reduce the wage gap between the skilled and 
the unskilled. This may be due to the supply-side effects as the number of skilled 
foreign workers increased in the domestic economy. In contrast, the increase in 
unskilled workers in the economy tends to increase the wage gap as the increase in 
supply of unskilled foreign workers tends to depress the wages and increase the gap 
between the skilled and unskilled. As the Malaysian economy transits to higher value-
added activities, there will be greater pressure for skilled workers and thus putting more 
pressure on the skilled wages. Furthermore, there is expected hallowing-out as labour 
intensive industries shift to low cost production. This will have a larger displacement of 
unskilled workers and will have depressing effects on the unskilled wages. Again, this 
will increase the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled. 
The share of semi-skilled foreign workers has a positive but a not statistically 
significant impact on the wage gap. It was also observed that increasing capital 
investments tend to increase the wage gap. As new capital investment in machinery and 
technologies in the manufacturing industries increases, it will increase the demand for 
skilled workers and hence increase the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled. This 
coefficient is robust to both the fixed and random effect estimation. It was also observed 
that increase in output has a positive impact on wage gap. This again reflects the likely 
increased demand for skilled workers ·as output in the manufacturing sector increases. 
The impact of technology and exports on the wage gap was examined by inter-
acting the share of skill types of workers with R&D expenditure and share of exports 
respectively. The results are given in Table 36. It is interesting to observe that the 
skilled share, and in particular the share of semi-skilled foreign workers, increased the 
wage gap. This is mainly due to the structural adjustment of the economy to higher 
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value-added activities. The results clearly indicate that technology is not the cause of a 
widening wage gap in the Malaysian manufacturing sector as the R&D interactive term 
is not statistically significant. In contrast, the export and trading activities are the main 
source of the widening wage gap in the economy. 
The interactive terms of exports and share of semi-skilled foreign workers tend 
to negative, thereby indicating that a greater flow of semi-skilled foreign workers 
narrows the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. In contrast, trade and 
export activities tend to increase global competition and greater inflow of foreign 
unskilled keep the cost of production low. Increases in unskilled foreign workers widen 
the wage gap in the manufacturing sector. Greater competition will also increase the 
pace of structural adjustments and increase the value-added activities in the economy. 
The hollowing-out effect, where low technology and labour intensive industries will 
relocate to low cost countries, will also increase the lay-off unskilled workers increasing 
the supply of unskilled workers in the economy, thereby increasing the wage gap. 
Table 36 Wage gap between skilled and unskilled in the Malaysian Manufacturing 
Sector 2000-2005 
Variable 
In (share of skilled foreign to local workers)it 
In (share of semi-skilled foreign to local 
workers)it 
In ( share of unskilled foreign to local 
workers)it 
ln(Net Fixed Assets)it 
ln(Value-Added Output)it 
In (share of skilled foreign to local 
workers)it*ln(R&D Expenditure) it 
In (share of semi-skilled foreign to local 
workers)it*ln(R&D Expenditure) it 
In (share of unskilled foreign to local 
workers)it*ln(R&D Expenditure) it 
In (share of skilled foreign to.local 
workers )it* ln(Share of Exports) it 
In (share of semi-skilled foreign to local 
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These findings raise fundamental questions about whether Malaysia's current 
race-based affirmative action policies are suitably geared to addressing income 
inequality in the manufacturing sector in general, and especially within the context of 
overcoming the middle-income trap. As discussed, overcoming the middle-income trap 
requires further specialisation of industries, firms, products and geographical areas. If 
government strategies in human capital development and income inequality during the 
catch-up phase and rapid growth had failed, continuing these strategies to overcome the 
middle-income trap is clearly unwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The consensus view, as discussed in Chapter 1, is that for Malaysia to return to 
high growth path, there is a critical need to upgrade the manufacturing sector towards 
higher value added production and processes. 
The results here suggest that human capital accumulation is crucial for 
development of Malaysian economy. In particular, the increase in human capital will 
comple~ent technology adoption in the manufacturing sector; it will also have a 
positive impact in narrowing the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled if the 
supply-side effects of increasing the educated and skilled workers are sufficiently 
strong. In this respect, education and training institutions play an important role in 
creating the appropriate skills and human capital in the economy. 
However, the focus on human capital development alone is insufficient. The 
results also indicate that as the economy structurally adjusts to higher value-added 
activities, there will be greater displacement of unskilled workers. This is expected to 
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widen the wage gap and depress the wages of the unskilled. As Malaysia faces greater 
global competition from other rapidly developing economies such as China, India and 
Vietnam, Malaysia can expect greater ' hollowing-out ' effects as the economy 
structurally adjust to higher value-added activities. The implication is that Malaysia 
should expect a widening of the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled local 
workers in the future. This has great implications on the competitiveness and 
sustainability of long-term growth of the Malaysian economy as the level of income 
inequality and poverty in the economy will increase. This will increase the social and 
economic burden on the economy. 
The results of the study indicate that trade and exports have more important 
impact on the widening wage gap in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. As the 
manufacturing sector is expected to maintain its cost competitiveness, the flow of 
unskilled foreign workers is expected to keep the cost down for the export sector. There 
is no observation of any statistically significant impact from R&D activities in the 
economy. Thus, there appears to be little impact from technology on the wage gap. This 
may be due to very low innovative activities in the manufacturing sector. As the 
competition from the export sector increases, it is expected that the wage gap between 
the skilled and unskilled workers will widen. 
The results also highlight the importance of managing foreign workers in the 
economy. As the share of unskilled foreign workers increases in the domestic economy, 
the wages of the unskilled workers will be depressed and the wage gap will widen. This 
has important implications for the employability of local unskilled workers. 
Developing educational and training institutions is an important strategy to 
develop human capital. More importantly, life-long learning of the workers is also now 
an imperative. Workers have to constantly update and up-skill to remain relevant and 
competitive in the labour market. Developing strong educational and training 
institutions that allow for seamless upgrading of skills is very relevant. The policy 
leverage in terms of higher educational attainment and training of local workers is 
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expected to have the technology inducement effects to acquire higher skilled levels and 
education. The results suggest that the technology inducement effects will narrow the 
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. This is therefore the key policy lever 
to narrow the wage gap and increase the competitiveness in the domestic economy. 
These finding raises fundamental concerns about whether Malaysia's current 
strategies to address income inequality through human capital development policies 
which are race-based are suitably geared towards addressing income inequality in the 
manufacturing sector in general, and especially within the context of overcoming the 
middle-income trap? 
These issues are addressed in the institutional analysis in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 What's wrong with human capital development in 
Malaysia? 
But compared to other countries - both in the region and developed countries 
worldwide - the quality of students being produced . .. continues to be 
inadequate. Educational policies have stymied the national objective of 
producing the best talent to meet the country's needs. 
NEAC (2010a, p. 55) 
Malaysia cannot compete globally if the education system produces graduates 
and workers that are technically ill-equipped for a competitive global market. 
NEAC (2010b, p. 4) 
The lack of an appropriate institutional architecture for upgrading knowledge 
and technology appears to be one important reason for the reliance on low cost labour 
and increasing inequality in the manufacturing sector. This failure is caused by perverse 
incentives, a product of economic and political factors, in addressing market failures 
associated with knowledge generation, human capital development and technological 
upgrading in the manufacturing sector. This chapter provides an institutional analysis of 
this problem to explain the findings of the empirical analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
chapter also identifies the current institutional weaknesses in human capital 
development and managing income inequality in Malaysia. 
INSTITUTIONS, HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
The chapter advances three institutional reasons behind the manufacturing 
sector' s reliance on low skilled labour and rising income inequality. The first is the 
failure of educational and training institutions to produce the required quantity and 
quality of skilled labour. The second is the failures of firms in the manufacturing sector 
to train and retrain its workers to either upgrade their skills or provide a new set of 
relevant skills. The third reason is attributed to government policies that undermine 
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efforts by firms and individuals to invest in human capital development. Potentially, all 
these have a detrimental impact on income inequality between low and high skilled 
labour in the manufacturing sector. 
Educational institutions55 are responsible for supplying the country with the 
required quantity and quality of labour with explicit knowledge and skills. This supply 
and demand is coordinated at various institutional levels through various mechanisms 
by government, private and intermediary organisations. 56 
Firms in the manufacturing sector, individually, or through collaborative efforts 
with other firms (private sector linkages) and/or with the public sector or other 
intermediary institutions (public-private sector linkages) are responsible for the human 
capital development of their employees. This network of institutions is responsible for 
the supply of explicit, tacit and implicit knowledge or general and specific skills that are 
embodied in labour through learning by doing. This supply is developed within a firm 
through complex interaction determined by the density and cohesion of networks that 
the firm is part of. 57 
Finally, government policies that influence the demand and supply of labour in 
Malaysia are also responsible for the outcomes of low human capital development and 
income inequality in the manufacturing sector. The labour market (Level 2 -
55 For a discussion on how institutions are classified in this th_esis, please refer to Chapter 3 which 
provides a detailed treatment of the institutional mapping. · 
56 The rel~vant components intersect all institutional levels from Levels 1 to 5. Institutions (Level 1) 
includes norms, rules, conventions, habits and values; institutional arrangements (Level 2) includes the 
role of markets and states in the provision of education and training; institutional sectors (Level 3) include 
the system of education; organisations (Level 4) players such as the Ministry of Education, public, private 
and non'..profit schools, colleges and universit'ies both general and technical that provide education and 
training; while outputs and performance (Level 5) are policies that determine the nature, quantity and 
quality of the system of education such as the content of the curriculum, the availability of places in 
institutes of learning and training, fiscal incentives, staffing policies, the accreditation process and many 
other policies, statutes and administrative decisions that influence human capital development in 
Malaysia. 
57 To illustrate this, the institutions invoJved are institutional arrangements (Level 2) such as the 
relationship between state and markets, networks, associations and communities; institutional system 
(Level 3) such as system ofresearch; organisations (level 4) such as firm, chambers of industry and 
commerce, universities and R&D institutions, skills development centres ; and government agencies; 
outputs and performance (Level 5) such as government policies to promote innovation, to promote 
linkages between the private and public sector but also among private sector participants. 
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institutional arrangement) is the focus but related institutions such as organisational 
level human resource policies (Level 2), immigration policies on foreign workers and 
active repression of trade union activities in the manufacturing sector (Level 5 - outputs 
and performance) impact on the quality of human capital supplied and demanded. 
Five important characteristics are used to analyse the effectiveness of the 
institutions when addressing human capital development and income inequality. These 
five institutional characteristics were put forward by Rasiah (2002) and Rasiah (2005) 
who built on the work pioneered by Best (2001) to explain the effectiveness of 
integrated cluster networks in technological upgrading in Malaysia. First, effective 
systemic coordination and network cohesion is necessary to stimulate demand-supply 
conditions for the creation and appropriation of knowledge through formal educational 
institutions as well as firms. Secondly, institutions enjoying cohesion and connectivity 
are important to ensure continuous growth of supplier chains intersecting global value 
chains with domestic production. Thirdly, these institutions facilitate the leveraging of 
tacit and implicit knowledge of individuals (entrepreneurs, managers, labour) within the 
sector allowing for the further specialisation of labour. Fourth, a critical mass of 
technical personnel, R&D engineers and scientists are essential to enable firms ' 
effective participation in technological upgrading and innovative activities. Finally, 
institutions that promote open national frameworks through selective immigration 
policies facilitate the ability of firms to overcome challenges that are associated with 
human capital or technology deficiencies. 
The rest of the chapter is organised into three sections. Each section discusses 
one of the three reasons identified in the beginning of this section as the proximate 
cause for the manufacturing sector' s use of low skilled labour and rising income 
inequality. These three reasons in turn are evaluated, using the five characteristics 
outlined by Rasiah (2002; 2005) and Best· (2001) which was discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. The chapter concludes by identifying the key institutional weaknesses that 
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will need to be addressed if Malaysia wants to develop the human capital required to 
overcome the middle-income trap. 
Income inequality and human capital development 
Despite significant advance in the overall welfare of all Malaysians in terms of 
levels of income, but also extensive and comprehensive scope of race-based affirmative 
action, and the extended period (43 years and counting) for the Bumiputera community, 
this study confirmed well-trodden grounds that affirmative action had not addressed 
income inequality in Malaysia nor assisted the Bumiputera community in achieving 
parity with non-Bumiputeras. A comprehensive study by Muhammad (2011) on the 
distribution and inequality of wealth using Malaysia' s 2007 Household Income Survey 
(H!S2007) finds that an average Bumiputera has about one month of financial reserve to 
cover his/her monthly expenditure in case of loss of income or employment. About 93 
per cent of Bumiputera households have no savings, and about 66 per cent have no 
financial assets. About 72 per cent of Malaysians who are without wealth are 
Bumiputeras when compared to only 17 per cent Chinese and 10.7 per cent Indians. The 
study also validated the existing consensus that distribution of w_~alth is highly skewed, 
with the top 10 per cent of Malaysian household per capita controlling 35 per cent of the 
country' s wealth, while the bottom 40 per cent owning only 8 per cent. It is evident that 
the government' s focus on corporate wealth and income measurements are not 
reflective of the economic well-being of an average' Malaysian household, especially for 
the Bumi_puteras. 
Income inequality and -government-linked corporations 
Government-linked compal}ies/corporations (GLCs) are defined as companies 
that have a primary commercial objective and in which the Malaysian Government has 
a direct controlling stake. Controlling stake refers to the Government' s ability (above 
and beyond the percentage of ownership) to appoint members to the Board Directors, 
senior management, make major decisions ( e.g. awarding of contracts, strategies, 
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restructuring and financing, acquisitions and divestments, etc.) for GLCs directly or 
through government-linked investment companies (GLICs) which act as holding 
companies for GLCs. 
The GLICs are defined as Federal Government linked investment companies 
that allocate some or all of their funds to GLC investments. The Federal Government 
influences GLICs in the same way it influences GLCs, by appointing and approving 
board members and senior management, and having these individuals report directly to 
the government as well as in providing funds for operations and/or guaranteeing capital 
and in some cases, income, placed by unit holders. 
There are currently seven GLICs: Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 
(KWSP/EPF - Employees Provided Fund), Khazanah Nasional, Kumpulan Wang 
Amanah Pencen (KW AP/RFI - Retirement Fund Incorporated), Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera (LTAT/AFFB-Armed Forces Fund Board), Lembaga Tabung Haji 
(LTH-Pilgrims Fund Board), Ministry of Finance Inc., and Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (PNB). The total numbers of GLCs are unknown but from publicly available 
information, these GLCs as a group employ 5 per cent of the national workforce, 
account for approximately 36 per cent of the market capitalisation of the Bursa 
Malaysia (Malaysian main stock exchange), and comprise 54 per cent of the benchmark 
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI). 
Existing studies from a financial perspective highlight the fact that non-GLCs 
outperform the GLCs (Lau 2008; Najid and Rahman 2011 , CIMB 2011) but also to 
Singapore' s GLCs (Lye 2011). They have also contributed to the government's fiscal 
burden. This raises the question on the role of the GLICs and GLCs in the Malaysian 
economy, especially within the context of growth beyond the middle income trap. 
The GLICs and GLCs are not only complex entities due to their size, breadth 
and scope of activities but also because of their secretive nature (Lai 2013). Their 
objectives are vaguely. GLICs· have two overriding objectives: first, to manage the 
commercial assets owned by the federal government; and second, it was directed to 
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make 'strategic investments' on behalf of the government that would contribute towards 
'national interests' and 'nation building'. However, these phrase - 'strategic 
investments', 'national interests' and 'nation building' are undefined. 










Angkatan Tentera · 
Mandate and/or priorities 
'To enhance the economic wealth of the Bumiputera 
community in particular and to contribute toward the 
growth and prosperity of the nation for the benefit of all 
Malaysians.' 
'Responsible for holding investments on behalf of 
Government of Malaysia and to manage these 
investments in line with national interests.' 
'To maximise shareholder value of investments and to 
shape selected strategic industries in Malaysia, nurturing 
their development and doing so with the objective of 
pursuing the nation's long-term economic interests. 
Entrusted to explore strategic investment opportunities 
in new sectors and new geograph~s.' 
'To provide retirement benefits to its members through 
efficient and reliable management of their savings. Also 
committed towards nations socio-economic 
development through prudent investments.' 
'To provide retirement and other benefits to other ranks 
of the Armed Forces ,and .to enable officers and 
mobilised members of the volunteer forces in the service 
to .participate in a savings scheme. To offer retraining 
for retiring and retired personnel of the Armed Forces of 
Malaysia. 
Lem~aga Tabung Haji 'To ern;\ble Muslims to save gradually to support their 
expenditure during the pilgrimage. To enable Muslims 
to have active and effective participation in investment 
activities in Islam through their savings. To protect, 
safeguard interests and ensure welfare of pilgrims 
during pilgrimage by provi<:ling various facilities and 
services.' · 
Kumpulan Wang Amanah 'To assist the government to finance pension payments 
Pencen and other retirement benefits to Malaysian civil servants. 
Source: Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance, 2006 
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Not much is known of its antecedents but GLICs and GLCs development were 
an outcome of the ruling coalition's strategy to drive economic growth that is contingent 
of the political settlement that they operate within, and the ultimate objective of 
remaining in power. One key outcome of the May 13, 1969 riots was a shift in relying 
on markets to deliver on growth and distributional outcomes towards more activist 
government policies. There are three distinct phase in government involvement in 
' business'. The first was through state owned enterprise (circa 1970-19850, the second 
through private entrepreneurs linked to the ruling coalition, and thirdly, through GLICs 
& GLCs. 
GLICs and GLCs had existed in various other forms in Malaysia since the 
1960s. Many of the current GLCs (National Electricity Board, Malaysian Airlines, Wate 
Department, etc.), were first state owned enterprises that were first privatised to 
companies or individuals linked closely to the ruling party or were purchased outright 
on stock markets (Sime Darby). The GLCs and GLICS then were not very visible 
although critically important to the economy. These GLCs and GLICs came into the 
national consciousness fully at the onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 /98 
(EAFC) as the government went about bailing out or were companies repurchased from 
their owners (individuals or companies linked to the ruling party) as they went bust 
(Malaysian Airlines, Renong, UEM, RapidKL, etc.). As state owned enterprises were 
already largely discredited far causing a fiscal crisis in the early 1980s, these now 
privatised firms were recapitalised by GLICs and made into GLICs. 
The very first GLICs and GLC reforms dubbed 'transformation programme' 
started only recently in 2003/04 when the newly minted Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 
administration attempted to transform these entities from ' bloated and inefficient civil-
service like corporations' into entities that not only can hold their own against the 
private sector but can also be ' regional champions ' (CIMB 2011). The 10-year 
transformation programme had four phases and is currently is its final phase. The first 
phase spanning 2004/05 involved the revamp of Khazanah and setting key performance 
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indicators (KPI) for all the GLCs.58 Phase 2 in 2006 was the launch of 10 transformation 
manuals and the setting of policy guidelines. Phase 3 which covers 2007-2010 was the 
period when tangible results are to have emerged, and the final phase which covers 
2011 to 2015 is when Malaysia's regional champions are expected to emerge. 
· The transformation programme is driven by Khazanah, which also played a key 
role in the formulation of the Government Transformation Programme (GTP) and the 
Economic Transformation Programme (ETP). As part of the New Economic Model 
(NEM), the GLICs and GLCs have five key roles: 
Diligently staying the course in executing the 10-year GLC transformation 
programme; 
Relentlessly continuing their journeys to regional champion status; 
Pursuing new economy investment in line with the NEM; 
Collaborating and co-investing with the non-GLC private sector; 
Focusing on core businesses on a level playing field and progressively 
divesting non-core and non-competitive assets. 
Whether these reforms have been successful has yet to be ascertained. 
Government 'report cards' of the transformation programme paint a glossy picture 
while independent reports and by the academic sends mixed signals. Furthermore, the 
opacity within which these GLICs and GLCs operate provides a veil of ignorance on the 
performance of these GLCs. It is_ only when scandals occur - which are increasingly 
regular and at increasingly large record breaking quantum - that the thrust of this study 
is validated, that reforms that the past .and present administration are undertaking are 
only occ;urring in the margins, and hot where it matters most. 
In the ETP, the GLCs are to play a key role in generating growth beyond 
middle- income trap. However, as this study .has demonstrated, the fundamental 
58 Khazanah Nasional is currently the sixteenth and twentieth largest sovereign wealth fund in the world 
as measured by Monitor Group (2012) and SWF institute (2012). 
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challenge of the nation has yet to be addressed. The government's strategy with the 
GLCs appear to be similar of the strategies of the past i.e. picking the winner, with the 
senior management of the GLCs together with political guidance from the ruling 
coalition, identifying and pursuing 'winners' and/or ' new growth ' areas. The dominant 
role of the GLCs and their lethargic performance continue to be critiqued by experts 
(Menon 2012); REFSA 2012) and in the manufacturing sector, the GLCs are either a tax 
burden (e.g. PROTON) or are generating profits due to behind the borders protection 
(e.g. Pharmaniaga). None of the GLCs have developed indigenous technological 
capacity, capability and/or capital in the way the Japanese, the South Koreans, and the 
Taiwanese. While reasons are multifaceted, this study has demonstrated through the 
analysis of human capital development in the manufacturing sector that the institutional 
settings within which these GLCs operate have yet to be reformed. Thus it is not 
surprising that the GLCs continue to receive mixed reviews, and have been unable to 
drive growth in Malaysia 
INSTITUTIONS, THE PRODUCTION OF EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
The basic challenge that the Malaysian economy faces is n producing and 
matching the supply and demand of skilled human capital. Stated differently, 
Malaysia's education system is not producing a sufficient number of people with the 
correct level of explicit knowledge, and matching these with market demands. More 
specifically Malaysia's education system is not producing and training a sufficient 
number of people with the skills, technical and scientific knowledge that are needed in 
the manufacturing sector. This is exacerbated by similar shortages in the educational, 
training and research and development institutions that feed into the manufacturing 
sector. 
Comparing Malaysia with the successful East Asian economies provides a 
snapshot of Malaysia's current situation. Only 5 per cent of Malaysians aged 25 years 
old and above had tertiary level education compared to 24 per cent in Japan, 17 per cent 
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in Korea, 11 per cent in Taiwan and 12 per cent in Singapore in 2010. The average 
years of schooling for a Malaysian 25 years old and over was only 5 years compared to 
almost 12 years in Japan and Korea, 11 years in Taiwan and 9 years in Singapore. This 
snapshot provides a starting point to analyse the failure of Malaysia' s education system 
in producing the required stock of skilled human capital. 





























Note The Barro-Lee dataset (2011) provides estimates for educational attainment data for 146 
countries in five year intervals. It is the most commonly used dataset to measure educational 
attainment. a - percentage of population aged 25 years old and over that have completed 
various levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary) ; Average year of schooling of 
population aged 25 years and over for different levels (total, primary, secondary and tertiary) for 
various years at 5 year interval . 
Source Barro-Lee, (2010). 
Further investigation into Malaysia' s educational system identify a key reason 
that explains the low stock of skilled human capitaLas evidenced in Table 39. The 
transition rate from upper secondary to pre - university and tertiary level is disturbingly 
low. The participation rates59 reflect the flow of human capital that contributes towards 
the stock of human capital. The higher the flow towards the upper reaches of 
educatiqnal attainment, the better the stock of human capital. In Malaysia, only 15 per 
cent of students within the age group of 17-18 are enrolled in the education system60 
59 Participation rates are calculated by dividing the total number of students enrolled in the public 
education system over the total population in that cohort. 
60 Education system here only includes all publicly funded or assisted schools and coll eges (e.g. general , 
vocational and technical). 
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while only 16 per cent of those aged 20-24 are enrolled in a public institution of higher 
learning. In total , approximately 20 per cent of Malaysian in the age group 20-24 is 
enrolled in all institutions of higher education, domestic and abroad. 
This shows that Malaysia's education system is successful only at providing 
mass education demonstrated through the high participation and high transition rates at 
the primary, lower and upper secondary levels. However, Malaysia has not been 
successful in developing human capital at the higher levels of education - more 
specifically from the pre - tertiary education level onwards. 
Table 39 Participation rates by educational level, Malaysia, 1970-2010 (per cent? 
Educational level and 1970 b 1980 1990 2000 2010 
age 
Primary (6 -11) 88.2 93.6 99.8 96.8 94.2 
Lower secondary (12- 52.2 81.9 83.0 85.0 86.8 
14) 
Upper secondary (15- 20.1 40.8 49.1 72.6 77.2 
16) 
Pre-university (17-18) c 3.1 9.7 18.9 16.2 15.0 
Tertiary (19 -24) 0.6 1.8 2.9 8.1 16.0* 
(20**) 
Note a - Refers to participation rates in public and government-aided institutions only 
(Emolment/Population* 100); b - Data refer to Peninsular Malaysia only; c - referred to as 
'Post-secondary ' in the source tables; * - author' s calculation of domestic students in public 
universities;** author's calculation of Malaysians from ages 20-24 emolled for basic degree in 
domestic public and private universities and all Malaysian students enrolled overseas in 201 0; 
Source Hill et al. (2012) for data from 1970 to 2000; Ministry of Education (2011) and Ministry 
of Higher Education, Malaysia (2010) for all other data. 
Malaysia's success in ensuring high rates of enrolment and participation at the 
lower and mid-levels of the education system is attributed mainly to supply side factors. 
These supply side factors are infrastructure such as schools, colleges, universities, 
teachers and administrators. Also, government policies to provide free education at the 
primary and secondary levels since the early 1960s and at the upper secondary level 
since the early 1980s has made education affordable for the majority of Malaysians. 
Major gains in transition from ·the different levels began in 1965 following the 
introduction of automatic promotion through nine years of schooling in 1964 and 
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through 11 years of schooling in 1988 (UNESCO 2011 ). In 2003 , primary education 
was made compulsory with severe penalties to parents who fail to enrol their children in 
schools (UNESCO 2011).With education provided by the state, compulsory primary 
education and facilitated by automatic promotion, in 2010, the transition rate61 from 
primary to secondary education was close to 86 per cent, and from lower to upper 
secondary education was about 96 per cent (Ministry of Education 2010). 
However, transition from upper secondary to pre-university was 13.6 per cent in 
2010. This drastic fall at the pre-university level has been a consistent trend since 1970. 
This raises the question on why despite the provision of 11 years universal education; 
there is serious attrition in secondary education. A longitudinal study by Nagaraj et al. 
(2006; 2008) discovered that of the 481 ,200 students who entered year 1 (beginning of 
primary) in 1993, only about three in four entered year 11 (end of upper secondary) in 
2003 (Lee and Nagaraj 2006; Nagaraj et al. 2008). Malaysia now has a lower transition 
rate from upper to higher secondary school/pre university compared to countries such as 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand or Vietnam (Cheong et al. 2010). Young 
Malaysians, it appears, prefer to opt out of education after completing their Sijil 
Pelajaran Malaysia (Malaysian Education Certificate/SPM)62. 
Participation rates at the tertiary level shows the highest increase overtime 
compared to all other age levels. This has been especially visible since 1990. 
Nevertheless, the outcome compared to the other East Asian economies, remains low at 
16 per cent63. The main reason for this was the increase in the number of public and 
private universities that came with the liberalisation of the higher education sector in 
1996 . . 
6 1 The transition rate for primary to lower. secondary is calculated by calculating the ratio of the 
enrolment rate at (Form 1/standard 6 * 100); enrolment into upper secondary (Form 4/Form 3*100) and 
into upper secondary/pre tertiary (Form 6 lower/Form 5 *100). 
62 The SPM is equivalent to O 'Levels or the Australian Year 10 qualification. 
63 For comparative statistics, the World .Bank Indicator ' School enrot"ment, tertiary (% gross)' is used. 
This indicator calculates gross enrolment as the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Here Japan in 
2009 records 59 per cent gross enrolment at the tertiary level, Republic of Korea was 104% in 2009. Data 
for Singapore is not available while Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations. Malaysia was only 
37% in 2008 . 
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In 1990, there were six public universities which increased to 20 in 2007 while 
the number of private universities increased from one in 1999 to 37 in 200764, making it 
a total of 57 universities for a population of 28 million people (Ministry of Education 
20 l 0) . This removed two critical bottlenecks in the flow of human capital and was 
relevant especially for non-Bumiputeras. 
The first is that it made higher education more accessible by expanding the 
limited number of places available in public universities for non-Bumiputeras. The 
number of places available to non-Bumiputeras was severely curtailed with the 
introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP stipulated that 55 per cent of 
places in institutions of higher education were to be reserved for Bumiputeras (Ramesh 
and Asher 2000).65 The second bottleneck addressed was that it improved access to 
Malaysians by making private tertiary education more affordable. Prior to 1990, non-
Bumiputera students who were unable to get into public universities despite doing well 
in national examinations66 were forced to go overseas. The costs of tertiary education 
overseas were significantly higher than in Malaysia ' s public universities. This acted as a 
significant deterrent to many non-Bumiputeras from pursuing higher education. 
However, the increase in the number of domestic universities has raised other 
challenges that are discussed shortly. 67 
The reasons that almost 75 per cent of students opt out of the education system 
after upper secondary are multifaceted. One important reason is the fact that there is no 
automatic transition from upper secondary to pre-university unlike at the other levels 
64 This tabulation includes only recognised private universities, university colleges and branch campuses 
of foreign univers ities. There are several classifications of universiti es which are not included. 
65 The actual ratio is closer to 75 per cent (Ramesh and Asher 2000) as there are a high number of co urses 
and institutions of higher learn ing which are exclusively fo r Bumiputeras. A confidential study 
commissioned by the World Bank identified that in 2008 almost 85 percent of places in publ ic 
universities were fi ll ed by Bumiputeras (Mukherjee et al. 2011). 
66 The STPM (Sijil Tinggi Pelaj aran Malaysia) is .equiva lent to the Briti sh Higher School Certi fi cate or 
Australian Year 12 and used as the national test to gain admiss ion into publ ic un iversities. Due to 
affirmative action, a system of quota is used to determ ine absolute numbers from each race. Hence 
competition is lim ited to withi n racial groups and not across. 
67 The expansion of higher education institutions have created other prob lems such as a decline in the 
overall standards in higher education and poor quality graduates, decline in the premium of higher 
education qualification, and various social challenges stemming fro m high graduate unemployment. 
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such as at year six and year nine. The SPM, which is the national level examination at 
the end of 11 years of education, functions as a filter that determines placements in high 
schools, colleges' and other institutes of higher learning both domestic and 
international. Many students fail at the SPM level due mainly to lax standards being set 
on students prior to reaching the SPM level (Tan 2010). Also for many non-Muslims, 
the SPM is a significant barrier, as affirmative action ensures that only limited places in 
Malaysia's vast public institutions of higher learning are available to them. Many public 
institutions of higher learning are exclusively for Muslims either through overt 
legislations or through informal practises (Lee 2012). 
It may also be the case that many students, in their adolescence, take this 
opportunity to exit the school system to work. The SPM is the basic qualification for 
entry into employment in Malaysia. Hence, many having completed SPM also exit the 
education system as they have the relevant qualification to get low-paid work in the 
services sector. 
Many students also do not pursue further education as they are negatively 
influenced by the declining returns on investment for tertiary education (Nagaraj et al. 
2009). The increased number of universities domestically and also the increased 
accessibility to foreign universities as a result of increased levels of income and the 
reforms in tertiary education globally has reduced the premium for tertiary education in 
Malaysia as the number of graduates increases exponentially. 
The high unemployment rates among graduates have also influenced many 
students to exit the education system. Lucas and Verry (1999) found that unemployment 
was much higher among job seekers with post-secondary or tertiary education than 
those with an upper secondary education (the group that fills 80 per cent in the 
manufacturing sector). In 2001 , unemployment among recent graduates (diploma and 
degree holders) was about 12.7 per cent (Baharuddin 2004), rising to 24.1 per cent in 
2008 (Mohamed Khaled 2009). In 2007, graduates accounted for 25.l per cent of the 
unemployed (Hill et al. 2012). 
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The lack of demand for the qualifications that graduates have attained, poor job 
search skills (Lim et al. 2008); poor choice of courses and lack of proficiency in English 
and soft skills (PICS 2005; 2009; Gill and Kharas 2007), easy access to university 
(Sjoholm 2005), and the increasingly more selective nature of the public sector in 
employing Bumiputera graduates (Jain et al. 2003) have been put forward as reasons for 
the high unemployment among graduates .. 
Another indicator of failure of Malaysia ' s educational and training system is the 
poor educational outcomes at all educational levels. The quality of Malaysian students 
at all levels has come under severe criticism from various quarters (PICS 2005 ; PICS 
2009; NEAC 2010; World Bank 2010a; World Bank 2010b). Criticism has also been 
extended to the quality of teachers and academics throughout the educational system. 
While quality of education is difficult to assess precisely, there are three 
internationally acknowledged cross --country assessments that can be used to rank 
educational outcomes. They are the Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
(TIMSS), the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Malaysia did not participate 
in the PIRLS study and only started participating in the PISA study since 2010 in which 
Malaysia performed significantly below OECD average levels (World Bank 2012). 
Malaysia's score on the four TIMSS benchmark for mathematics and science 
fell between 1999 and 2007 (Mullis et al. 2008) although there was a slight 
improvement from 1999 to 2003. Furthermore, in the TIMSS 2007, approximately 20 
per cent of Malaysian students failed to meet minimum benchmarks for both Science 
and Mathematics, compared to only 5 per cent in Science and 7 per cent in Mathematics 
in 2003 (World Bank 2012). Malaysian students' performance in TIMSS 1999 -2007, 
was significantly weaker than their counterparts from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore (Mukherjee and Wong 2011). 
A study by Altinok and Murseli (2007) that developed a method to develop 
qualitati e indicators of human capital for approximately 105 countries reaffirms the 
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findings that Malaysia's human capital development is not on par with the benchmark 
countries. The study developed four quantitative indicators based on the various studies 
that measured the performance of school-going children in mathematics, science, 
reading and a general index. Malaysia lags the benchmark countries in all aspects as 
reported in Table 40. 
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Table 40 Qualitative indicators of human capital for selected countries 
Country QIHC-M QIHC-S QIHC-L QIHC-G 
Japan 92.20 96.62 91.71 93.51 
Korea 94.45 96.24 98.35 96.34 
Taiwan 96.9 98.7 97.4 
Singapore 100 100 90.14 96.71 
Malaysia 83.97 88.24 86.11 
Note QIHC-M 'Qualitative Indicators of Human Capital in Mathematics ' , QIHC-S 'Qualitative 
Indicators of Human Capital in Science' , QIHC-R 'Qual itative Indicators ofHuman Capital in 
Reading', QIHC-G 'General Index of Qualitative Indicators of Human Capital ' 
Source Altinok and Murseli, (2007). 
Malaysia ' s tertiary education system is also not highly regarded. The disparity is 
self-evident when Malaysia's premier university, the University of Malaya (UM) is 
compared to her sister university, the National University of Singapore (NUS). Between 
2004 and 2009, The Times Higher Education - QS World University Rankings (THE-
QS 2008-2011) showed NUS among the world's top 20 (2004, 2005 and 2006) and top 
30 (2008 to 2011), with UM moving progressively lower between 2004 and 2011 from 
89 to 167, reaching an all-time low of230 in 2008, before improving to 180 in 2009 and 
then dropping again to 207 in 2010. No other Malaysian university is ranked in the top 
200 universities globally. 
These issues have contributed to the limited stock of skilled human capital in the 
economy. This contributes directly to the critical shortage of skilled labour in the 
manufacturing sector. The government' s sustained investment nevertheless has shown 
some results. The mean level of education in the labour force has increased. The 
proportion of the labour force with no formal education declined from 14.1 per cent in 
1970 to 9.0 per cent in 2010, while those with upper secondary education has risen to 37 
per cent. In contrast, those with pre-university (high school and diploma) and tertiary 
have reached 21.4 per cent of the total labour force, demonstrating strong gains from 
government investment in human capital. evertheless, those with tertiary level 
qualification remain at a low of 10 per cent despite the expansion in tertiary education 
more than 20 years ago. 
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Table 41 Educational attainment of the labour force by educational level , Malaysia, 
1985 -2010 (per cent) 
Educational level 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Not applicable 13.9 9.8 8.7 5.6 4.6 3.6 
No certificate 55.8 53.6 40.6 37.5 29.4 9.0 
UPSR - primary 12.3 
PMR/SRP/LCE/SRA 9.4 8.5 14.0 13.3 14.1 14.0 
- lower secondary 
SPM-upper 14.6 20.2 25.7 29.6 33.3 37.3 
secondary 
STPM - High school 1.3 2.2 3.5 3.1 2.9 3.2 
Diploma 2.7 3.2 4.0 5.8 8.4 8.2 
Degree 2.1 2.5 3.4 5.1 7.3 10.0 
Total 99.8 100 99.9 100 100 97.6 
Source Department of Statistics, Labour Force Survey Report, various years 
The composition of the labour force has also changed to reflect the 
improvements in basic educational attainment. Those with lower levels of skills still 
dominate the labour force. The proportion of workers in all occupational categories 
except agriculture has increased. The share of professional, technical , administrative 
and managerial workers increased from 5.5 per cent of the workforce in 1970 to 15.2 
per cent in 2000 while the agricultural workforce declined from 53.6 per cent to 18.1 
per cent. One third of the workers were classified as production workers in 2000. 
Table 42 Employment by occupational groups, Malaysia, 1970-2000 (per cent) 
Occupational groups 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Professional, technical and related 4.8 6.0 8.8 11.0 
workers 
Administrative and managerial 0.7 1.0 2.4 4.2 
workers 
Clerical and related workers 5.0 7.3 9.8 11.1 
Sales workers 8.3 9.8 11.5 11.0 
Service workers 8.2 8.7 11.6 11.8 
Agricultural, animal husbandry and 53.6 38.7 28.3 18.1 
forestry workers, fishermen and 
hunters 
Production and related workers, 19.4 28.5 27.6 32.8 
transport equipment operators and 
labourers 
Total employed (' 000) 2794.0 4816.9 6621.0 9271.2 
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Note Occupation classified according to the 'Dictionary of Occupational Classification, 1980 ' 
Source Department of Statistics, (2011 ). 
Using a more detailed occupational classification standard introduced in 1998 as 
set-out in Table 42, 21 per cent of the total labour force in Malaysia can be categorised 
as skilled workers (Level 2 and 3), and 11 per cent as unskilled (elementary 
occupations). The bulk of workers in Malaysia, 68.2 per cent, are semi-skilled (Level 4 
to 8) reflecting the structure of a country that is industrialising but with an inadequate 
human capital base to transition to a developed economy. 
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Table 43 Employment by occupational groups, Malaysia, 2001-2010 (per cent) 
Skill level and occupational groups 2001 2005 2010 
1. Legislators, senior officials and managers 7.4 7.7 7.5 
2. Professionals 4.9 5.5 6.3 
3. Technicians and associate professionals 12.0 12.6 14.8 
4. Clerical workers 9.5 9.9 10.2 
5. Service workers , shop and market sales 13.8 14.8 16.8 
workers 
6. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 13.5 · 12.6 11.3 
7. Craft and related trade workers 12.4 11.4 10.5 
8. Plant and machine operators and 15.8 14.2 11.8 
assemblers 
Elementary occupations 10.6 11.2 10.7 
Total employed ('000) 9357.0 10045.4 11129.4 
Note Occupation classified according to the 'Malaysia Standard Classification of Occupations 
(MASCO), 1998 ' . Level 2 and 3 are classified as skilled workers, levels 4 to 8 are semi-skilled 
workers, and elementary occupations as unskilled workers. 
Source Department of Statistics, (2011 ). 
The structure of the workforce in the manufacturing sector is quite similar to the 
national structure where the bulk of the workers are classified as semi-skilled or 
unskilled. This is the key challenge faced by Malaysia with regards to human capital 
development. Although the structure of the workforce has changed as predicted by 
various economic theories since industrialisation became a central strategy in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector more 40 years ago, it remains low skilled. While in the 
early 1970s and 1980s, it was mainly unskilled workers in labour intensive industries, it 
is now mostly semi-skilled workers but still in labour intensive although more 
sophisticated manufacturing industries as reported in Table 43 (Lall 1999; Rodrik 2006; 
Athukorala et al. 2009). 
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Table 44 Skills structure in the manufacturing sector (per cent) 
Skills structure 2000 2005 
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
Total labour (in numbers) 1574797 1675163 
Total labour by citizenship (in%) 86.1 13.9 78.l 21.9 
Skilled workers (total) 16.5 18.6 
Skilled workers 16 0.5 18 0.6 
Managerial and professional 5.1 0.3 6.9 0.3 
Technical and Supervisory 10.9 0.2 11.1 0.3 
Semi-skilled workers (total) 78 74.44 
Semi-skilled workers 64.7 13.3 53.8 20.64 
Clerical and related occupation 6.2 0.03 6.4 0.04 
Production/operation workers 58.5 13.1 47.4 20.6 
Unskilled labour (total) 3.5 4.3 
Unskilled workers 3.3 0.2 3.9 0.5 
General workers 3.3 0.2 3.9 0.5 
Source Department of Statistics, (2011 ). 
When using educational attainment as an indicator of structural change in the 
manufacturing sector, it becomes evident why there is continued reliance on unskilled 
and semi-skilled labour in Malaysia' s manufacturing sector. Table 44 provides a clear 
indication of this. The number of Malaysians with tertiary level qualifications in the 
manufacturing sector has increased marginally from 4 to 7 per cent, while those with 
--
diplomas has also only increased marginally from 9 to 12 per cent over the past nine 
years. This is despite the fact that the manufacturing sector has taken root in Malaysia 
for over 40 years. The majority of domestic workers in the manufacturing sector -
almost 82 per cent - have no more than upper secondary school qualifications. 
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Table 45 Educational attainment of manufacturing sector domestic labour force (per 
cent) 
Educational level 2000 2005 2009 
University degree and above 4 7 7 
Diploma/STPM68 or equivalent 9 12 12 
SPM/SPVM69 or equivalent and 87 84 82 
below - upper secondary 
Source Department of Statistics, (2011 ). 
The poor educational outcomes, high graduate unemployment, especially among 
Bumiputera graduates, the significantly large group of unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
- 80 per cent - and shortage of skilled labour point to systemic failure. The relevant 
institutions that produce human capital and that coordinate the supply and demand of 
labour between the educational institutions and the manufacturing sector has failed to 
perform its functions effectively. The institutional reasons for this failure relate mainly 
to ideological reasons and the lack of autonomy in the organisations that deliver 
education and training, which are discussed below. 
INSTITUTIONS - IDEOLOGY AND LANGUAGE POLICY 
The decision to use Bahasa Malaysia in the public sector and therefore in the 
education system is a direct outcome of the ideology of Malaysia's ruling party of 
developing a national identity around the Malay language and Malay/Islamic culture 
(Rajandran 2008; Brown 2007). As part of the bargain agreed at independence among 
the political ethnic elites, was the guarantee that the Malay, Tamil and Chinese 
vernacular systems were allowed to continue. English, a key medium of education and 
instruction was discontinued in 1961. A significant component of educational reform in 
Malaysia since then has been to centralise education around the Malay stream with 
68 STPM - Sijil Tinggi Pelajaran Malaysia or Higher School Certificate (HSE) or Year 12. 
69 SPM/SPVM - Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) and previously known as the Malaysian Certificate of 
Education (MCE). It is equivalent to the British O 'Levels or the Australian Year 10 . The SPVM is the 
Sijil Pelajaran Yokasional Malaysia or the Malaysian Vocational Education Certificate. 
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Malay as the language of instruction in the national schools system. By 1983, Malay 
had become the sole medium of instruction in the national education system. 
In 2002, the Malaysian government, without prior consultation, made English, 
the language of instruction for the teaching of Mathematics and Science and 
Technology subjects. This was to be implemented in stages beginning from 2003 with 
the aim of making English the medium of instruction for these two subjects at all levels 
by 2008. This decision was based on the rationale that mastery of English is regarded as 
an important mechanism for direct acquisition of knowledge in the field of science and 
technology (Ong and Tan 2008). 
This led to many problems. There were critical human capital constraints as the 
public education sector was populated by teachers with weak English language 
capability and other challenges such as inadequate teaching resources for these subjects 
in English (Ong and Tan 2008). Furthermore, the majority of Malaysian students, their 
parents and contemporaries were educated in Malay and their English proficiency was 
weak. 70 This made understanding abstract concepts in mathematics and science even 
more challenging. After sustained protests from various groups' , especially Malay and 
other vernacular language advocates, the policy was reversed in 2012 with the option 
for students who wanted to continue studying Mathematics and Science in English to 
continue. 
The emphasis on Malay language and the decline in the overall quality of 
education in the national schools system has had an unintended impact on human capital 
development and technological upgrading. Language and an industrialisation strategy 
that is based on technological progress are intimately linked (Ritchie 2005). 
Technological progress depends on· the ability of a country to absorb, disseminate 
technology and ultimately innovate. When technologies exist in the local language, 
70 Tan and Raman (2007) in the paper, 'Problems and. challenges of learning through a second language: 
the case of teaching of science and mathematics in English in the Malaysian primary schools ' Kajian 
Malaysia, Jld XXV, No. 2, pp. 29 - 54, noted that in 1994, 45.5 percent of students failed English in the 
national level examination at year 6, 41.8 percent failed English at the national exam at year 9, and 38 
percent failed English at the Year 11 national examinations. 
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combined with knowledge of the basic science of the technology, the technology can be 
dispersed widely, comprehended, utilised and improved. If the knowledge of the 
technology exists in a foreign language then one of the two must be done - either the 
knowledge must be translated or the society must be fluent in the foreign language. 
Malaysia' s preferred mode for technology transfer is either by acquiring it from 
foreign multinationals or through foreign direct investment.71 However Malaysian firms 
in the manufacturing sector (specifically in the electrical and electronics industry) have 
not developed effective linkages with the MN Cs (Kline et al. 2011; Yusof and 
Nabeshima 2009). More importantly, Malaysia has not successfully developed 
institutions to extract, centralise, organise, translate and disseminate the required 
technology compared to Korea, Taiwan and Japan (Johnson 1987; Amsden 1990; Wade 
1990). Without these institutions, the ability to bridge the technological gap between 
foreign and local firms is limited. 
Persistent mismatches between language and technology access hinder the 
transmission and absorption of technology in three ways. First, the technology is 
available only to a select few in the firm that can speak the foreign language (e.g. 
English, French, German, Japanese, et cetera). Second, the technology resides almost 
exclusively in the foreign company. Third, it is difficult to link the foreign firm to the 
education and training infrastructure, including the components of the institutional 
system responsible for research and development. Malaysia's insistence on the Malay 
language as the language of instruction compounded by the inconsistency in its 
language policy, and the decline in the quality of education had hampered human capital 
development and technological upgrading (Ritchie 2005). 
71 This is discussed in detail in the next section - Institutions, the production of tacit knowledge and 
human capital development. 
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INSTITUTIONAL SECTORS -EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
Quality education requires accountability and autonomy for individual schools 
and institutions of higher education. Both of these characteristics are in short supply in 
the Malaysian educational system. Accountability requires frequent and rigorous 
assessments of the quality of education. Despite numerous education reforms 
undertaken by the government, Malaysia' s educational outcomes remain on a long term 
downward trajectory (Ong 2010). 
In the 23 country OECD's 'Teaching and Leaming International Survey' 
(TALIS), Malaysia ranked poorly in terms of delegation of authority to schools as set-
out in Table 46. It was placed last in six of the 13 categories and its performance was 
significantly lower than the 23 country T ALIS average. 
Table 46 School autonomy at lower secondary - TALIS 23-country study 
Malaysia Korea 23 Country Malaysia 
TALIS Rank a 
Average 
1. Selecting teachers 6.9 31.2 67.7 23 
2. Firing teachers 6.8 20.8 60.7 23 
3. Establish Teacher Salaries 4.0 5.7 24.3 18 
4. Determine Salary Increases 11.4 3.7 25:6 15 
5. Professional Development 33.8 63.2 60.3 17 · 
6. Formulate School Budget 68.8 77.3 75.3 17 
7. Allocations Within Budget 62.5 94.9 88.2 21 
8. Discipline Policies 56.7 56.7 93.l 23 
9. Assessment Policies 21.6 91.1 88.9 23 
10. Admission Policies 21.6 85.8 85.0 23 
11. Course Offering 35.4 88.7 72.2 22 
12. Course Content 33.4 85.4 65.7 20 
13. Choosing Textbook 19.0 96.7 90.0 23 
Average 29.4 61.6 69 20.6 
Note a --;- 1 = top and 23 = bottom 
Source \Y orld Bank, (2012). 
Malaysia has a highly centralised edu.cation system with four hierarchical levels 
at the federal, state, district and schools. All major decisions are taken at the federal 
level at the Ministry of Education and the relevant department, the Curriculum 
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Development Centre, the school division and the Malaysian Examination Syndicate 
with the Education Minister and his Cabinet colleagues always being the ultimate 
decision makers.72 
Universities in Malaysia also have limited autonomy in decision making. Sirat 
(2009) identified six dimensions to analyse the relationship between the state and 
Malaysia' s universities. They are (i) financial relations; (ii) administrative relations; (iii) 
knowledge and information flow; (iv) human resources flow; (v) the conferral of status; 
and (vi) ideology. Sirat (2009) concludes based on the six relationships noted, that 
State-centrism still dominates and that universities in Malaysia have little autonomy. 
The autonomy that they have are driven more by the increasing complexity of 
knowledge generation and the liberalisation of higher education globally. This state -
centrism is one of the main reasons for the poor showing of Malaysia's universities. 
In a recent assessment comparing Malaysia's premiere university - the 
University of Malaya (UM) - with the National University of Singapore (NUS), 
Singapore's top university, Mukherjee and Wong (2011) identified several salient points 
that explained UM' s mediocre performance which can be generalised to the tertiary 
education sector. They note that UM' s mediocre performance is a direct outcome of 
Malaysia' s affirmative action policy. UM institutional goals reflect the demands of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) namely the imposition of ethnic quotas for student 
admission. These findings also supported another important study by Lee (2012) which 
demonstrated that affirmative action had diluted the quality of education. These 
findings can be generalised to all public universities in Malaysia. 
Apart from the student quota system, the NEP also translated into more 
scholarships to Bumiputera students to universities, a special foundation and 
matriculation programs to facilitate their entry into higher education institutions, the use 
of the Malay language in place of English in the entire education institutions including 
72 Technically the Parliament is all powerful as it approves all legislations, but in a country which is 
class ified as an electoral authoritariani sm, the real power is with the ruling party (MacIntyre, 2001 ). 
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universities by 1983, special pre university schools and colleges for rural Bumiputera 
children, and greater opportunities provided to Bumiputera students to study science at 
the tertiary level. In the public universities as it was in government, the NEP impact 
spiralled upward so that Bumiputera staff members, over time, secured almost all senior 
management, administrative and academic positions and also in the Ministry of 
Education. Ethnicity and not merit was the overriding criterion for placement and 
employment in universities. The state - centrism also made these universities 
unaccountable to the public as they were beholden to the political objectives of the state. 
INSTITUTIONS, THE PRODUCTION OFT ACIT AND IMPLICIT KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN 
CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT 
The second explanation for low human capital development in the 
manufacturing sector is the weakness in generating tacit and implicit knowledge at the 
firm level. Entrepreneurs and labour acquire and develop tacit and implicit knowledge 
and skills by performing in real business environments and in an integrated cluster 
network rather than simply in a vacuum or in formal training institutions (Rasiah 2001). 
The challenge has been to develop the institutions that will facilitate this aspect .of 
human capital development. 
At the macro level, Malaysia' s indicators on the production of tacit and implicit 
knowledge which is proxied through indicators such as high technology exports , 
research and development spending, researchers per capita, technicians per capita, 
number of patent applications, scientific and technical journal articles are not 
encouraging when compared to the successful East Asian counterparts. Malaysia lags 
significa,ntly behind in these indicators. 
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Singapore 50 2.1 ** 5834.0 596.8 4187 
Malaysia 45 0.6# 364.6 43.0 1351 
Note 1 - High technology exports (HTE) are products with high R&D intensity. HTE is 
measured as a percentage of manufactured exports;* 2009; ** 2008, #2006 
Source World Bank Data Indicators, (2012). 
Malaysia's location as the assembly of high technology electrical and electronics 
exports masks the lag in developing skilled human capital in the manufacturing sector. 
An important reason for this is the weak linkages, both among the private sector but also 
between the public and private sector in the manufacturing sector. 
As Malaysia reached its turning point with surplus labour in the late 1980s, the 
focus of industrial policy and the attendant institutions shifted towards industrial 
deepening as the government attempted to take advantage of low unemployment levels. 
To overcome issues related to collective action, coordination and free riding, the 
government created several institutions ranging from legislations, master plans and 
policies to organisation, to overcome anticipated market failures. 
The Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development (APITD) of 1990 
helped provide the groundwork for the establishment of several of these institutions 
such as the Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF) in 1992, Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) and the Malaysian Industry 
Government High Technology (MIGHT) in 1993, and the cluster based Second 
Industrial Master Plan (IMPII) in 1996 set the blueprints for this transformation . This 
was followed by the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) and the opening of the 
Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC) in 1997. Nevertheless, none of these 
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institutions have been successful in promoting high human capital formation in the 
private sector. The East Asian Financial Crisis put paid to many of these ideas and 
institutions. 
The most pertinent example to demonstrate the failure of private sector linkages 
in developing human capital with the tacit and implicit knowledge in the manufacturing 
sector is the electrical and electronics (E&E) industry. The E&E industry is a key driver 
in the Malaysian economy. In 2008, it contributed 42 per cent of Malaysia' s total 
exports and was by far the largest contributor, although this was a significant decline 
from 62 per cent in 2000. It is also the single largest contributor to the manufacturing 
sector output (more than 33 per cent) and employs 5 per cent of Malaysia' s total 
workforce. 
The industry is dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs) and the role of 
local manufacturing firms has largely been confined to being vendors, suppliers or 
outsourcing partners. Despite the E&E industry having been in Malaysia for more than 
40 years, there is no internationally acclaimed Malaysian company, let alone a 
Malaysian developed product or process, in this field. While the industry has 
continuously provided impressive economic statistics for Malaysia, it has an average 
value add of just 8.4 per cent of gross exports confirming the limited linkage it has with 
the domestic economy. 
There are an extensive number of in-depth studies that have clearly 
demonstrated the weak linkages between the private and public sector and in the private 
sector especially to link small and medium scale enterprises with MNCs. Examples of 
these linkages were the setting up of skills centres such as the Penang Skills 
Development Centre (PSDC), the Sdangor Human Resources Development Centre 
(SHRDC) and the Johor Skills Development Centre (JSDC). Only the PSDC was a 
success as it attracted strong participation by ·both local and_ foreign firms. SHRDC and 
JSDC were failures as they lacked the inter-firm and firm - institution relation needed 
for strong participation (World Bank 2006). 
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Rasiah (2002; 2005) through extensive firm level surveys demonstrates weak 
linkages between the public education, research and development organisations, 
chambers of commerce and industry and the firms. 
One important reason for this weak linkage is the basic approach that the public 
sector has towards the private sector. Public-private sector linkages in Malaysia 
functions in formally soliciting the input of the private sector for policymaking 
processes, which was an outcome of the Malaysia Inc. (Malaysia Inc. (Incorporated)) 
idea that was proposed by Malaysia ' s third prime minister. Both the Malaysian Business 
Council (MBC) and the Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology 
(MIGHT) were created to coordinate government initiatives with the needs of private 
firms . 
In 1999, at the height of the East Asian economic crisis, of the 84 members of 
MIGHT, businesses made up 79 per cent (66 members), with approximately 11 per cent 
(9 members) foreign. Nevertheless, among theinfluential permanent members only one 
(5.5 %) represented business, with the rest representing academia, public research 
institutes, and the government (MIGHT 1999). Presently, there are 58 ordinary 
members, 32 permanent member and two associate members. The lead members are 
Malaysia' s three largest government linked corporations. All permanent members are 
government bodies while the ordinary members are dominated by government linked 
corporations, state owned companies or businesses that have benefited from close 
association with the government (MIGHT 2012). 73 
Although more formalised, these bodies operate much like the high-level 
government committees but in ineffective for several reasons. First, neither includes 
labour. Second, they do not engage in direct policymaking themselves, but act as 
consultative bodies to the ministries, agencies, and departments that do. Finally, 
MIGHT is actually a wholly owned government corporation and therefore does not 
73 The websi te link provides the names of the members of MIGHT. 
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engage directly in policymaking. Instead, it must funnel input from its members to 
internally insulated policymaking bodies. 
Even at the line ministry level , Malaysia's public sector has been unable to 
develop the linkages with the private sector. In most cases, where committees exist to 
promote human capital development or technology policy, they are most often 
populated by the department' s own people with a token number of representatives from 
the private sector (Ritchie, 2001 ; 2004; 2008). 
The Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC) has been touted by the 
government as a new model of public-private cooperation. It does indicate that Malaysia 
is making a concerted effort to formalise the linkages between the public and private 
sector. For example, Malaysia has solicited the input and advice from numerous foreign 
and local technology firms in a Technology Advisory Panel. High-ranking executives, 
often the CEO, MD, or President, offer input, advice, and direction to the Multimedia 
Development Corporation, the group responsible for the development of the MSC. 
However none of these people are actually involved in the policymaking process. 
Indeed, neither are the officials at the MDC, another wholly owned government 
corporation under the prime minister' s office. Instead, input from the advisory panel is 
funnelled through the MDC to the office of the prime minister where actual 
policymaking takes place. 
Since the financial crisis of 1997 /98, most of these institutions targeted towards 
human capital development and technological upgrading have taken a back seat as the 
country moved away from the manufacturing sector towards the services sector. 
Nevertheless, the basic problem of human capital development in the manufacturing 
sector remains. 
The issue of limited integration or linkages into the domestic economy either to 
other private sector firms or public sector institutions, is due mainly to the focus of 
domestic institutions on other priority issues such as wealth distribution, employment 
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generation or the demands of the entrepreneurs rather than on creating and building a 
technology platform. 
INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS - LIFELONG LEARNING AND TRAINING 
An important reason that has led to the skills mismatch in the manufacturing 
sector is the limited private sector involvement in the process of developing and 
implementing technical and vocation training programmes (World Bank 2012; Ritchie 
2005 ; Rasiah 2005) 
A recent assessment of the Malaysian National Dual Training System (NDTS) 
has yielded some insights into why skill training programmes remain mismatched with 
industry in Malaysia (Pang 2010). The NDTS was modelled after the successful 
German vocational training system. However, the study found that the two systems are 
different in one critical respect - the role played by the private sector in shaping the 
programme. In the Malaysian system, unlike the German one, the Government plays the 
lead role in developing, funding, implementing, and overseeing the system, while the 
private sector plays a supportive role. In terms of coordination and quality control , the 
Malaysian system is centralised, mostly through the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and 
the Department of Skills Development, with no role for employers and workers 
organisations (World Bank 2012). 
Another reason for the skills mismatch is the low take-up rate for vocational and 
technical training. A recent study by the government (EPU 2009) attributed the low and 
declining take-up rates partly to the fragmentation of the training system which 
overwhelms students and parents as they lack the necessary information in order to 
make informed decisions among the plethora of available options. The study also 
pointed out that the quality of the training offered varies significantly, which leads 
industry to distrust the qualifications produced by the vocational training sector. 
Another study found that complicated financial schemes available for technical and 
vocational training have also led to low take-up rates by students. 
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The failure of the government to engage the manufacturing firms effectively in 
developing private and public sector linkages especially in training, retraining and up-
skilling, and in policymaking has contributed to the failure in human capital 
development. 
LABOUR MARKETS AND HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT 
The third reason for the manufacturing sector's reliance on low skilled labour is 
government policies that impact on Malaysia's labour market institutions. As early as 
1991 , in a study commissioned by the Government of Malaysia, the World Bank had 
recognised that the Malaysian labour market was tightening and recommended a 
restructuring of the labour force towards higher skilled labour (World Bank 1991). The 
problem worsened by the mid-1990s as Malaysia experienced critical labour shortages 
in all skills categories (Jomo and Felker 1999) on the back of a booming economy. 
Despite government attempts towards industrial deepening to address tightening labour 
markets through various measures including labour market reforms, the economic facts 
suggest that these have been failures. The focus is on two key int~r-related aspects of 
labour market institutions to explain this failure. They are the national level industrial 
relations (IR) and the corresponding firm level human resources policies, and 
immigration policies affecting migrant labour in the manufacturing sector. 
Malaysia has a strong state and employer dominated IR model (Kuruvilla and 
Erickson 2002). It is characterised by extensive state control guaranteeing a high level 
of managerial prerogative within the workplace, minimal overt conflict and very little 
bargaining power for labour (Arudsothy and Littler 1993; Jomo and Todd 1994; Ariffin 
1997; Todd and Peetz 2001). Within this framework, the Malaysian government has 
pursued four dominant industrial relations/human resources (IR/HR) strategies to shape 
its industrialisation efforts and technological upgrading (Kuruvilla 1996a) as illustrated 
in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Industrialisation strategies and national industrial relations/human resource 
policy goals framework 
Primary 
Secondary 
Import Substitution Industrialisation Export Oriented 
Industrialisation 
IR/HR Policy Goal = Stability IR/HR Policy Goal = Cost 
Containment 
Passive HR practises 
Paternalistic IR practises 
Pluralistic system 
Relatively Tayloristic work 
organisation 
IR/HR Policy Goals = Stability+ 
Productivity Enhancement 
active HR practices to increase 
productivity 
collaborative IR practices 
pluralistic system 
Cost containment oriented HR 
practices 
Union. avoidance and 
suppressive IR practices 




Aggressive HR practices 
promoting skills and flexible 
pay 
dynamic work organisation 
positive and non-union HR 
practises 
highly flexible HR systems 
Source Kuruvilla, (1996a). 
These four dominant IR/HR strategies are determined by two key factors. The 
first factor is the type of industrialisation strategy that is promoted by the state. There 
are essentially two types of industrialisation strategy; import substitution 
industrialisation (ISi) strategy or export oriented industrialisation (EOI) strategy. The 
second key factor is finding the balance between stability and human capital 
development. These two factors are used to calibrate other issues that impact on 
Malaysia' s industrialisation strategies. 
ISI industries receive government protection and often the workers in these 
industries constitute an important stakeholder for the government. Therefore, under a 
primary ISI strategy and the lack of significant external competition allows the 
government to pursue more comprehensive IR/HR policy goals while its secondary 
priority is to achieve both stability and productivity enhancements. 
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A primary EOI strategy based on cheap labour and foreign direct investment 
requires a cheap labour force with the appropriate levels of productivity and skills, a 
labour movement whose structure and policies do not deter foreign investment through 
labour militancy or resistance to the introduction of new technology and dispute 
resolution mechanisms that can quickly solve industrial conflict. The transition to 
secondary EOI requires IR/HR policies that emphasise productivity, increased skills 
formation, and workplace flexibility. 74 
Malaysia has undertaken both strategies ISi and EOI. The ISi had three distinct 
periods namely, 1957-1963 which was private sector led, and from 1963 - 1970 and 
1981 - 1985, which were driven by the state. The EOI phases were from 1970 to 1980, 
and which was further strengthened after 1985. However, industrial relations policies 
have remained constant. 
The focus of the Malaysian government was primarily to contain conflict and 
cost in the interest of economic development (Kuruvilla and Arudsothy 1995; Jomo and 
Todd 1994, Hill et al. 2012). The prohibition of strikes and restrictions on the ability of 
the various national labour federations to carry out trade union functions ensured that 
the government had control over the labour movement. 
At the level of the firm, legislation was also restrictive with restrictions on the 
subjects of bargaining (transfers, promotions, layoffs, retrenchments and job assignment 
were deemed to be outside the scope of bargaining) and restrictions on the ability of 
unions to strike. Wage bargaining was largely at the industry level (Kuruvilla and 
Arudsothy 1995; Kuruvilla 1996a and 1996b). 
·The emphasis on cost containment in the manufacturing sector can be seen in the 
government's refusal to enact minimum wage legislation for the export industry ( or for 
that matter any industry), its refusal to enact equal pay for equal work in the export 
oriented sector where 78.6 per cent of those employed were female (Rasiah 1994), and 
74 Workplace flexibility here is defined as the ability.of employers to quickly react to changes in market 
demands by restructuring work organisation, compensation, human resources practices and labour 
relations. 
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the liberal policies in allowing in migrant workers but refusing them to become 
unionised. 
The second critical point is the institutions that regulate the use of migrant 
workers in the manufacturing sector in Malaysia. As the Malaysian economy reached 
full employment towards the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government's efforts at 
industrial deepening were not effective and firms approached the government to import 
unskilled foreign labour to sustain their operations (Devadason and Chan 2009). This 
option further reduced the pressure to upgrade technology (Rasiah 2011 ). The 
government's focus on unskilled labour in the 1980s and 1990s essentially undermined 
firm-level initiatives to upgrade as they continued to absorb unskilled domestic and 
foreign labour. 
Table 48 Malaysia - Distribution of foreign workers by key sectors (per cent) 
Sector 1985 1990 2000 2005 2008 
Agriculture 1 50.1 37.7 24.8 26.0 25.0 
Manufacturing 6.9 8.8 38.1 32.1 36.0 
Construction 15.0 34.4 8.5 15.5 14.0 
Non-domestics 20.3 2 19.1 6.7 8.8 9.0 
services 
Domestic services 22.0 17.6 16.0 
Total(%) 95.3 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total ( '000) 212 440 807 1815 2020 
Note 1 Includes forestry, fishing and mining; 2 - Includes domestic services; ... - Not available 
Source Athukorala and Devadason, (2011). 
The majority of foreign workers in Malaysia are semi-skilled and unskilled as 
reported in Table 43. Foreign workers cannot benefit in any way from the human 
resources development funds that are available to Malaysians. Employers are reluctant 
to invest in training for migrant workers mainly because immigration policies limit the 
duration that foreign workers can work in Malaysia to five years. The unlimited supply 
of migrant workers and the non- existence of trade unions or minimum wage policies, 
and lax enforcement of immigration laws, provide employers with a continuous supply 
of cheap migrant labour. 
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Policies that allow unskilled and semi-skilled labour to work in Malaysia are 
more liberal than the policies for expatriates which cover skilled workers - the very type 
of labour that Malaysia needs. As with most policies when the economic interest of the 
state or its coalition is threatened, exceptions are made. The Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC) is a good example. In this case, firms with MSC status can import as many 
foreign skilled workers as they need. Firms without MSC status are restrained by 
Malaysian labour laws from bringing in foreign skilled workers. This is ironic as the 
largest manufacturing firms are not MSC status companies such as the electronic and 
electrical multinational (e.g. Intel, Fujitsu and Sony) which have establishments 
throughout the country but are unable to freely bring in skilled foreign workers. 
Initiatives to attract local born emigrant talent to meet the demand for skilled 
workers have also been a failure mainly because of their bad design. For example, the 
government initiated a ' Come Home' , 'Brain Gain ' and the most recent setting up of 
TalentCorp. None of these policies have thus far delivered results (World Bank 2011). 
The benefits that these policies provided did not address the underlying reasons that led 
to these local born talents emigrating. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued that there are three institutional reasons to explain the 
manufacturing sector' s reliance on low skilled labour and rising income inequality. The 
first is the failure of educational and training institutions to produce the required 
quantity and quality of skilled labour. The second is the failures of firms in the 
manufacturing sector to train, retrain and/or up-skill its workers. The third reason is 
attributed to government policies that undermine efforts by firms and individuals to 
invest in human capital development. Stated differently, Malaysia' s institutions such as 
its education system, public - private and public-public sector linkages and labour 
market policies have been targeted towar?s a low cost export oriented industrialisation 
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strategy, meeting the expectations of Bumiputera interests, and the firms in the 
manufacturing sector responded to these incentives. 
The government's attempts to develop human capital through technological 
deepening and industrial upgrading, using education and training system and industrial 
policies has failed to take - off for various economic and political reasons. The 
democratisation of public education from the primary to secondary school level has had 
the effect of increasing participation rates in schooling. However the educational 
outcome of the increased student participation has not been encouraging. Furthermore, 
the democratisation at the tertiary level for the Bumiputera community has had the 
unintended effect of diluting the overall quality of tertiary education in Malaysia. 
The increased supply of low and semi-skilled labour due to the democratisation 
of education has led to shortages and mismatches in the labour market. Weak public-
private sector linkages and private sector linkages among firms and limited investment 
in training within the manufacturing sector have led to poor outcomes in the production 
of labour with tacit and implicit knowledge. This has undermined further the efforts in 
human capital formation. 
Coercive industrial relations policies have also suppressed wages and 
undermined the successful strategy used by successful East Asian economies of a 
tripartite strategy of state-capital-labour working collaboratively in human capital 
development and industrial upgrading. This has been exacerbated by a major policy 
error in response from private sector demand to overcome labour shortages - the 
liberalisation of Malaysia's labour markets towards unskilled and semi-skilled foreign 
workers. 
Hence, the failure of the current institutional architecture is due mainly to the 
failure of Malaysia ' s educational and training institutions, the public-private sector 
networks and labour markets. The significant contribution of low skilled labour towards 
manufacturing output and the increasing income inequality between skilled and 
unskilled labour, as well as the general decline in the quality of human capital and the 
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current organisations responsible for their development, the weak research and 
development capabilities in the public and private sector, and the failure of institutions 
that coordinate the demand and supply of human capital are simply the manifestations 
of these perverse economic incentives. 
In order for Malaysia to overcome the middle-income trap, these institutions will 
need to be reformed. This is discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Even if our bodies are crushed and our lives lost, brothers and sisters, whatever 
happens, we must defend Putrajaya. 
Prime Minister Najib Razak, (2012). 
Malaysia is among an important group of countries whose growth performance 
has nearly stalled, after a period of progress towards higher income levels. Its inability 
to overcome the middle-income trap is linked inextricably to the quality of its 
institutions. This chapter concludes the argument by revisiting the research questions, 
the research methods, the key theoretical concepts used, the key findings and the 
conclusions of the thesis. It goes on to make a number of recommendations to address 
the key institutional weaknesses in developing human capital that exist in Malaysia. The 
chapter highlights the contribution of the thesis towards understanding the importance 
of the role of institutions in human capital development and addressing income 
inequality in Malaysia's efforts to overcome the middle-income trap. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 established through a literature review that Malaysia was in a middle-
income trap. More importantly, in 2010, the Government of Malaysia accepted a report 
by the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) which identified that Malaysia was 
caught in a middle-income trap; a situation where the Malaysian economy is caught 
between countries with low wage producers and highly skilled innovators and not being 
able to compete with either. The report highlighted Malaysia' s declining rates of growth 
for gross domestic product (GDP), exports, gross capital formation , private investment 
including foreign direct investment (FDI), and total factor productivity (NEAC, 201 0a) 
as evidence of being in this trap. The report attributed Malaysia' s declining economic 
performance to domestic factors such as capability constraints, productivity ceilings, 
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institutional degradation; and external constraints such as weak foreign investor 
confidence, sluggish global economy, and the economic ascendancy of low cost 
regional competitors. The report went on to propose that if the domestic factors that 
were under Malaysian control were not addressed, Malaysia risked spiralling 
downwards from its current upper middle income economy position. 
Institutional degradation was one of the key reasons that the NEAC report put 
forward as the cause of Malaysia ' s declining economic performance. It did not provide 
an explanation of how its authors arrived at that conclusion. There was also no attempt 
to provide analysis of how institutions had impacted on the Malaysian economy. 
The ambiguity in understanding the role of institutions, the middle-income trap 
and long run economic growth in Malaysia raise two important questions that are 
addressed in the thesis: (i) what are the domestic institutional issues that are 
constraining Malaysia' s economic growth and its ability to overcome the middle-
income trap; and (ii) what then are the possible institutional reforms needed to facilitate 
Malaysia' s return to a high growth path? 
This chapter revisits the approach to answering these two research questions and 
is structured as follows. The following section summarises the middle-income trap 
concept and its theoretical underpinning followed by a summary of the key concepts 
and definitions used in this study. The subsequent section highlights the key findings 
that provide the basis for developing possible recommendations to correct these 
institutional weaknesses. The chapter concludes by highlighting the contribution of the 
thesis towards understanding the importance of the role of institutions in human capital 
development in Malaysia directed at overcoming the middle-income trap, and raises the 
limitations of this study as well as recommending future research areas. 
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MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP, INSTITUTIONS, HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
Chapter 1 also discussed the middle-income trap. The standard explanation of 
the middle-income trap is that low income countries can compete in international 
markets by producing labour intensive low cost products, in which they have 
comparative advantage, using technologies developed abroad. Large productivity gains 
occur through a reallocation of labour and capital from low productivity agriculture to 
high productivity manufacturing through policy change and reform that connects the 
domestic economy to international market opportunities. As countries reach middle 
income level, the underemployed rural labour force shrinks and wages rise, eroding 
competitiveness in labour intensive activities. Productivity growth from sectoral 
reallocation and technology catch-up are eventually exhausted, while rising wages make 
labour intensive exports less competitive internationally. If countries cannot increase 
productivity through innovation in products and processes, they find themselves trapped 
as they are unable to compete with lower cost producers and technologically superior 
producers in international markets. 
Chapter 1 discussed the different approaches used to explain the middle-income 
trap. There are currently four broad approaches that seek to explain the middle-income 
trap. The growth theory approach explains that lower income economies tend first to 
diversify, where the economic activity is spread more equally across sectors; then, at a 
relatively late stage in the development process, when per capita incomes are high, these 
countries start specialising again. Two related theories that are also important in 
explaining the importance of specialisation within this approach are the new trade 
theory and new economic geography. These theories argue that economies of scale and 
economies of agglomeration forces firms to produce for the global market and also to 
relocate to particular geographic regions which have comparative advantages in the 
production of certain goods and services (Gill and Kharas 2007). Governments of 
countries facing the middle-income trap will have to ensure that their institutions 
facilitates firms in achieving economies of scale and economies of agglomeration for 
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the products and services that the firms have comparative advantage in order to achieve 
high growth rates beyond the middle-income level. 
The second and third approaches are conceptually similar. In the ' economic 
development' approach, poor countries are first caught in a poverty trap or a low level 
equilibrium trap as discussed by (Rostow 1969 and Hayami 1998 cited in Easterly 
2006). To overcome this trap, a ' big push ' is needed, usually through massive capital 
infusion to meet the short-fall in the savings-investment gap or at a turning point when 
they exhaust surplus labour. When countries experience growth slowdown and 
stagnation at the middle-income level, a similar strategy is required to achieve take-off 
beyond the middle-income level. Malaysia' s New Economic Model is premised on this 
approach (NEAC 2010a). 
The 'industrial structure' approach is similar to the stages of development 
explanation but focuses on industries, in particular, the manufacturing sector (Ohno 
2009). Here, countries that follow the East Asian model of industrialisation are stuck in 
a middle-income trap if they are unable to develop indigenous capital and technology, 
and domestic capabilities in industrial production. In both these approaches, the 
activities using unskilled labour remain the same - intensive and repetitive - although 
there is a transition in the form and content of production as the economy transitions 
from agricultural production to early stage industrialisation. Graduating from the 
middle-income trap requires skilled labour to undertake more creative and complex 
work. 
The final and most recent attempt to explain the middle-income trap is an 
institutional evolution approach within the context of economic development (Aoki 
2011). This approach used two East Asian economies - China and Japan - as examples 
and compared their institutional evolution as their economies developed. In this 
approach, economic development is divided into five phases: the Malthusian phase of 
the poverty trap; the government-led development phase; the Kuznets process in which 
development is realised through structural shifts; the human capital-based development 
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phase; and the post demographic transition phase. In this approach, countries that are 
stuck in the middle-income trap have difficulty moving through the Kuznets-phase 
onwards because their institutions have not evolved to support the next phase of 
economic transformation. 
The New Economic Model incorporates all of what these theories are putting 
forward. It focuses on ' the big push ' through eight strategic reform initiatives 75 which 
were later revised to six as described in Table 55. The strategic reform initiatives are 
focused on reforming organisations, resource allocation, legal structures and 
regulations, and government practices in these four areas: (i) the creation of a 
competitive environment; (ii) development of a quality workforce; (iii) transformation 
of the government so as to improve its service delivery to support the private sector and 
become fiscally sustainable; and (iv) promoting inclusiveness. These strategic reform 
initiatives are operationalised through the Government Transformation Programme, 
Economic Transformation Programmes and the 10th Malaysia Plan. 
Distilling these four theories within the context of a global economy, it can be 
concluded that for Malaysia to overcome the middle-income trap, two things would 
have to happen. First, growth will have to be driven endogenously through high human 
capital formation , mastery of technology, and innovation in products and processes. 
Second, structural change is needed where the Malaysian economy specialises in a 
select number of higher value added products and services that are globally competitive. 
The question then becomes whether Malaysia has the institutions that can facilitate the 
above two transitions? 
The literature review in Chapter 1 highlighted the fact that many studies have 
been conducted on the nature and cause of Malaysia's weakening economic 
75 The ew Economic Model Part 1 (2010) had li sted eight strategic reform initiatives (SRis) that the 
government wou ld have to address. They are: (1) re-energising the private sector to drive growth; (2) 
Developing a quality workforce and reducing dependency on foreign labour; (3) Creating a competitive 
domestic economy; ( 4) Strengthening the public sector; (5) Transparent and market-friendly affirmative 
action; (6) building the knowledge base and infrastructure; (7) Enhanci ng sources of growth; (8) Ensuring 
sustai nabi li ty of growth. These 8 SRis were later reduced to six. This SRis are more focused and is 
described in Table 55 . 
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performance including the NEAC's two part New Economic Model report. Most of 
these studies, including the NEAC report, stopped short of investigating the deeper 
reasons or root causes for the declining economic performance. The thesis has 
attempted to contribute in this area - to investigate the institutional reasons for the 
declining economic performance through analysis of human capital development and 
income inequality in Malaysia's manufacturing sector. 
The methods employed to undertake this analysis were two-fold. Chapter 2 
began by surveying the economic growth literature to identify and understand what the 
determinants of economic growth were. This literature review identified the proximate 
as well as the deeper determinants of economic growth. The proximate causes of 
economic growth are the growth of factors of production such as physical and human 
capital, while deep determinants are factors such as geography, trade and institutions. 
There are convincing arguments and empirical support that suggests that, while all these 
factors contribute towards economic growth, it was institutions that were the most 
important. This is because institutions function as the meta-structure through which the 
other deep determinants such as trade and geography interact with proximate factors 
such as labour, capital and technology, notwithstanding the fact that all these factors 
also influence institutions. How institutions are constructed and reformed therefore is 
critical to explaining the varying performance of the different economies, and also the 
changing performance of particular economies over time. 
While there is consensus that institutions play a key role in economic growth, 
there is no clear consensus on what institutions are. Despite attempts to define 
institutions, there is little consensus on how to apply the concept of institutions 
analytically. Furthermore, measuring institutions, according to their various definitions, 
remains a daunting task. This study follows North ' s (1991) definition of institutions as 
the rules of the game and organisations and their agents as the players in the game. The 
Governance Indicators was used for the purpose of measuring the quality of institutions 
and Hollingsworth (2000) schema that mapped institutional resistance to change as the 
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criteria for mapping institutions, used for the purpose of classifying the relevant 
institutions. 
The next step was to undertake an empirical analysis of how institutional quality 
affected economic performance. A stochastic frontier production function , where the 
institutional variables were the variables of interest, was used to determine and rank 
Malaysia's economic performance over time and in relation to other countries. This 
approach allowed for a comparative perspective across countries, the evolution of the 
performance of a single country over time changes and the impact of institutions on 
economic performance at the aggregate level. In order to have a more comprehensive 
and in-depth institutional analysis, the study used a case study approach on a chosen 
factor of production. The factor that was selected was human capital in the 
manufacturing sector. Both human capital and the manufacturing sector were selected 
for their importance to the Malaysian economy and their key role in economic growth. 
KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 4 tested two hypotheses: (i) do institutions matter for economic 
efficiency; 76 and (ii) which institutions matter at the different levels of economic 
development. The results showed that institutions, measured through the Governance 
Indicators, mattered in improving economic efficiency. Overall, institutions related to 
'Government Effectiveness' 77 had the strongest impact on economic efficiency when 
compared to institutions relating to 'Voice and Accountability ', 'Political Violence', 
'Regulatory Quality', 'Rule of Law', and 'Control of Corruption.' This result, across 
countries, for the period 1990 to 2008, supports the perspective that economic 
76 Economic effic iency is the numerical measurement of the perfo rmance of a parti cular unit - in this 
case, a country- by identi fyi ng ' best practice' and evaluating that economic unit 's perfo rmance relati ve 
to the best practice fro nti er. 
77 
'Government effectiveness' captures the perceptions of the quality of public serv ice, the quali ty of the 
civi l service and the degree of independence fro m political pressures, the qua li ty of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credib ili ty of the government's commitment to such po licies . 
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performance 78 was not influenced so much by regime type, but rather by how effective 79 
the regime was. 
This may partly explain how countries such as China, Malaysia and Vietnam, 
while having relatively poor performance in other categories such as 'Rule of Law', 
'Control of Corruption' or 'Voice and Accountability', can have still generate high 
growth rates because of their good performance in the category ' Government 
Effectiveness. ' These governments, although largely undemocratic and corrupt, have 
been successful in developing policies that have improved the welfare of the majority of 
their citizens. These governments' ability to generate economic growth by attracting 
foreign direct investment, providing political stability, managing industrial relations, 
investing in infrastructure, social services and successfully distributing the economic 
growth to a large segment of their poor population are examples of government 
effectiveness. 
At higher levels of income, the institution that matters most is 'Rule of Law' . 
'Voice and Accountability' was also important but wrongly signed. This suggests that 
the increase in democratic rights initially at least had a negative impact on economic 
efficiency. This can be explained from the perspective that as the individual ' s welfare 
increases, the demand for democratic participation is also likely to increase. As the 
Arrovian impossibility theorem suggests, taking into account the interests of every 
individual and group can be a source of 'inefficiency'. 
Secondly, the results for countries in the upper middle income level of 
development, such as Malaysia, reveal that the institutions that mattered were related 
not only to ' Government Effectiveness ' but also related institutions such as ' Control of 
Corruption' and 'Rule of Law. ' In the stochastic model, Malaysia ' s economic 
performance improved from achieving 45 per cent of its potential in 1990 to 61 per cent 
of potential in 2008. These two observations together suggest that if Malaysia improves 
78 Economic performance here means a country' s actual performance relative to its potential 
performance. 
79 Effective as defined in ' Government Effectiveness' in footnote 2. 
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its institutions such as its ' Government Effectiveness ', 'Control of Corruption ' and 
'Rule of Law' , then Malaysia' s economic efficiency could improve further. 
As a country achieves high income or developed economy status, 'Voice and 
Accountability' becomes the most significant governance variable. This reflects the 
demand from individuals for increased democratic participation as their income level 
rises . However, the variable is negatively signed meaning that 'Voice and 
Accountability' reduces economic efficiency. As discussed in Chapter 3, empirical tests 
on whether democracies are good for growth are not conclusive (Brunetti et al. 1998), 
and this result suggests the need for even more empirical work in this area. The 
combined outcome of all six governance indicators point to democratic countries' 
ranking the highest in the empirical analysis. The results do face the issue of causality: 
whether higher incomes lead to better quality democracy or does democracy lead to 
higher economic growth? While there is still no consensus on this issue, there is strong 
evidence that the nature of economic activities .at high levels of income, based as they 
are on knowledge generation and creativity, can only flourish sustainably in free 
societies. 
Chapter 5 and 6 provide case studies for the institutional analysis. Chapter 5 uses 
a stochastic production frontier function to estimate the contribution of the different 
levels of human capital to manufacturing sector output for the period 2000-2005. The 
results from this analysis show that capital investment and local labour made the most 
significant contribution to output growth in the manufacturing sector while the 
contribution of foreign labour was not significant. When the contribution of local and 
foreign labour towards technical efficiency in the manufacturing sector were studied 
further, the results showed that it was the local unskilled labour that contributed most 
significantly towards technical efficiency. Local skilled labour' s contribution was 
negligible and the semi-skilled labour' s contribution was negative. 
Foreign skilled and semi-skilled labour also did not contribute positively to 
improving technical efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Rather, as with local labour, 
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it is foreign unskilled labour that contributes positively to technical efficiency in the 
manufacturing sector. These observations can explain the low level of technology 
adoption in Malaysia' s manufacturing sector. This observation also supports the 
literature which argues that entrepreneurs use technology to complement the skills level 
of its labour. Low skilled labour available in the manufacturing sector is complemented 
with low level technology. Hence, the outcome the high percentage of unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour in the manufacturing sector is increasingly detrimental to Malaysia' s 
efforts to overcome the middle-income trap. 
Chapter 6 analysed three important transmission channels of income inequality 
in the manufacturing sector. Firstly, the analysis showed that an increase in the share of 
skilled foreign labour reduced the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour. 
Additionally, an increase in unskilled labour in the manufacturing sector increases the 
wage gap between skilled and unskilled labours. This follows from conventional theory 
that increased supply in either skilled category lowers the wage premium of its labour. 
In general, increased supply of foreign labour in either category is expected to lower 
wages, other things remaining the same. 
The results also showed that increasing capital investment tends to increase the 
wage gap. The increase in new capital investment in machinery and technologies in 
manufacturing industries increases the demand for skilled labour but not for unskilled 
labour. This has resulted in an increase in the wage gap between the skilled and 
unskilled labour. This study could not determine whether this phenomenon is temporary 
or persistent. However, a government policy that restricts the free movement of skilled 
labour, but allows for a relatively free movement of unskilled labour in the 
manufacturing sector, is most likely to have contributed to this outcome. The results 
also showed that the share of semi-skilled labour and in particular the share of semi-
skilled foreign labour increased the wage gap. The increasing demand for semi-skilled 
labour is mainly due to the structural adjustment of certain segments of the 
207 
manufacturing sector to higher value-added activities that Malays ia was experiencing 
(World Banlc 2012). 
The results also clearly indicate that technology is not the cause of the widening 
wage gap in the Malaysian manufacturing sector as the R&D interactive term is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, trade (exports and imports) contributes to the 
widening wage gap in the manufacturing sector. 
The empirical analysis also demonstrated that the interactive terms of exports 
and share of semi-skilled foreign labour tend to be negative, indicating that greater flow 
of semi-skilled foreign labour tends to lower the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled labour. 
The findings from Chapters 5 and 6 indicate that the manufacturing sector's 
output derives primarily from the unskilled and semi-skilled labour inputs. Moreover, 
firms have also adopted a low technology regime to complement their predominantly 
low skilled labour input to maximise outputs. The reliance on unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour input has exacerbated wage inequality in the manufacturing sector. It can be 
inferred from this empirical analysis that the primary contributors to rising wage 
inequality in the manufacturing sector result from competition from lower cost 
producers and the unregulated flow of unskilled and semi-skilled migrant workers. 
DEEP CAUSES OF INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES 
Chapter 7 advanced three reasons behind the low human capital formation and 
rising wage inequality in Malaysia's manufacturing sector and identified the institutions 
responsible for this. First, Malaysia's education and training institutions have failed to 
produce skil led labour in sufficient numbers and quality. Second, skills development 
through training, retraining and up-skilling in the manufacturing sector has not produced 
the required human capital with the appropriate skill s.80 The private sector linkages and 
SO These trainings can take place onsite (on the job/shop floor) and off-site (specialised training centres), 
and in a forma l (accredited and structured programmes) or info rmal (i n house or industry wide through 
vo luntary exchanges) manner. 
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public-private sector partnership necessary for this training to be effective have yet to be 
developed. Third, labour policies in the manufacturing sector provide incentives for 
firms to rely on unskilled or low skilled labour rather than high skilled labour. 
The institutional reforms that are needed to facilitate further human capital 
development, product and process innovation and address income inequality in the 
manufacturing sector is therefore closely associated with improving the skills level of 
the workforce in the manufacturing sector and addressing affirmative action that focuses 
on employment and equity targets. These proximate solutions are well known and have 
been articulated through many government documents , studies and consultancy reports 
since the early 1990s.81 
The discussion in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 demonstrates that these institutions and 
the institutional reforms undertaken through various government policies, thus far have 
not delivered on their objectives. The latest strategies and policies to address these 
challenges have been broadly articulated through the New Economic Model, the 
Government Transformation Programme (GTP), the Economic Transformation 
Programme (ETP) and the 10th Malaysia plan which emphasised and prioritised 
improving institutional efficiency, human capital development and innovation 
capability.82 More specific policies relate to implementing productivity-enhancing 
structural reforms such as improving the skills of the labour force , the emphasis on the 
quality, and not the quantity in the accumulation of capital, private rather than public 
endeavours in promoting competition and investment, bottom-up rather than top-down 
decision making in more decentralised and participative process; unbalanced rather than 
the balanced regional growth with an emphasis on industrial clusters; selective and 
targeted incentives rather than sector based approaches; and making better use of 
foreign skilled labour. 
81 Tables 53 and 54 in Appendix 4 provides the evolution of industrialisation and a list of policies that 
were targeted at promoting economic growth through human capital development, and ameliorating 
incoming inequality through industrial and technological upgrading in Malaysia. 
82 Tables 5 5 to 60 provide a brief analysis of reform measures under the ETP and GTP relating to human 
capital development and income inequality. 
209 
In Chapter 4, the results from the stochastic model provided the rationale that if 
Malaysia improved its 'Government Effectiveness' , 'Control of Corruption' and 'Rule 
of Law' , then Malaysia ' s economic performance could improve further. This is 
supported by the two case studies and the subsequent discussion in Chapter 7. Delving 
deeper into the three reasons advanced to explain the mediocre performance in human 
capital development and rising income inequality in the manufacturing sector, the 
importance of the institutions of 'the state' and its policies becomes clearer. The state is 
ultimately responsible for developing and implementing the policies that determine the 
effectiveness of the education and training institutions, public-private partnership in 
human capital development and labour policies. Private sector initiatives in human 
capital formation are also influenced by government policies. 
What then are the possible deeper reasons for Malaysia's inability to develop 
human capital and reduce income inequality? 
In Chapter 1, Malaysia was identified as a competitive authoritarian regime. The 
ruling coalition consists of 13 political parties with the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO) functioning as the backbone of the coalition. 83 Almost all of the 
parties in the coalition are ethnically based or are dominated by a particular ethnic group 
or region. UMNO uses its ethno-nationalist ideology of Malay supremacy, concurrently 
with objectives such as 'national unity' and 'social stability', to achieve primacy as the 
other ethnic communities neither have size (numerical superiority) or scope (are limited 
to certain geographical areas). UMNO has implemented policies that while placing 
emphasis on economic growth, are not entirely devoid of the need to control key 
institutions of the nation: the government, religion and culture, economic and political 
process (Wade 2009; Case 2010; Brownlee 2007). In doing this, UMNO has created 
meta-rules and norms that influence all other institutional levels. This has fundamentally 
impacted Malaysia ' s institutions. The most vivid illustration of UMNO' s dominance is 
Malaysia' s public sector which is overwhelmingly Malay - the politically dominant 
83 Read 'The origins and evolution of ethnocracy in Malaysia ' , Wade (2009) for a survey of these issues. 
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racial group. 84 This is also true for publicly funded education and training, and the 
research and development institutions. 
Table 49 provides the main affirmative action institutions in relation to labour. 
Affirmative action has provided Bumiputeras, especially Bumiputera Malays with easy 
access to education and also employment in the public sector, government linked 
corporations and various agencies that are funded by the government. This 
democratisation of educational opportunities for the Bumiputera community has 
however eroded the quality of education. 
84 The Centre of Public Policy Studies (CPPS) noted that in 2006, the proportion of Malays in the civil 
service has grown from 60% to 77% since 1970. The elite Malaysian Home and Foreign Service 
(Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplomatik/PTD) was 85% Malay (CPPS, 2006). 
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Extensive growth of 
Bumiputera in tertiary 
education; concerns over 
decline in quality 
Important in facilitating 
University scholarship access to university 
education but lacking a 
systematic framework for 
balancing merit and need 
considerations in the 
awarding of scholarships 
Public sector employment De facto quota, largely ad 
hoc in implementation; 
major role in absorption of a 
growing urbanised 
Bumiputera population and 
growth of Bumiputera 
professionals and 
administrators 
Industrial Coordination Act Minimal impact at 
professional and managerial 
level; no impact on SME 
Public enterprises Spanning all sectors, but 
largely underperforming or 
failed; post-1997 crisis -
government linked 
companies given mandate to 
spearhead BCIC agenda. 
The manner in which the Bumiputeras have been allowed a preferred position in 
the public sector has contributed to mediocre human capital formation. Take as an 
example student educational achievement. In Malaysia, the public education system 
provides education to the majority of Malaysians at all education levels while the 
private sector plays an important role at the pre-tertiary and tertiary levels. There are 
several variables that contribute to educational outcomes - the student, the curricula, the 
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policy, the principal, the school environment, the teacher, the various teaching 
strategies, and the home. 85 While the government has less control over the student and 
the home, it has significant control over 'within school' factors. The within school 
factors can be categorised into infrastructure (school environment and facilities), 
teaching and administrative resources (the principal, the teacher and teaching strategies) 
and curricula. Another key factor is the resources to finance these factors. 
Malaysia has one of the highest levels of expenditure on education, either as a 
share of GDP or total government expenditure, in the region and when compared to its 
comparators (Chapter 5). In terms of infrastructure, Malaysia ' s public education 
infrastructure is also deemed to be of high standard (UNESCO 2012). This leaves 
teaching quality and the curricula as the 'within-school ' factors that contribute to 
Malaysia' s mediocre educational outcomes. This logic can also be extended to the 
publicly funded technical, vocational and community colleges and also to the public 
sector universities. All are well funded yet have mediocre outcomes. 
Chapter 7 reported that the quality of graduates from Malaysian universities is 
poor. Most of the weak Bumiputera graduates join the public sector. A large percentage 
of them would opt to become teachers. Hence, if teacher quality is the most important 
factor among 'within-school' factors to determine student achievement, it is not 
surprising that Malaysian student achievements are mediocre. Although the government 
under the Government Transformation Programme has introduced several significant 
measures to improve teacher quality, none addresses the deeper cause of ethnic division 
in Malaysia, the lack of meritocratic selection criteria in the public sector and the lack of 
transparency. 86 
85 Within-school factors are factors that the state and its agents (the school) should control over. 'Out of 
school ' factors such as parenting, neighbourhood and socio-economic background are also very 
influential in determining educational outcomes for the individual student. This thesis does not discuss the 
out of school factors . 
86 Tables 56 and 57 are reform measures introduced by the present administration. None identify 
meritocracy as a first principle. 
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Table 50 Distribution of occupation by race group, percentage of Malaysia employed 
population, 1970-2005 
Occupation Bumi- Chinese Indians Bumi- Chinese Indians 
eutera eutera 
1970 1990 
Admin and 22.4 65.7 7.5 30.3 65.5 4.2 
managerial 
Professional and 47.2 37.7 12.7 62.2 29.9 7.9 
technical 
Exel. teachers 58.0 - 33.2 8.8 
and nurses 
Teachers and 68.8 24.7 6.4 
nurses 
Overall 51.4 37.0 10.7 56.3 34.6 9.1 
2000 2005 
Admin and 36.6 55.8 6.6 37.l 55.1 7.1 
managerial 
Professional 57.3 33.5 7.9 58.5 31.9 8.2 
Excluding 45.4 44.2 9.3 47.2 42.0 9.6 
teachers and 
lecturers 
Teachers and 74.4 18.2 5.8 74.9 17.4 6.2 
lecturers 
Technicians and 59.5 30.3 9.5 59.5 29.7 10.0 
assoc. pro 
Exel. teachers 54.6 34.0 10.8 55.2 32.9 11.2 
and nurses 
Teachers and 71.1 21.4 6.4 70.6 21.5 6.9 
nurses 
Overall 56.4 32.5 9.1 56.5 32.4 9.3 
Source Lee, (2010). 
Another significant problem that is generated by the ethno-nationalist strategy of 
the ruling party is that it creates an adversarial situation between Malays and non-
Malays, the Chinese in particular. This is played out especially in the political sphere 
but also in the administration of the country. The public sector is dominated by Malays 
and the private sector, and most especially the manufacturing sector, is dominated by 
Malays ian Chinese.87 This adversarial system and several high profile incident where 
87 Arti cle 160 of Malays ia ' s Federal Constitution defines Malay as someone who habitually speaks the 
Malay language, practi ses Malay culture and embraces Islam . Hence, all Malays must be Muslims 
through the fo rce oflaw, but not all Muslims need to be Malay. There is no legal definition for 
Bumiputeras (ind igenous Malays ians). Bumiputera is operationali sed through policies and regulations 
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the property rights of minority communities have come under threat of hostile takeovers 
legally or illegally and the threat of expropriation has contributed to mistrust especially 
of Chinese owned small and medium scale manufacturing firms of government 
initiatives. This supports the literature that the lack of social has capital undermined 
economic growth 
Table 51 Tertiary educated managers and professional and total tertiary-educated 
employed person, Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera, 2000 (per cent) 
Total employed 
Public sector managers 
Private sector managers 
Public sector professionals 
Private sector professionals 













Since the late 1960s, the Government of Malaysia has been systematically taking 
over strategic business owned by ethnic Chinese and Indian Malaysians, but also of 
foreign interests'. Heng (1996) captures this conscious long term political objective of 
the Malay polity in the following manner: 
The Malay nationalist leadership agreed on a common political, economic, and 
cultural agenda. The first, and most pressing priority, was to regain sovereignty 
and control of their homeland from the British. The economic agenda of 
addressing Malay backwardness and closing the income gap between Malays 
and Chinese was to be achieved after the attainment of Malay political 
hegemony. The cultural agenda was to build the new nation state on Malay 
cultural attributes: Islam and the Malay language ... Malay political and cultural 
ascendancy was initially acknowledged by the British in the 1948 Federation of 
Malaya agreement, and subsequently entrenched with the promulgation of the 
1957 independence constitution. The economic agenda, however, was not 
~mplemented until after 1969. 
Heng (1996, p. 33).88 
which then has the force of law. Bumiputeras include Malays (on Peninsular Malaysia) and non-Malay 
Bumiputeras (in Sabah and Sarawak). Approximately 7 per cent ofBumiputeras are not Muslims. 
88 Heng (1996), 'Chinese responses to Malay hegemony in Peninsular Malaya 195 7-1996 ', Southeast 
Asian Studies, pp. 32-55, 34:3 provides an overview of the strategies taken by the Chinese community in 
Malaysia, in response to the Federal Government's actions in promoting Malay interest. 
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The non-Malay/Muslim community, especially the Malaysian Chinese 
community have been reminded on a regular basis of the discretionary powers of the 
state. The Industrial Coordination Act, 197 5 (ICA 197 5) is one such of those but the 
coercive powers of the state extends beyond the ICA 197 5 to include the lack of checks 
and balance usually associated with a democracy. 89 For example, there is a strong 
perception that the judiciary does not provide adequate redress in disputes with the 
government or with an individual who has the support of the government. This matter is 
further exacerbated by a predominantly Malay public sector regulating a predominantly 
Chinese manufacturing sector as evidenced in Tables 50 and 51. The most pertinent 
example is that almost 95 per cent of domestic manufacturing firms in Malaysia prefer 
to remain below the ICA 1975 thresholds to avoid being subjected to the discretionary 
powers of the state. The scale of Malaysian manufacturing firms can be argued as 
explored in Chapter 5 has debilitating effects of technical efficiency. Furthermore, 
overcoming the middle-income trap requires firms to achieve economies of scale, 
something that the ICA 1975 may be hindering. 
The ethno-nationalistic strategy of the ruling party also point to several other 
worrying trends that highlights fundamental weaknesses in Malaysia's institutions. 
89 After the riots of May 13, 1969, and beginning with the Second Malaysia Plan (1971 - 1975), the 
government began with earnest to assist Malay (and Bumiputeras) but also sought domination in other 
political and cultural fields. The New Economic Policy, the New Educational Policy and the National 
Cultural policy which were all introduced in the 197-71 period when Malaysia was under Emergency 
rule (and Parliament suspended) because of the riots, were aimed at propagating a Malaysian national 
culture and economy that were dominated by Malay and Islamic elements (Heng 1996). Two vivid 
examples relating to foreign interests are the Petroleum Development Act 1974 which created 
PETRONAS (Malaysia ' s national oil company) and gave it exclusive rights and powers over Malaysia's 
hydrocarbon resources (World Bank 2008); and the 'Dawn Raid ' on 7th September 1982, which saw the 
Malaysian government owned investment agency take control of British controlled plantations such as 
Guthrie, Dunlop, Harris and Crosfield (SS Rajah 2012; White and Yaakob 2010). In relation to domestic 
interests, other than the Industrial Coordination Act 1975, government directives that stipulate only 
Bumiputera or firms with substantial Bumiputera interests are privy to government [at all levels] and 
government linked corporation procurement (Menon in Hill et al. 2012), the consolidation of the financial 
sector after the East Asian Financial Crisis 1997 /98 which reduced the number of banks and financial 
firms - which were mostly Malaysian Chinese owned - from more than 40 to currently only 2 (Lai 2007 
and see Table 61), and the dominance of Malaysian government linked companies or corporations 
(GLCs)- in 2009 GLCs had a market capitalisation of 49 per cent of the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange 
(Bursa Malaysia) - have seen the private sector which has a significant Malaysian Chinese and foreign 
investors ownership crowded out (Menon 2012). 
216 
These problems go beyond challenges related to managing the economy but towards 
how Malaysian society views Malaysia's long-term sustainability. 
An estimated 1 million Malaysians have migrated with almost a third being 
skilled labour. Almost 50 per cent of them are ethnic Chinese and are working in 
Singapore, Malaysia's neighbour. The three main reasons provided by respondents in a 
survey undertaken in this report were that there were limited career prospects, social 
injustice and poor compensation in Malaysia (World Bank 2011). 
A report by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) ranked Malaysia at number five in 
terms of illicit financial outflows. Malaysia ranked higher than other larger countries 
that are known to be corrupt such as India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria and the 
Philippines. The outflow from Malaysia in 2000 was US$22.2 billion and tripled to 
US$68.2 billion in 2008 with a total cumulative illicit outflow of US$291 billion. In 
2009 alone, GFI estimates that approximately US$47 billion was illegally siphoned out 
(Global Financial Integrity 2011). In a separate report by the Tax Justice Network 
(TJN), Malaysia was among the top 20 countries when it came to capital flight. TJN 
estimated that from 1970 to 2010, approximately US$283 billion had been transferred to 
tax havens from Malaysia (The Guardian 2012). To provide a context for this illicit 
outflow, net foreign direct investment inflows into Malaysia over the period 2000-2008 
was only US$41 billion (World Bank 2009), or Malaysia' s public debt in 2011 was 
US$75 .5 billion (World Development Indicators 201-2). 
Improving government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption90 and 
ameliorating inter-ethnic tensions are key to Malaysia overcoming the middle-income 
trap. Hence, beyond the stated economic and social reforms put forward in policies to 
overcome the middle-income trap and to restore confidence in Malaysian institutions 
such as the Government Transformation Programme or the Economic Transformation 
Programme, the Malaysian government will need to move away from racial based 
policies, and develop institutions including policies that are based on efficiency 
90 As defined by the Governance Indicators investigated in Chapter 4 
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considerations and/or on merit. Doing all of this will not only set the institutional 
foundations on the correct footing but also enable the adversarial nature of Malaysian 
politics of Muslims against non-Muslims or Malays against non-Malays to be 
ameliorated. 
Affirmative Action in Malaysia - Genesis and Contemporary Impact 
It would be wrong to think that affirmative action only began in 1970. It would 
also be wrong to think that the current po 1 itical settlement is of recent origin. The nature 
of Malaysian polity, and the entrenchment of the idea of ' Malay special 
privileges/rights ' 91 has its antecedents to almost 200 years ago. 
The concept of 'Malay special privileges/rights ' originated with the British 
colonial rule in the Federated States of Malaya in 1874. The underlying philosophy was 
the idea that even though Malaya was under colonial rule, a myth was created that the 
Malays were still the rightful owners of the 'land'. This myth should and could be 
maintained by granting the Malays 'special status' and 'protection' by the British (Lim, 
1984). There would be two layers of protection: the Malay rulers who would continue to 
'protect' their Malay subjects, and in turn , the British colonial government would 
protect the interests of the Malay rulers and the Malays in general from being over-run 
by the non-Malays, in particular the Chinese migrants. Malay peasantry (paddy farmers , 
fisher-folks, etc.) would be protected in their traditional mode of existence from the 
modern sector and the incoming migrants while the Malay ruling elites were also 
protected in matters of governance by allowing them to retain symbolic sovereignty and 
offering them generous compensation. 
In 1913, the Malay Reservation Enactment was passed which designated certain 
areas to be reserved for Malay ownership only. The act also prohibited non-Malays 
from holding mortgages on Malay reservation land. This was in response to the 
expansion of agriculture owned by Chinese migrants and British colonialists into Malay 
91 While the Malaysian Federal Constitution provides for privileges for the Malays in certain areas, 
Malay ethno-nationali sts have interpreted these privileges as rights . 
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land (KS Jomo, 1986). This was followed by the Rice Land Act, which is related to the 
Malay Reservation Act that prohibited the Malays from cultivating any crash crop other 
than rice on reservation land. The concept of 'protection' extended also into the fields of 
education and public employment. The Kuala Kangsar Malay College (MCKK) was 
established in 1905 to provide English education and upper-class English culture to 
children of Malay aristocrats to nurture a local ruling class that would serve as junior 
partners to the colonialists. The declared policy was to fill the burgeoning Malayan 
Administrative Services (MAS) with Malays. 
The British policy of 'Malay special privileges/rights' was conceived out of the 
need to assuage the Malay populace into whose life the British had intruded. While all 
of these created a peaceful coexistence between the colonialists and the Malay majority 
community, it however implanted the seeds of suspicion and separatism between the 
Malays and the migrant communities. It also created a situation where the Malays while 
being economically disadvantaged were politically superior because of British 
patronage. Furthermore, as decolonisation took place, a compromise was achieved 
wherein the non-Malays, in return for receiving citizenship based on the principle of jus 
-
soli, agreed to having limited special privileges in terms of scope and time length 
conferred to the Malays in order to uplift their economic situations. There forth, Malay 
special privileges were enshrined in Article 153 if the Malaysian Federal Constitution of 
1957. 
There are two distinct phases in post-independence affirmative action 
programme; the first from 1957 to 1970, and the second, since 1970 until present. In the 
first phase, the special privileges programme was a continuation from the pre-
indep~ndence period with additional privileges for Malays to enter into the modem 
sector and to attain economic parity with the non-Malays (specifically the Chinese). 
Article 153 of the Federal Constitution specifically refers to the need for Malays to 
make inroads into the field of public service, education, and business. Despite making 
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some progress in the first two areas, this phase ended with the May 13, 1969 pogrom 
(Soong, 2007). 
The May 13, 1969 pogrom provided the impetus for launching the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), considered to be the world's most extensive affirmative action 
programme that had a twofold goal: to eradicate poverty and to restructure society and 
the economy, so that the Bumiputeras would have a at least thirty per cent employment 
in, and ownership of the economy by 1990.This saw the rapid scaling up of government 
support to the Bumiputera community in public and private sector employment 
opportunities (seven prestigious professions were identified in which a 30 per cent 
target was set for Bumiputera' s achievement), education (quotas in public universities; 
scholarships; dedicated schools, technical and community colleges, and universities), 
business licenses, provision of credit and various training, ownership and management 
programmes; rural land development schemes; and corporate, equity and asset 
ownership. While the NEP had ended as a policy in 1990, the thrust of the affirmative 
action policies continues. Although the affirmative action have been in place for forty-
three years, the government claims that it has yet to meet its objectives of 30 per cent 
equity ownership for the Bumiputeras. Affirmative action, instead has come to be 
associated with all the malaise in Malaysia from declining foreign direct investment and 
the crowding out of private investment (Menon, 2012), institutionalised corruption 
(Narayanan in Hill et al., 2012) and rampant corruption (CIS, 2011), dampening 
entrepreneurial capacity and capabilities (Gomez in Hill et al. 2012, Rasiah in Hill et al. 
2012) and poor quality human capital development (Lee and Nagaraj in Hill et al. , 
2012). 
The key issue, as demonstrated in this study, is that the politically dominant 
Malays argue that these ' privileges' are their ' rights ' (Level 1), and are therefore non-
negotiable ( de facto) , and not a privilege as understood in law ( de jure) that can be 
removed. The outcome, as had been experienced in the past 40 years or so, is the 
continued expansion of affirmative action in Malaysia. Successive political leaders, 
220 
since the second Prime Ministers, from the ruling coalition have used this to consolidate 
their power, but have inadvertently painted themselves into a comer as any strategy to 
reform is likely to undermine their political base. 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This thesis has contributed to a better understanding of the impact of human 
capital development on manufacturing sector output in Malaysia and the increasing 
trend of income inequality in the manufacturing sector. The thesis measured the impact 
of the quality of institutions on economic performance and reported that that Malaysia 
was only performing at 60 per cent of its economic potential. The thesis was also able to 
determine which institutional quality was important in influencing economic growth at 
which particular level of development. If the government of Malaysia is interested in 
graduating from the middle-income trap, it must further improve its governance 
indicators in the 'Rule of Law' and 'Control of Corruption' areas in addition to 
' Government Effectiveness.' 
Institutional analysis offered reasons for Malaysia' s poor human capital 
development and rising income inequality in the manufacturin_~ sector. By analysing the 
deeper causes of the institutional weaknesses, the thesis provided a plausible .argument 
that the ruling party' s ethno-nationalist ideology is one of the major factors that have led 
to the current predicament of Malaysia's manufacturing sector. More critically, due to 
the fact that ideologies are institutions (norms) that are the most difficult to change, it is 
likely ~hat UMNO's ideology of ethno-nationalism will become a major impediment to 
the efforts of the government to undertake reforms. This is already evident in the failure 
of the present administration to implement its stated reform agenda. 
· Within the context of the middle-income trap, the thesis therefore argues that the 
most important obstacle that Malaysia has to overcome is its institutional structure, if it 
wants to graduate to a higher income level. The government of Malaysia in 2010 laid 
out policies and strategies that focused on a big push of institutional reforms to 
overcome the middle-income trap. Although some political will has been demonstrated 
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by the Prime Minister (Najib Razak), this thus far, has not delivered significant reform 
(Hill et al. 2012) . The Prime Minister ' s conflicting stance on his key reform measures 
and his inability to reform the fundamental ideological basis of his political party are the 
main reasons for the lacklustre performance. 
The most important area for further research would be to analyse ways to 
implement the required institutional reforms or strategies to overcome the institutional 
constraints created by the ruling party and its ethno-nationalists ideology. More 
specifically, research is needed in two areas: (1) on how the Malaysian government can 
successfully exit from the extensive affirmative action programmes that it has created 
over time; and (2) research on strategies on how the Malaysian government can divest 
its direct involvement in the Malaysian economy through its government linked 
corporations and investment agencies. This thesis has demonstrated that unless the 
Malaysian government is capable of undertaking these two reforms successfully - to 
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Table 52 Governance indicators and welfare outcomes 
Economy VA09 PV09 GE09 RQ09 RL09 CC09 HDI 
value 
Norway 100.00 91.51 94.76 91.43 98.58 94.76 93.70 
Australia 94.79 76.42 95.24 98.10 95.28 96.19 93 .50 
New Zealand 96.68 84.91 97.62 98.57 99.06 99.52 90.40 
United States 85 .78 58.96 89.05 89.52 91.51 85.24 89.90 
Ireland 92.42 84.43 88.10 95.24 94.34 93.33 89.40 
Liechtenstein 95 .73 100.00 97.14 93.33 91.98 92.38 88.90 
Netherlands 98.10 83.02 94.29 97.14 97.17 97.62 88.80 
Canada 95.26 85.38 96.67 96.19 96.70 96.67 88.60 
Sweden 98 .58 88.21 98.57 96.67 99.53 98.57 88.40 
Germany 93.84 76.89 91.90 92.38 92.92 92.86 88.30 
Japan 81.04 83.49 86.67 80.95 88.21 87.14 88.10 
Switzerland 99.53 92.45 98.10 94.76 95.75 95.71 87.20 
Korea, South 68.25 52.36 83.33 75 .24 82.55 71.43 87.20 
Israel 67.30 9.43 82.38 81.43 74.53 74.76 87.10 
Finland 97.16 95.75 99.05 97.62 100.00 98.10 86.90 
Iceland 96.21 91.98 93.33 79.05 94.81 97.14 86.90 
France 90.52 65.57 90.00 85.24 89.62 90.48 86.90 
Belgium 94.31 74.06 90.48 86.67 88.68 90.95 86.50 
-
Denmark 99.05 85 .85 99.52 99.05 98.11 100.00 86.40 
Spain 87.20 38.21 77.62 84.76 85.38 80.48 86.10 
Hong Kong 63 .51 81.60 95.71 99.52 90.57 94.29 85.70 
SAR, Chjna 
Greece 73.93 41.98 68.57 74.76 66.51 61.43 85 .30 
Italy 81.52 64.62 68.10 77.62 62.74 59.05 85 .10 
Luxembourg 97.63 96.23 96.19 95 .71 97.64 95 .24 85 .00 
Austria 93 .36 89.15 93.81 92.86 96.23 93.81 84.90 
United 91.94 54.72 90.95 94.29 93 .87 91.43 84.70 
Kingdom 
Czech 82.46 81.13 79.05 86.19 81.13 69.52 84.10 
Republic 
Singapore 34.60 90.09 100.00 100.00 92.45 99.05 84.10 
Slovenia 76.30 77.36 84.29 77.14 83.96 81.43 82.60 
Andorra 92.89 94.81 92.86 90.95 87.26 89.05 82.20 
Slovakia 72.51 78.77 76.67 82.38 67.92 66.19 81.50 
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Economy VA09 PV09 GE09 RQ09 RL09 CC09 HDI 
value 
Malta 88.63 86.32 82.86 89.05 91.04 78.57 81.30 
United Arab 24.17 80.66 77.14 68 .57 64.62 80.95 81.20 
Emirates 
Estonia 85.31 66.98 84.76 91.90 84.91 80.00 80.90 
Cyprus 82.94 57.55 88.57 87.62 85.85 79.52 80.90 
Brunei 27.49 95 .28 75.24 82.86 72.17 79.05 80.40 
Hungary 79.62 67.92 73.81 81.90 73.58 70.00 80.30 
Bahrain 25.59 40.57 69.05 74.29 64.15 65.24 79.80 
Qatar 23.22 88.68 83.81 70.95 80.66 91.90 79.80 
Portugal 89.10 74.53 85.24 80.48 83.49 81.90 79.10 
Poland 80.09 80.19 70.95 78.57 68.87 70.95 79.10 
Barbados 86.73 87.74 91.43 65.24 81.60 86.67 78.70 
Bahamas 77.25 77.83 80.95 73.81 72.64 90.00 78 .30 
Latvia 70.14 61.32 69.52 80.00 74.06 65.71 76.90 
Kuwait 30.81 59.43 61.43 55.71 66.04 69.05 76.90 
Croatia 64.93 67.45 70.48 68.10 60.38 58.57 76.50 
Saudi Arabia 3.79 32.55 51.90 56.67 58.49 62.86 74.80 
Malaysia 31 .28 46.70 79.52 60.00 65.09 58.10 73.90 
Trinidad And 61.14 44.81 64.29 69.52 49.06 55.71 73.20 
Tobago 
Equatorial 3.32 42.92 2.86 6.67 8.02 0.95 53 .60 
Guinea 
Oman 16.11 75.47 71.43 73.33 69.34 70.48 n/a 
Source World Governance Indicators, (2012). 
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APPENDIX 2 CHAPTER 5 
The Malaysian Productivity and Investment Climate Surveys (PICS-1 and PICS-11) 
The Malaysia Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS -1) is based 
on a stratified random survey of 1,151 firms conducted by the Malaysian 
Department of Statistics and the Economic Planning Unit from December 2002 
to May 2003 in collaboration with the World Bank. The objective of the survey 
was to identify the key constraints to competitiveness as perceived by the firms 
in the manufacturing and selected business support services. It covered 10 
industries in the manufacturing sector and five industries in the business support 
services sector across six regions in Malaysia. A total of 902 firms in the 
manufacturing sector and 249 firms in selected business support services were 
surveyed. The firms were probed on three areas: the firms ' perceptions of what 
was holding back productivity growth; to assess the skills and technology 
programs in Malaysia; and to assess the investment climate. 
The second Malaysia Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS - II) 
was undertaken in 2007 to assess whether and how the investment environment 
had changed since the first survey in 2002 (PICS-I). PICS - II added two new 
industries in the manufacturing sector to the survey, making it 12 industries 
surveyed and retained the five in the business support services sector. PICS-II 
surveyed 1115 firms in the manufacturing sector and 303 in selected business 
support services. 488 manufacturing firms and 13 7 services firms participated in 
both survey rounds. 
World Bank, (2005; 2009) 
Technology indicators 
The Technology Achievement Index (TAI) is a composite indicator which 
aggregates national technological c·apabilities and performance in tenns of 
creation/diffusion of new technologies, diffusion of old technologies and 
development of human skills. 
The Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) consists of 109 structural 
and qualitative variables on the 4 Knowledge Economy pillars: (i) economic 
incentive and institutional regime; (ii) education and skills; (iii), innovation; and 
(iv) information and communications technology infrastructure. Variables are 
normalised on a scale of 0 to 10 relative to other countries in the comparison 
group. The KAM also derives a country's overall Knowledge Economy Index 
(KEI) and Knowledge Index (KI). The variable of interests which is used in this 
paper is education and skills. 
Classification of workers 
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The 2000-2005 data classifies workers as: (i) managerial and professional ; 
technical and supervisory; clerical and related occupation: general workers; 
production/operative workers directly employed; production/operative workers 
employed through labour contractors. 
In this study, workers are classified in the following manner: 
(i) Skilled - managerial and professional; technical and supervisory; 
(ii) Semi-skilled - clerical and related occupations; production/operative 
workers directly employed; production/operative workers employed 
through labour contractors; · 
(iii) Unskilled workers - general workers. 
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Figure 31 Technical efficiency and local establishments' for industries in the 
manufacturing sector, 2000-2005 
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Figure 32 Technical efficiency and local skilled workers for industries in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector, 2000-2005 
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Figure 33 Technical efficiency of local semi-skilled workers for industries in the 
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Figure 34 Technical efficiency of local unskilled workers for industries in the Malaysian 
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Figure 36 Technical efficiency of foreign unskilled workers for industries in the 
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Figure 37 Technical efficiency of foreign semi -skilled workers for industries in the 
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APPENDIX 3 CHAPTER 6. 




































































































































































































- Value Added (RM '000) - Sales value (RM '000) - Export Value (RM '000) - Value of Assets (RM '000) 
Source: Department of Statistics, (2011). 
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Box 2 Classification of foreign labour in Malaysia 
The Department of Immigration gathers data on international migrants to 
Malaysia based on the type of visa or work permit issued to foreigners. Data on 
the following categories are generated by the Department of Immigration 
Expatriates: This group includes all professional and technical migrant 
workers who earn a monthly salary of not less than RM3, 000. The 
expatriates are issued with an Employment Pass if the employment contract 
is at least two years. Expatriates are allowed to bring in their dependents. 
The spouse and children of expatriates are issued the Dependents Pass, while 
the others accompanying the expatriate such as parents or in - laws are 
issued the Social Visit Pass. 
Foreign skilled workers: This category includes all professional and 
technical migrant workers on short-term contracts of less than a year. They 
are issued the Visit Pass for Professional Employment (VPPE). 
Unskilled and semi-skilled workers: These short-term contract migrant 
workers are commonly termed migrant worker in Malaysia and they are 
issued with the Visit Pass for Temporary Employment (VPTE), initially for 
three years, and can be extended to another two (1 + 1) years . The work 
permit however has to be renewed annually. Workers in this category are 
only allowed to work in selected sectors and occupations, and can only be 




Figure 41 Wage gap and share of skilled foreign workers in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector 
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APPENDIX 4 CHAPTER 8 
Table 53 Industrial phases and policies, 1957-2020 
Phase Industrial Strategy Industrial Policy Emphasise Motivations 
I Import - substitution industries Industrial Pioneer Ordinance Light consumer goods; Supply finished goods; 
(1) (1956 - 1970) 1958 (FDI for import Domestic market-oriented Employment; Diversify 
substituting industries) economy. 
II Export Oriented Industries (1) Investment Incentives Act 1968; Export oriented; Free trade Employment; Diversify 
(1969 - 1980) Industrial Coordination Act zones; Electrorucs and textile economy 
1975 ; products; 
III Import - substitution industries Heavy Industries Corporation of Consumer durables; Capital and Employment; linkages; 
(2) (1980 - 85) Malaysia Act intermediate goods industrial upgrading; nurturing 
Bumiputera enterprises; 
IV Export - oriented industries First Industrial Master Plan Access to new markets; Cluster Employment; technology 
( 1986 - 2005) (1985 - 1995); Second industrial based industries; Strengthen transfer and moving up the 
Master Plan (1996 - 2005) industrial linkages production value chain 
Promotions of Investment Act 
1986. PIA reviewed in 1991. 
V Export-oriented industries (Ill) Third Industrial Master, Plan Strengthen competitiveness and Continuation of knowledge-
(2006 - 2020) linked to selected (2006 - 2020) improve industrial linkages; based industrial growth; linking 
services sector (Cluster based industrial dev) ; manufacturing to services (K-
Manufacturing ++ strategies economy) 
Source: Various Malaysia Plans, Master Plans 
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Table 54 Evo lution of Malaysia' s economic development, human capital development, science and technology and industrial policies 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010 
Development Primary commodities, agriculture; Investment driven stage, shift to Innovation driven stage?? - Focused 
stage and provision of basic infrastructure manufacturing; focus on learning and towards knowledge based/ innovation 
key sectors developing duplicative imitation and economy 
adaptive capabilities 
Economic Laissez-faire; New Economic Large investments Vision 2020 ; NEAC; National New Economic 
planning Malaysia Plan ; rise Policy - focus on in heavy industries; APITD; East Asian Innovation Model ; Model· 10th 
' and in public national unity and growth in FDI; Economic Crisis focus on Malaysia Plan; 
conditions expenditure restructuring . . sustainable growth Global Financial maJor recession 
soc iety Crisis 
Industrial Dependence on Free Trade Zones Liberalisation of Growth strategies Focus on Greater emphasis 
policy primary and beginning of private sector focusing on productivity driven on knowledge 
direction commodities; Export led investment; shift modernisation of growth; based economic 
decline of industrialisation towards heavy technology ( e.g. Stimulating growth?? 
commodity prices; industries; high technology, knowledge based 
Beginning of Industrial Master ICT); Industrial indigenous 





1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010 
Economy Master 
plan. 
S&T policies Limited to Dedicated Ministry 1st National S&T Multimedia Super 2nd National S&T Year of 
agriculture for Science; policy; first chapter Corridor policy; National Innovation; Talent 
setting up of on S&T in established; Innovation Corporation 
NCSRD Malaysia plans; National IT Council; Biotech established; UNIK; 
IRPA grants Council; restart of strategy PEMANDU 
established; double meg-projects; announced; IRP As 
deduction Returning Scientist streamlined; Brain 
incentives for Programme Gain programme 
. R&D launched 
Education Focus on basic Focus on Continued focus on Large scale Ministry of Higher Reforms in schools 
policy education for all improving quality; improving quality economic reform; Education - learning from top 
system begins and access; Reforms in private established; schools worldwide 
adjusting to National sector institutions; National Higher 
economic needs Vocational Human Resource Education Action 








Note: NCS RD - Nationa l Co uncil for Scienti fie Research and Development; AP ITD - Act ion Plan fo r Industrial Technology Development; IRPA - Tntensification of Research in 
Priority Areas; NEAC - National Economic Action Council ; UN I K - Unit lnovasi Khas/S pec ial Innovations Uni t; MQF - Malaysian Qualification Framework; NOTS - National 
Dual Training System 
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Table 55 Strategic reforms in the ETP 
Strategic Reform Key outcomes 
Initiatives (SRI) 
International standards Follow international standards in governance, management and 
and liberalisation sustainability 




Adopt quality standards for goods and services 
Convert existing Malaysian standards into international standards 
Administer compliance with standards 
Liberalisation of entry, ownership and operations 
Reform the regulatory framework 
Swift and resolute implementation of the competition law 
Set-up central oversight authority 
Divest non-strategic companies and re-engineer the roles of the 
remaining ones 
Channel proceeds from divestment into a sovereign wealth fund 
Reengineer GLCs to support private sector 
Consolidate and merge national enterprises to create scale. 
Modernise labour legislation 
Strengthen strategic human resource programmes 
Establish a national wage consultative council 
Formalise a productivity linked wage system 
Consider a minimum wage policy 
Enhance the labour safety net by introducing unemployment 
msurance 
Undertake a labour market forecast and survey programme 
Focus on up-skilling and upgrading of workforce 
Leveraging women's talent to raise productivity 
Public service delivery Revise the public sector governance framework 
Implement a compliance monitoring system 
Strengthen the government's facilitative role 
Create a citizen-centred public service 
Expand private delivery of public service 
Enhance public agencies to drive growth 
Reform the PSC (JPA) to defme strategic human resource policy 
and management process in the public sector 
Revive the NDPC as the premier body for policy development, 
coordination and consultation 
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Strategic Reform Key outcomes 
Initiatives (SRI) 
Narrowing disparities Establish specific programmes for Bumiputera SMEs. 
(Bumiputera SMEs) Focus on capacity building programmes 
Public finance reforms Develop government and GLC procurement policies that support 
local innovative products and services 
Adopt accrual accounting for prudent fiscal management 
Implement efficient broad based tax (GST) for revenue and fiscal 
stability 
Strengthen expenditure control 
Improve fiscal policy institutions and processes 
Natural homes (NKEAs Supporting SMEs and innovation and efficiency in allocation of 
I NKRAsl National capital 
Committee of Accelerate the roll out of broadband lnvestments/UNIK) 
Internalise externalities 
Promote green growth and energy efficiency 
Favour sustainable agriculture 
Strive for energy resources sustainability 
Foster better and closer R&D links between institutions of higher 
learning (IHLs) and the private sector 
Turning existing HiCoEs (Centre of Excellence Accredited by the 
MoHE into full-fledged networks of excellence) 
Extract greater value from the development and management of 
Intellectual Property 
Pursue administrative reforms in the Judiciary 
Establish an overarching policy on social assistance programme 
Adopt a single comprehensive database based initially on e-Kasih 
Addressing the transportation and housing needs 
Break the poverty cycle through education 
Source: PEMANDU, (2012). 
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Table 56 Strategic Reform Initiative - Human Capital Development 
Workplace transformation Workforce transformation 
Level 1: [Rule] Modernise labour Ensure reduced cost of labour management to business 
legislations Ensure effective worker protection 
Level 4: [Organisation] Strengthen Identify centres/organisations that can provide HR 
human resources management in management support for SMEs to enhance quality and 
SMEs productivity 
Provide incentives to SMEs that adopt specific HR 
' 
practises consistent with international standards 
Level 2: [Labour market] Enhance Unemployment insurance scheme supported by up-
the labour safety net by introducing skilling and retraining programme and upgraded 
unemployment insurance employment services. 
Level 5: [ sectoral performance] Strengthen logistical links between industry needs and 
Focus on up-skilling and up- outputs of training / vocational / tertiary entities to 
grading the workforce improve training relevance 
Involve industry in curriculum development and 
teaching 
Level 5: [ sectoral performance] A framework to establish a centralised labour market 
Undertake a labour market forecast institute to be defined and adopted. 
and survey programme 
Level 5: [ sectoral performance] Adopt policies to leverage women ' s talents to raise 
leverage women ' s talents to raise productivity 
productivity Promote participation of women in public and private 
sector 
Source: PEMANDU, (2012). 
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Table 57 Improving student outcomes (educational sector reforms under GTP) 
Institutional level Institutional reforms 
Level 1: norms; rules; Status quo remains. 
conventions; habits and No commitment to meritocracy (Attracting the best students and values 
retaining the best teachers. Performance based evaluation can only 
be implemented if government reverses current ethno-supremacist 
ideology.) 




Level 3: system of Increasing public-private partnership - to achieve additional classes 
education while adhering to national standards. 
Level 4: Organisations Developing high performing schools 
Identifying and rewarding high performing schools: schools which 
excel in all aspects of education and maintain its decorum will be 
rewarded with more freedom in decision making, financial 
incentives, human resource flexibility and chances for student 
advancement. 
Performance management: Schools rated based on a composite 
score which consists of the Grade Point Average (70%) and 
Standard for Quality Education in Malaysia (SQEM) (30%) 
School performance ranking: Performance of 9,900 government 
schools will be ranked on a yearly basis. Target to reduce the 
number of Band 6 and 7 schools (lowest) by 20% and increase the 
number of Band 1 and 2 schools by 7% in the course of the GTP. 
New Deal: Head teachers and principals reward system: Those who 
exceed targets set will be given both financial and non-financial 
rewards. Underperformers will be sent to undergo development 
management and remedial programmes to assist their performance. 
Teachers in schools with a head teacher or principal who qualifies 
for the reward will also be eligible for a financial reward 
Level 5: Statutes; Increase pre-school enrolment rate - from 67% currently to 87% in 
administrative 2020. 
decisions; the nature, Establishing monitoring committee - The National Committee on quantity and the Pre-School Education and a Pre-School Division within the quality of industrial Ministry of Education to govern all pre-school providers . products; sectoral and 
societal performance National Pre-school Curriculum Standard (NPCS) - Developed in 
collaboration with the private sector to standardise industry 
requirements. 
Quality improvement - training of pre-school teachers and teacher 
assistants, including 30,000 new and existing staff (2010-201 2) 
Increasing number of classes (particularly for the 4+ age group). 
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Institutional level Institutional reforms 
Developing a national pre-school information system - collation of 
administrative information. 
Ensure basic literacy and numeracy skills among children after 3 
years of primary education 
literacy and numeracy programme (LINUS): screening conducted 
three times a year to assess effectiveness of programme and help 
identify students who require the LINUS remedial programme or 
Special Education Programme (subject to identified learning 
disabilities) 
- New literacy and numeracy modules: simple learning concepts will 
be communicated followed by teaching of application of the 
concepts 
LINUS training: Approximately 17,000 teachers trained on the new 
LINUS modules for effective results by February 2010. 
Collaborative effort: awareness programmes and activities to pool 
resources of state and district education departments, Parent 
Teachers Associations (PTA), head teachers, teachers association 
and the public. 
Intensive monitoring: Bottom 10% schools will be monitored at 
state and district level 
Deployment of expert facilitators (FasiLinus): Sent to assist District 
Education Departments to support LINUS teachers in schools 
Source: PEMANDU, (2012) . 
Table 58 Raising living standards of low-income households 
Institutional level Institutional reforms 
Level 1: norms; rules ; Status quo. 
conventions; habits and Improvement on definition of poor - standardised definition of 
values 
variants of poverty focuses on marginal groups rather than 
race/religion. 




Level 3: Financial ... 
system; system of 
education; business 
system; systems of 
research 
Level 4: Organisations ... 
Level 5: Statutes; Standardised definition of variants of poverty: based on a monthly 
administrative household income was implemented for use by all ministries and 
decisions; the nature, agencies to accelerate coordination to channel assistance. 
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Institutional level Institutional reforms 
quantity and the e-Kasih database - encourage low income households to register 
quality of industrial and be recorded by the government for immediate assistance and 
products; sectoral and earning opportunities to be provided. 
societal performance lAZAM: a programme to lift low-income households out of 
poverty through means of employment, entrepreneurship, economic 
activities and services; 
AZAM Tani (agriculture activities): providing financial 
assistance-equipment, seeds, fertilisers and any other related items; 
training; marketing assistance and supp9rt from related agencies to 
ensure long term implementation, sustainability and success of 
agriculture activities; 
AZAM Niaga (small businesses): Elevating the living standards 
of the people by making them create their own income channels. 
Given the opportunity to venture into appropriate businesses to 
increase their income. Micro-credit, training, tools sourcing and 
motivational sessions will be provided to ensure the venture is 
viable and successful; 
AZAM Kerja Uob matching/job placement/income generating 
activities): Linking available workforce to employers in need. 
Creating a database of human resource to match available jobs. A 
strategy called 'place and train' is used where the participants are 
given their job placement and then relevant training is provided for 
them in order to improve their skills. Furthermore, those interested 
in income generating activities are given the opportunity to select 
appropriate business options to supplement their monthly income. 
AZAM Khidmat (services): Assisting with various skill levels 
like landscaping, home management, day care centres, self-
grooming and reflexology treatment to ensure there are diverse 
business options besides the availability of products, micro-credit, 
training, tools sourcing and motivational sessions will be provided 
to ensure the venture is viable. 
Source: PEMANDU, (2012). 
Table 59 Improving rural basic infrastructure 
Institutional level Institutional reforms 
Level 1: Norms; rules; Status quo. 
conventions; habits and 
values; ideology 
Level 5: sectoral and Build more than 7,000km of new and upgraded roads by 2012. The 
societal performance achievement of thi's will mean that 91.4% of the population 
1,900km of the planned roads will be in Sabah and Sarawak 
Provide 50,000 new and restored houses to the rural and hard-core 
poor by 2012 
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Institutional level Institutional reforms 
Speeding up delivery process through building of standard design 
houses 
Collaboration with suppliers to ensure that supply and availability 
of raw materials throughout the GTP is ensured 
Tracking and monitoring to ensure that the new and restored houses 
are delivered as per timeline 
Ensure access to clean and treated water 
Provided for 360,000 additional households by 2012. This will 
- mean in Sabah and Sarawak, the percentage of rural houses with 
access to clean or treated water will reach approximately 60% in 
2012 and 89% in 2012. 
Finding least cost and fast ways to deliver through usage of 
alternative sources like tube wells, gravity wells or rain water 
recovery for areas that are distant from reticulation networks 
Improved communications amongst government agencies, 
contractors and consultants speeded up construction works on site, 
thus creating effective and high intensity workforces throughout 
project periods. 
Provide access to 24 hour electricity 
140,000 additional households to enjoy 24-hour electricity by 2012 
By the end of 2012, 82% of households in Sabah and 73% of 
households in Sarawak will have access to electricity. 
Leverage on distributed power generation technologies like solar 
hybrid power generation or micro hydro-electricity for areas distant 
from electricity generation and transmission infrastructure. 
Source: PEMANDU, (2012). 
Table 60 Addressing cost of living 
Institutional level Institutional reforms 
Level 1: Norms; rules; Status quo. 
conventions; habits and 
values·; ideology 
Level 2: markets; Development ofKedai Rakyat lMalaysia (KRlM)- approximately 
states; corporate 250 KRlM labelled essential products can be bought 30.-50% 
hierarchies; cheaper than normal stores/hypermarkets. Currently 5 stores in 
communities Klang Valley with another 22 to be opened by end 2011 . 
Menu Rakyat 1Malaysia - RM2 for breakfast; RM4 for lunch; 
Currently there are 700 participating outlets and to be extended to 
3000 outlets by end 2012. 
Commercial Agro Fund: 
253 
Institutional level 
Level 3: Healthcare 
system 
Level 5: Statutes; 
administrative 
decisions; the nature, 
quantity and the 
quality of industrial 
products; sectoral and 
societal performance 
Institutional reforms 
Ensuring sufficient food supply, increasing the value-added of the 
agro-food sector, complementing and strengthening the supply 
chain 
RMl.1 billion has been allocated in 2012 for the development of 
the agriculture sector to fund key projects such as the Northern 
Terengganu Integrated Agricultural Development Project, Sabah 
and Sarawak Irrigation projects, TEKUN and NKEA projects; 
Expansion of the Commercial Agriculture Fund which will be 
given an allocation of RM300 million tQ include innovative 
agriculture projects; 
Contract farming programme in ensuring sufficient food supply. 
This programme will be handled by the Federal Agricultural 
Marketing Authority (FAMA), where agricultural produce will be 
marketed directly through FAMA to farmers' markets across the 
country 
A total of 4,500 ' agro-entrepreneurs ' are expected to be involved 
encompassing 7,000 hectares ofland. For this, an allocation of 
RM14 million will be provided. 
Open 30 units of Agro Bazaar Kedai Rakyat to promote local 
agriculture products and promote 1 Malaysia brand products 
Klinik I Malaysia - treatment for basic ailments is available for 
Malaysians at RMI and RMI 5 for non-Malaysians. Clinics are 
opened in high density, low income areas to ensure that the Rakyat 
always have access to reliable and immediate medical attention. To 
have 50 clinics nationwide with approximately 3 - 4 clinics in each 
state. 
Incentives/Cash assistance: 
Incentives for taxi drivers 
Cash assistance of RM500 for all households with income of 
RM3 ,000 and below; 
RMI 00 cash assistance for every school going child from Year 1 to 
Form 5 nationwide. Claiming of the assistance should be at the 
discretion of the parents who need the assistance; 
RM200 book voucher to all Malaysian students in public or private 
local institutions or higher learning, matriculation and Form 6 
students nationwide 
I Malaysia Rakyat' s Welfare Programme (KARI SMA): 
Assistance for poor Senior Citizens of RM300 per month 
Assistance for poor children of RM100, maximum RM450 per 
month per household; 
Assistance and allowance for disabled people between RM150 and 
RM300 per month. 
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Institutional level Institutional reforms 
Special housing fund - aimed to assist fi shermen due to their 
volatile income and with the aim of ensuring that they own their 
own homes. 
Source: PEMANDU, (2012). 
Table 61 Banking groups in Malaysia after consolidation 
10 Anchor Banks Merger Groups 
Malayan Banking Mayban Finance Bhd, Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd, PhileoAllied 
Bhd (MayBank) Bank Bhd, Pacific Bank Bhd, Sime Finance Bhd and Kewangan 
Bersatu Bhd 
The Bumiputra - Bumiputra-Commerce Finance Bhd and Commerce International 
Commerce Bank Merchant Bankers Bhd 
Bhd 
RHB BankBhd RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers Bhd, Delta Finance Bhd and 
Interfinance Bhd 
Public Bank Public Bank Bhd, Public Finance Bhd, Hock Hua Bank Bhd, Advance 
Finance Bhd and Sime Merchant Bankers Bhd 
The Arab Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd, Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd, 
Malaysian Bank Bank Utama Malaysia Bhd and Utama Merchant Bankers Bhd 
Bhd(AMMB) 
Hong Leong Bank Hong Leong Finance Bhd, Wah Tat Bank Bhd and Credit Corporation 
Bhd Malaysia Bhd 
Perwira Affin Bank Affin Finance Bhd, Perwira Affin Merchant Bankers Bhd, BSN 
Bhd Commercial Bank Bhd, BSN Finance Bhd and BSN Merchant Bank 
Bhd 
Multi-Purpose International Bank Malaysia Bhd, Sabah Bank Berhad, MBfFinance 
Bank Bhd Bhd, Bolton Finance Bhd, Sabah Finance Bhd, Bumiputra Merchant 
Bankers Bhd and Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd 
EONBankBhd EON Finance Bhd, Oriental Bank Bhd, City Finance Bhd, Perkasa 
Finance Bhd and Malaysian International Merchant Bankers Bhd 
Southern Bank Bhd Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd, Cempaka Finance Bhd, United Merchant 
Finance Bhd, Perdana Finance Bhd and Perdana Merchant Bankers 
Bhd 
Source: Muhamed-Zulkibri Abdul Majid et al. , 2006 
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